Convoy PQ 13

Convoy PQ 13 was a British Arctic convoy that delivered war supplies from the Western Allies to the USSR during the Second World War. The convoy was subject to attack by German air, U-boat and surface forces and suffered the loss of five ships and an escort vessel. Fifteen ships arrived safely.

In October 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver 1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by 2,000 tanks and another 3,600 aircraft more than already promised.^[1][a] The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjordur, Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.^[3]

By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who liaised with the escort commander and directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships.^[4][b]

The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, naval Headache personnel, with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions, were embarked on warships. ^[6]

The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.^[7] B-Dienst broke Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic.^[8]

As soon as information was received about the assembly of a convoy, Fliegerführer Nord (West) would send long-range reconnaissance aircraft to search Iceland and northern Scotland. Once a convoy was spotted, aircraft were to keep contact as far as possible in the extreme weather of the area. If contact was lost its course at the last sighting would be extrapolated and overlapping sorties would be flown to regain contact. All three Fliegerführer were to co-operate as the convoy moved through their operational areas. Fliegerführer Lofoten would begin the anti-convoy operation east to a line from the North Cape to Spitzbergen Island, whence Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) would take over using his and the aircraft of Fliegerführer Lofoten, that would fly to Kirkenes or Petsamo to stay in range. Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) was not allowed to divert aircraft to ground support during the operation. As soon as the convoy came into range, the aircraft were to keep up a continuous attack until the convoy docked at Murmansk or Arkhangelsk. ^[9]

The Luftwaffe Sea Rescue Service (Seenotdienst) along with the Kriegsmarine, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprised Seenotbereich VIII at Stavanger covering Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim and Seenotbereich IX at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations if people were to be saved before they succumbed to the climate and severe weather. The sea rescue aircraft comprised Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, Dornier Do 18s and Dornier Do 24 seaplanes. Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, the high command of the Luftwaffe) was not able to increase the number of search and rescue aircraft in Norway, due to a general shortage of aircraft and crews, despite Stumpff pointing out that coming down in such cold waters required extremely swift recovery and that his crews "must be given a chance of rescue" or morale could not be maintained.^[10]

Convoy PQ 13 comprised seven British ships, including the tanker SS Scottish American, four US freighters, one Polish, four of Panamanian and one ship of Honduran registry. The Convoy Commodore was D. A. Casey in River Afton. The convoy was escorted for the first stage of its voyage, from its departure from Loch Ewe in Scotland on 10 March to Iceland, by a Local Escort Group, comprising two destroyers and an ASW trawler. For the second stage, from Iceland to the Soviet Union, departing on 20 March, the convoy had an ocean escort of two destroyers and two trawlers, augmented by three whalers being transferred to the Soviet Navy. The Ocean escort was commanded by Capt. Leslie Saunders, in the cruiser HMS Trinidad.^[11]

In support of the convoy escort, guarding against a sortie by the German battleship Tirpitz, was a Heavy Cover Force from the Home Fleet, comprising the battleships Duke of York (Vice Admiral Alban Curteis commanding) King George V, battlecruiser Renown, aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, the cruisers Kent and Edinburgh and sixteen destroyers, Ashanti, Bedouin, Echo, Escapade, Eskimo, Faulknor, Foresight, Icarus, Inglefield, Ledbury, Marne, Middleton, Onslow, Punjabi, Tartar and Wheatland. The Heavy Cover Force was to follow the track of the convoy at long distance, until the convoy was past Bear Island and then cover Convoy QP 9 the reciprocal convoy.^[12]

The first stage escort, three ships bound from Reykjavík to Murmansk and the close escort for the voyage, joined Convoy PQ 13 and sailed from Reykjavík on 20 March. The convoy was helped by a powerful south-westerly wind and soon after noon on 23 March, when around 120 nmi (220 km; 140 mi) to the south-east of Jan Mayen the convoy turned to the east after the Admiralty had received a decrypted Enigma signal giving the position of U-boat search line and during the unscheduled turn, the fleet oiler Oligarch and its escort, Lamerton made rendezvous with the Home Fleet to fuel its destroyer escorts.^[13]

At noon, when at 69°20′N, 00°20′E, the convoy turned back to the north-east for Bear Island but the diversion had brought nearer to the Luftwaffe base at Bardufoss and was 40 nmi (74 km; 46 mi) further on than planned and was making nearly 9 kn (17 km/h; 10 mph); the heavy Home Fleet covering force was on a parallel course about 250 nmi (460 km; 290 mi) further back. Trinidad sailed away from the convoy to the south-east for the night and during the long night of the Arctic winter, the wind rose to a gale and began to blow from the north-east. The merchant ships had serious trouble in station-keeping as the gale blew head-on, filling the air with spray, reducing visibility, making the ships wallow and take on more water. The cold froze the water that did not drain through the scuppers and stuck to the superstructure, masts, aerials and guns.^[14]

The convoy was disrupted by the storm; keeping a look-out became difficult, affecting station-keeping, ships had to be steered taking in the view from one wave peak to the next and while not requiring exceptional seamanship the convoy began to lose formation. The convoy escorts had their own problems, the smaller ships bucking and rolling. The misery of the destroyer crews, many of them inexperienced wartime conscripts and pre-war yachtsmen, was exceptionally bad. men on duty had no hot food to go with the cold, wet and the gyrations of the superstructure.^[15]

During the evening, Saunders broke wireless silence to the Admiralty and to Rear-Admiral Richard Bevan the Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia, then broadcast a convoy rally point to the south of Bear Island for 27 March. In the afternoon of 26 March, Ballot, Empire Starlight, Induna and Silja, claimed a German aircraft shot down. The group was later joined by Dunboyne, Effingham and Mana, the eastern-most segment of the convoy. A long way to the south-west, the aircraft carrier Victorious and the destroyer Tartar had been damaged in the storm and the Home Fleet ships had turned for home.^[15]

By dawn on 27 March, the storm had been blowing for 36 hours and none of the ships were near the rally point. An Admiralty signal warning of a surface attack arrived and that the senior officer of the escort was to gather the merchant ships. Before noon, Fury received a signal from Sumba that it was 50 nmi (93 km; 58 mi) north-east of Bear Island, making little headway and was running out of fuel. The captain turned west-south-west to follow the signal bearing, found Sumba at 4:00 p.m. and refuelled Sumba with a pipe over the stern.^[16] The ships were sitting ducks for the hours it took to refuel the whaler.^[17][c]

To the south, River Afton could make no headway or steer less than 60° off the wind direction, bringing the ship ever closer to Lofoten Islands, until the gale diminished around noon, then it began a solo run to Murmansk.^[16] During the worst of the storm, HMS Nigeria a Fiji-class cruiser, covering the reciprocal Convoy QP 9 west of Bear Island, was about 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) south-west of the island, when it met Trinidad, that had possibly seen Empire Ranger the evening before. Trinidad had found Harpalion and another ship and the destroyer Eclipse found one ship and another five that had kept together, south of the escorts and north of River Afton.^[16]

By 8:30 a.m. the storm had ended, leaving clear skies and sunshine. Overnight, Trinidad had accelerated and headed eastwards and came upon Empire Ranger 8 nmi (15 km; 9.2 mi) north of the North Cape (Nordkapp). Trinidad turned about to unite with th two destroyers, due to the possibility of meeting a German naval sortie. About 40 nmi (74 km; 46 mi) there was an advanced group of ships comprising Ballot, Dunboyne, Effingham, Empire Starlight, Induna and Mana, with the whaler Silja and the ASW trawler Blackfly; 35 nmi (65 km; 40 mi) further west were Fury and Harpalion. Eclipse the trawler Paynter, Sumba and five freighters with the tanker Scottish American were 60 nmi (110 km; 69 mi) behind. At 10:05 a.m. Trinidad fired on a BV 138 reconnaissance aircraft, that replied with "Your shots are falling short". Trinidad reached Fury and Harpalion and turned east at 11:25 a.m. All the ships of Convoy PQ 13 were well within range of the Luftwaffe airfield at Banak, some ships no further than 150 nmi (280 km; 170 mi) away. Admiral Hubert Schmundt the Admiral Nordmeer ordered the German destroyers Z24, Z25 and Z26 to sail from Kirkenes. The destroyers were carried four 150 mm naval guns each, torpedoes and had a nominal speed of over 35 kn (65 km/h; 40 mph), a formidable challenge to Trinidad that carried twelve BL 6-inch Mk XXIII naval guns and was slower.^[18]

Paynter was attacked by aircraft at 11:27 a.m. and Junkers Ju 88s dive-bombed the eastern group of ships, near-missing Mana and Ballot that was shaken so badly that the captain ordered the crew to make ready to abandon ship as it lost steam and fell back. The captain ordered 16 men to transfer to Silja by lifeboat. Just after midday, Raceland was bombed and sunk; Trinidad had made occasional radar sweeps to find ships and at 1:15 p.m. detected an aircraft that dived out of cloud and near-missed Trinidad with three bombs. After an hour, more Ju 88s made a more determined attack and near-misses damaged the main wireless transmitters. The captain dodged into mist banks and the gunners put up a tremendous barrage.^[18]

As the bombers turned away, Harpalion reported an air attack but got away with minor damage. At 7:30 p.m. just before dark, Empire Ranger was caught by bombers at 32°10′E, 72°13′N near the Kola Inlet. The ship sent a distress signal and Blackfly was sent to search for survivors but found nothing when it arrived the next day. Early in the night, Trinidad and Fury moved to the south of Point Tango (72°25′N, 30°00′E) a way-point on the convoy route and rendezvous with the Eastern Local Escort, due to arrive from Murmansk at 8:00 a.m. on 29 March. The point was mid-way between the two big groups of ships, intended to protect them, relying on radar for warning.^[18]

The German destroyer flotilla sailed northwards until reaching a position east of the point where Empire Ranger had been sunk. Pönitz had the destroyers turn west to sail in line abreast at 3 nmi (5.6 km; 3.5 mi) intervals at 15 kn (28 km/h; 17 mph) in the dark and at 10:45 p.m. came upon the survivors of Empire Ranger in their lifeboats, rescued them and resumed the sweep. At 12:30 a.m. came across Bateau, sank it with gunfire and torpedoes and took the survivors prisoner. The rescued mariners talked freely about the state of the convoy but mentioned two cruisers and four destroyers. The German flotilla turned south-east at 25 kn (46 km/h; 29 mph), Pönitz, under the impression that they were too far to the north, then having found nothing, turned north at 5:30 a.m. and kept this course for three hours. At 2:00 a.m. Trinidad and Fury were sailing to the north-east to close on the eastern group of ships and Position Tango and just after dawn, at 4:00 a.m., on 29 March, observers on Trinidad spotted something about 4 nmi (7.4 km; 4.6 mi) distant, hard to identify in the haze and three salvos were fired at it in case it was a U-boat then fire was cased in case it was a lifeboat from Empire Ranger but it submerged and the British ships turned west as the Eastern Local Escort of HMS Oribi and the Soviet destroyers Gremyashchiy and Sokrushitelny arrived.^[19]

Trinidad and the destroyers carried on to the west, looking for Eclipse and its part of the convoy, quickly finding debris from Empire Ranger and four empty lifeboats. Eclipse came into view at 6:30 a.m. with Paynter and Sumba escorting Eldena, El Estero, Empire Cowper, Gallant Fox, Mormacmar, New Westminster City, Scottish American and Tobruk. The Soviet destroyers joined the escorts and Oribi searched 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi) looking for stragglers. Trinidad and Fury turned south-east to look for the eastern group. By 8:30 a.m. the German flotilla was ahead of the convoy route. The eastern group had already passed as the German destroyers increased speed to 17 kn (31 km/h; 20 mph) to search to the west. Trinidad and Fury heading east at 20 kn (37 km/h; 23 mph) between the Germans and the western group and its escorts.^[20]

On 30 March four Halcyon-class minesweepers of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla, Gossamer, Harrier, Hussar and Speedwell arrived after sailing from Murmansk on 28 March. U-209 and U-456 fired torpedoes but failed to hit any of the ships. Induna was sunk by U-376 and Effingham by U-435. On 1 April U-436 sank a straggler, probably the whaler HMS Sulla and U-589 fired at and missed a destroyer. Fury obtained an asdic contact, thought to be a U-boat, attacked it and was credited with the destruction of U-585.^[21][d] The last stragglers reached port on 1 April. Six ships had been lost from the convoy.^[22]

Five ships sunk caused alarm at the Admiralty and to Admiral John Tovey, the commander of the Home Fleet who predicted that the Germans were assembling a maximum effort against the Arctic convoys. In 2025, Andrew Boyd wrote that the Naval Intelligence Division produced an accurate assessment of the German operation against the convoy that gave emphasis to the German change to a combined arms model of anti-shipping operations. The storm that disrupted the convoy and the fact that only unescorted stragglers had been sunk was noted, as was the fact that the loss of a destroyer and a U-boat made the German success a costly one. The captain of Trinidad reported that the speed in which it disabled the destroyer Z 26 was due to its Type 284 radar that had done all that was expected of it. The increasing numbers of aircraft and submarines would make convoys more vulnerable, especially during the forthcoming longer days and better weather of the Arctic summer, when the ships would still be limited by the polar ice from sailing further from the Norwegian coast.^[23]

The Convoy PQ 13 – Convoy QP 9 escort operation exposed the British lack of destroyers for convoy escort. When destroyers were committed to screening the aircraft carriers and battleships of the Home Fleet, not many were left for convoys and this was made worse by the decision that henceforth convoys must have ten escorts. Ships had been drawn from Western Approaches Command (WAC) when necessary but the Admiralty decided on a permanent policy of the WAC being responsible for finding most of the close escorts. If the Arctic convoy route maintained a 14-day departure schedule, at least 10 per cent of the destroyers of the WAC would be involved in the convoys, potentially forgoing an Atlantic convoy and its reciprocal. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, the professional head of the navy, had the same concerns a Tovey and on 10 April, after the departure of Convoy PQ 14 he said to the other service chiefs of staff that convoys had not been dispatched against the new extent. of air and submarine attack.^[24]

The advantage of geography lay with the Germans and more losses of ships and escorts could make the convoys impossible to maintain. In comparison with Operation Halberd (24–27 September 1941) in the Mediterranean, the sailing of fortnightly Arctic convoys put far more strain on the escorts; the ships were vulnerable to air, surface and submarine attack, the operations took place far from friendly bases and the Arctic convoys had little benefit from land-based air cover. The Soviet Northern Fleet was never able to emulate the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Fleet Air Arm (FAA) effort from Malta. Pound took the view that despite the difficulties, delivering supplies should remain a maximum effort. In 2025, Andrew Boyd wrote that perhaps Pound underestimated the difficulties that the Germans faced. Kriegsmarine ships were also far from adequate anchorages and repair facilities and were suffering from an acute fuel shortage, that was well known to the British from Ultra decrypts.^[25]

The position of the British in the war at sea was at its lowest ebb. The Shark cypher was introduced on 1 February, the U-boats along the east coast of the US were enjoying the Second Happy Time, the Regia Marina had gained control over the central Mediterranean and the Imperial Japanese Navy had the Indian Ocean at its mercy. On 5 March Pound met the defence committee and said,

If we lose the war at sea, we lose the war. We lose the war at sea when we can no longer maintain those communications which are essential to us.^[25]

when claiming more air support. A few days afterwards, the War Cabinet noted that convoy protection was an increasing problem with an increase in US ships for the Arctic route, with possibly 40 ships per month arriving at Iceland for the navy to escort to the USSR. If the 12 British ships were counted as well, this amounted to convoys of 25 ships every two weeks. The Home Fleet could escort convoys no larger than this and that it would be better to run monthly convoys. The First Protocol was due to expire in June and after the loss to Convoy QP 10 of two ships to aircraft and two to U-boats, it was agreed that the increasing danger to the convoys should be stressed o the Soviet authorities.^[26]

The German analysis of the anti-shipping operation was far from triumphant. The Seekriegsleitung (SKL, Naval Command) view was that five ships sunk was insufficient compensation for the loss of Z 26 and most of its crew, given the acute shortage of destroyers. Without adequate intelligence of British naval movements and with the chronic fuel shortage there was no possibility of committing the big ships to an operation. The ease with which Trinidad had knocked out Z 26 with radar-directed gunnery was another cause for concern.^[23]

The Germans sank five freighters, Trinidad was damaged and the German destroyer Z26 had been sunk. Fourteen ships had arrived safely, more than two-thirds of the convoy. The freighter SS Tobruk was credited with shooting down one bomber and another probable on 30 April.^[27] The Germans had lost U-655 on 23 March, when attacking Convoy QP 9, having been rammed by HMS Sharpshooter a Halcyon class minesweeper, the only German offensive effort against the convoy. U-585 was sunk on 30 March by a loose mine off the Rybachy Peninsula.^[28]

After SS Ballott was attacked on 28 March 1942, 16 members of the crew launched a lifeboat, were taken on board Silja and then transferred to Induna.

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• Convoy PQ 13 at Convoyweb
• Order of Battle-PQ13
• Helgason, Guðmundur. "PQ 13". German U-boats of WWII - uboat.net.
• SS Raceland