Convoy ON 67

Convoy ON 67 was a trade convoy of merchant ships that sailed during the Second World War. It was the 67th of the numbered series of ON convoys Outbound from the British Isles to North America. The ships departed from Liverpool on 14 February 1942 with the convoy rescue ship Toward (1923, 1,571 GRT) and were escorted to the Mid-Ocean Meeting Point by Escort Group B4.^[1][2]

On 19 February Escort Group A6 (the US naval task unit TU 4.1.5) comprising Gleaves-class destroyers USS Edison and Nicholson, Wickes-class destroyers USS Lea and Bernadou and the Canadian Flower-class corvette HMCS Algoma took over the escort from Escort Group B4.^[3] Edison's commanding officer, Commander Albert C. Murdaugh, USN, was the senior officer of the escort group.^[4] The escort group was conducting its first operation.^[5] Bernadou had been modified for long range escort work by replacing the fourth boiler and stack with an extra fuel tank.^[6]

Nicholson had the only functional radar, though the merchant ship Toward could provide support with its High-frequency direction finding (HF/DF, Huff-Duff) set.^[4] Lea carried a British ASV aircraft radar with fixed antennae, but salt water spray kept shoring the coaxial cable.^[7] Edison had no depth charge throwers, and was limited to a linear pattern rolled off the stern.^[8] The US ships did not have enough binoculars. Bernadou had a 7×50 pair for the officer of the deck and a 6×30 pair for the junior officer of the deck but there were none for the lookouts.^[9] The escort was reinforced on 26 February by the Treasury-class cutter USCGC Spencer.^[10]

U-155 reported the convoy on 21 February.^[11] Toward obtained a bearing on the contact report, and Lea searched the bearing unsuccessfully at dusk.^[12] U-155 approached the port quarter of the convoy in the pre-dawn hours of 22 February, torpedoed the British tanker Adellen, the Norwegian freighter Sama and both ships sank quickly.^[12][13] Algoma rescued eleven of Adellen's crew of 31 while Nicholson and Toward found 20 survivors from Sama's crew of 50.^[12][13] U-155 crash-dived to avoid Bernadou but the U-boat was not spotted.^[12] U-155 made another emergency dive while shadowing the convoy at 10:42 but Edison did not detect the U-boat. U-587, U-69 and U-558 found the convoy on 23 February.

U-558 approached the convoy at 21:20, but repeatedly turned away to avoid Bernadou's patrols until a squall provided cover at midnight. U-558 torpedoed the Norwegian tanker Inverarder at 00:45 on 24 February.^[13][14] The tanker sank slowly and Toward rescued all 42 of the crew. U-558 approached again at 02:30 and fired a single torpedo at Edison.^[14] The torpedo missed, and Edison was unaware it had been fired at.^[14] U-558 torpedoed the Norwegian tanker Eidanger at 02:55.^[14] U-558 reloaded and at 05:50 torpedoed the British tankers Anadara, Finnanger, and the British freighter White Crest.^[13][15] All three ships straggled and were sunk. Later that morning, the convoy commodore sent a signal to the escort commander regarding the performance of U-558: "That chap must be one of their best ones. I do hope you have done him in".^[8]

U-158 found the convoy at 04:25 hrs on 24 February and torpedoed the British tanker Empire Celt.^[14] Empire Celt was using the Admiralty Net Defence system, streaming a strong steel net from 50 ft (15 m) booms along either side of the ship. One torpedo broke through the net and hit amidships. Empire Celt later broke in half, but a tug from Newfoundland rescued 31 from the crew of 37.^[16][10]

As U-558 was torpedoing ships on the starboard side of the convoy, U-158 approached the port side and hit the British tanker Diloma at 06:35.^[17] Diloma was the only one of the torpedoed ships to reach Halifax.^[10] U-158 and U-558 dived to avoid being seen in the early daylight.^[18] U-558 found and sank the Eidanger, drifting and abandoned astern of the convoy, with gunfire and a torpedo.^[18] All of Eidangers crew had been rescued.^[13] Lea investigated a DF bearing from Toward at 15:15 and spotted U-558 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi) astern of the convoy at 17:07. Lea dropped eight depth charges at 17:46, surprised the U-boat on the surface at 18:13 and dropped 14 depth charges at 18:47 but U-558 was undamaged.^[19]

Nicholson investigated a DF bearing from Toward and sighted U-158 at 13:23. U-158 dived and evaded Nicholson that slowed to listen. U-158 surfaced at 15:50 and was surprised to find Nicholson waiting 4,900 ft (1,500 m) away. U-158 crashed-dived before Nicholson saw the U-boat. U-158 surfaced again at 18:17 and was surprised to find Edison 2,000 yd (1,800 m) away. U-158 again avoided detection by crash-diving. Edison spotted U-158 making another convoy approach at 20:08 and dropped 25 depth charges over the following six hours. U-158 was undamaged but had been prevented from making further attacks on the convoy.^[19] Admiral Karl Dönitz, BdU (commander in chief of U-Boats) ordered his U-boats to discontinue the attack on 25 February.^[10] The remainder of the convoy reached Halifax on 1 March 1942.^[20]

In 1997, Clay Blair wrote that Murdaugh was awarded a medal for "particularly outstanding" conduct in the defence of the convoy. Blair called the defence a disaster and an embarrassment for the US Navy. Eight British ships (including six tankers) of about 55,000 GRT had been sunk and another tanker damaged. Dönitz wrote that the results were "particularly satisfactory", given the number of inexperienced U-boat captains involved. Dönitz judged that pack attacks could be resumed when there were sufficient U-boats to find convoys, shadow them and attack en masse. Reports of the anti-torpedo nets on Empire Celt caused consternation that a ship streaming nets could achieve 9–10 kn (17–19 km/h; 10–12 mph) and demanded that a new magnetic pistol, to explode torpedoes under a ship be prepared. A new design was being tested but the scientists wanted the new exploder to be perfect, given the draconian punishments meted out to the inventors of the first type.^[21] In 2004, David Woodman wrote that the losses suffered by the convoy was an embarrassment to the US Navy and the seven hours it took the naval headquarters in Washington (seven hours) to agree a course change requested by Murdaugh was clearly inadequate and the staff of the Commander-in-Chief agreed after the convoy that discretion should be delegated to the escort commander. The usefulness of radar and Huff-Duff was demonstrated and the need for a procedure for depth-charge attacks and more training in exploiting Asdic contacts was accepted.^[22]

The convoy suffered the loss of 123 merchant sailors.^[22]

• Convoy Battles of World War II

• Boog, H.; Rahn, W.; Stumpf, R.; Wegner, B. (2001) [1990]. Der globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel zur Initiative 1941 bis 1943 [Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943]. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Germany and the Second World War). Vol. VI. Translated by Osers, Ewald; Brownjohn, John; Crampton, Patricia; Willmot, Louise (eng. trans. Cambridge University Press, London ed.). Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt for the Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt. ISBN 0-19-822888-0.
• Milner, Marc (1985). North Atlantic Run. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-450-0.