Flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

The flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainian: Прапор УПА, romanized: Prapor UPA), also known as the red-and-black flag (Ukrainian: Червоно-чорний прапор, romanized: Chervono-chornyi prapor) or Ukrainian nationalist flag, is a flag previously used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and now used by various Ukrainian nationalist organizations and parties, including UNA-UNSO, Right Sector, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and others.

In Poland, the flag is widely associated with the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. The meaning of the flag in Ukraine has shifted over time in response to the 2014 Russian invasion and it is frequently used today as an unofficial war flag.

According to historian Jars Balan, the colors themselves can be traced back to 12th century Slavic songs and poetry where red meant love and black sorrow, with this earlier symbolism intertwining the two.^[1]

Andriy Grechylo argues that the red-black color scheme heralds back to the Zaporozhian Cossacks, evidenced by the 1880-1891 painting Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks where it can be seen next to the blue-and-yellow draped spear.^[2][3]

The 1914-1917 Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS) embroidered the color scheme on their uniforms and banners and it was also used by the Knights of the Iron Spur, a chivalric order set up by USS officers in autumn 1916.^[4][5]

The colors were adopted by the Plast kurins Forest Devils (Lisovi Chorty) in 1922 and the Order of the Iron Spur, revived in 1927.^[6] The sports society "Ukraine" used the colors in the 1920s and 1930s in its emblem and kit.^[7]

The revolutionary faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was also called the OUN-B or the Banderites (because it was headed by Stepan Bandera), sought to develop its own symbolism in order to differ from the OUN-M of Andriy Melnyk, which used the blue flag of the OUN and the coat of arms with a golden trident (tryzub) with a sword.

The OUN-B adopted a red and black emblem, and at the II Great Gathering of the OUN in April 1941 decided to abandon the trident with a sword and use only "the national Trident of Volodymyr the Great in the form introduced by the Central Rada" and "a separate organizational flag of black and red colors. The way of life and the mandatory proportions will be adopted by a separate commission."^[8] However, due to the outbreak of World War II, this commission never met.^[9][10]

The flag received a lot of usage after the Independence of Ukraine in 1991, where it became a common symbol of Ukrainian nationalists.^[11] It has also been frequently used as a military symbol and unofficial war flag during the Russo-Ukrainian War.^[1]

When it was adopted in 1941, the flag symbolised Blut und Boden with the red symbolising blood shed in the struggle for Ukrainian spiritual values and the black symbolising chernozem soil as a naturalistic metaphor for the "homeland", as well as serving as a reference to the peasant base of the OUN-B.^[12][13]

In Poland, the red-and-black flag is widely associated with the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia committed by the UPA.^[14][15][16]

The massacres were cited to justify Operation Vistula in the propaganda of the Polish People's Republic and continue to be the focus of memory politics in contemporary Poland, largely driven by right-wing groups and politicians.^[17][18] The degree to which the massacres fully constitute a genocide remains controversial in Polish political discourse.^[19] According to Grzegorz Motyka, there has been a "growing radicalism" in Polish views on Polish–Ukrainian relations with the massacres often portrayed as a "third genocide" sometimes surpassing those committed by the Nazis and Communists.^[20]

In August 2025, President Karol Nawrocki proposed legislation that would ban "Banderite symbols", including the red-and-black flag, on par with Nazi and Soviet Communist emblems.^[21][22]

The Ukrainian far-right adopted the red-and-black flag in the aftermath of Ukrainian independence in 1991.^[23] The flag remained controversial and came to be associated with the UPA and Right Sector.^[24]

According to Serhy Yekelchyk, the image of Stepan Bandera acquired a new meaning in the course of the Revolution of Dignity as a symbol of resistance to the corrupt Russian-sponsored regime, set apart from the historical role of Bandera as a supporter of ethnonationalism— this symbolism as it relates to the red-and-black flag was further strengthened when Right Sector formed military units that fought in Eastern Ukraine.^[25] Andrii Portnov argues that this was facilitated by a rejection of Russia's portrayal of Ukrainians as 'fascists' and 'Banderites' and a general lack of knowledge about the activity of the UPA.^[24]

According to political scientist and historian Georgiy Kasianov, the nationalist memory narrative of the OUN and UPA as 'independence fighters against two totalitarian regimes' became an integral part of a "nationalist heroic myth" aimed at mobilising against Russian aggression.^[26] This narrative received strong state support between 2014 and 2018 with the slogan, flag, and anthem of the OUN promoted in broader liberation discourse while the totalitarian nature of the original OUN-B was concealed.^[27] The red-and-black flag was heavily promoted by Svoboda at the local level where the party was more successful— in Central Ukraine, it was referred to as the "flag of the struggle" rather than the more controversial "flag of the OUN".^[28]

Despite the successful rehabilitation of symbols used by the far-right, these parties were unable to translate their symbolic capital into political achievements— these groups received 0.7% of the presidential vote and six seats in the Verkhovna Rada in the 2014 elections and, in 2019, 1.6% and one seat respectively.^[31] According to Kasianov, positive attitudes towards nationalist formations surged in 2014–2017 and 2022 when many Ukrainians perceived the OUN and UPA in the context of Russia's aggression.^[32]

According to historian Jars Balan, the red-and-black flag has been used since the full-scale invasion by those who want to identify with the tradition of militant Ukrainian nationalism and who "respect the fact that the OUN and UPA took up arms in the struggle for Ukrainian independence".^[1]

• A ribbon imitating the flag of the OUN-B is present on the flag of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.
• Flag of Right Sector.
• Flag of Hai-Shevchenkivski.
• On 30 March 2018, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine registered a bill "On the Flag of National Dignity", which provides for the installation of a flag on government buildings, schools, institutes, enterprises nine times a year during the celebration of certain memorable dates in order to honor "heroes who made a significant contribution to the struggle for independence of Ukraine". This bill also provides for the technical justification and rules for the installation of the flag.^[33]
• On 24 May 2020, near the building of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration, during the "Stop Revenge" action, employees of a contractor fenced off a place near the Regional State Administration and began preparatory work to install a 12-meter flagpole for the red-black flag.^[34] The head of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council Svyatoslav Oliynyk called these actions a provocation.^[35] On 28 May 2020, four veterans of the War in Donbas solemnly raised the flag^[36] as a symbol of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence at an action initiated by the headquarters of the "Movement of Resistance to Surrender". The flagpole with the flag was installed on the basis of Agreement No. 116/20М dated 15 May 2020, between the KP "City Improvement Control Department" of the Dnipro City Council and the "Infoprostir" Social Technologies Center public organization.

The display of the red-and-black flag in Poland can result in police action as it may be associated with "the public promotion of fascism or another totalitarian system", which is forbidden by Article 256 of the Polish Penal Code.^[37] For that reason, Polish police searched for individuals accused of painting it on building facades in Wrocław in 2024.^[38] In the same city, police also questioned individuals who displayed the flag on a balcony in 2022.^[39]

In December 2024, Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, intervened with the Ukrainian attaché in Warsaw over flags displayed on Polish-donated Rosomak armored vehicles.^[40] Roman Ponomarenko, an officer of the 12th Azov Brigade commented on the matter, stating it was "an exploitation of historical conflict and narrative for the sake of cheap popularity".^[41]

In August 2025, during a concert by rapper Max Korzh at Warsaw's National Stadium, violence broke out. One of the attendees brandished a black-and-red flag. Over 100 people were detained by the police, and proceedings to expel 63 of them were initiated.^[42]

• Flag of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization

• Bruder, Franziska (2007). „Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!“ Die Organisation ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948 ["Fight for the Ukrainian State or Die!" The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) 1929–1948] (in German). Berlin: Metropol Verlag.

• Bujak, Piotr (2014). "Polityczne spory o upamiętnienie zbrodni na Wołyniu w polskim parlamencie" [Commemoration of the victims of Volhynia tragedy: Analysis of the Polish political discourse]. Border and Regional Studies (in Polish). 2 (1): 90–99.

• Glew, Anna (2021). "Commemoration in the midst of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict". British Journal for Military History. 7 (2): 148–165.

• Kasianov, Georgiy (2022). Memory Crash: Politics of History in and around Ukraine, 1980s–2010s. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press. ISBN 978-963-386-381-7.

• Kasianov, Georgiy (2023). "Nationalist Memory Narratives and the Politics of History in Ukraine since the 1990s" (PDF). Nationalities Papers. 52 (6). Cambridge University Press.

• Motyka, Grzegorz (2022). From the Volhynian Massacre to Operation Vistula. The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict 1943–1947. Paderborn: Brill.

• Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz (2014). Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult. Stuttgart: Ibidem Press. ISBN 978-3-8382-0604-2.

• Wilson, Andrew (1996). Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-052-157-457-0.