2009 United States attacks in Yemen

In 2009, the United States conducted missile strikes in Yemen against targets associated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The attacks, endorsed by the Yemeni government after months of negotiations for military intervention, were a culmination of the Barack Obama administration's increasing concern with the threat posed by AQAP.

Under the codename Operation Copper Dune, the US military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) launched Tomahawk missiles at two locations in Yemen on December 17. The main target was in the village of al-Majalah, which was believed to be hosting an AQAP training camp preparing to attack the local US embassy. The cluster missiles killed an estimated 14 militants, including ringleader Mohammed al-Kazemi, but also 41 civilians from two families living in huts near the AQAP camp.^[b] An AQAP safehouse in the area of Arhab was also bombed, but the targeted militant Qasim al-Raymi had escaped. A separate missile strike took place on December 24 targeting AQAP leaders Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Said Ali al-Shihri, and possibly Anwar al-Awlaki, at a compound in Rafadh, but none of them were among the five killed. An inquiry into the al-Majalah attack approved of by the Yemeni parliament cited a targeting error as the cause of civilian casualties. The Yemeni government agreed to compensate the victims by 2013.

Yemen publicly claimed responsibility for the attacks, however several news reports at the time began disclosing American involvement, and months later an Amnesty International report was published including photographs taken at al-Majalah which showed munitions exclusively used by the US military. On November 28, 2010, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed a secret agreement between top US and Yemeni officials in which the Yemeni government agreed it would take responsibility for US military strikes, including the 2009 attacks.

The attacks, the first of a prolonged military campaign in Yemen, did not eliminate AQAP's core leadership or its immediate threat, demonstrated immediately afterwards with the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253. Furthermore, the excessive civilian casualties in al-Majalah outraged local Yemenis and alienated them from their own government as well as the US. AQAP used the anger over the al-Majalah strike to boost its recruiting.

In 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted a drone strike which killed al-Qaeda's head in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi.^[2] It was the first targeted killing outside of a conventional battlefield in the war on terror; after Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had leaked it to the public, the Yemeni government banned any further drone strikes in the country. Regardless, the elimination of Harithi along with the capture of other al-Qaeda leaders in the country by local security forces led to al-Qaeda being effectively dismantled in Yemen by 2004. The US thus shifted its attention to the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan, expecting countries such as Yemen and Somalia to act as safe havens for al-Qaeda core rather than independent theaters of the war on terror.^[3]

The Yemeni government similarly began concentrating on matters unrelated to al-Qaeda, such as the Houthi insurgency in the north and the emerging southern secessionist movement. At the same time, the US cut foreign aid to Yemen as relations between the countries had cooled. Development and outreach initiatives pursued by the American embassy and other non-governmental organizations in the tribal regions had faltered, leaving them vulnerable to al-Qaeda influence.^[4]

These conditions were exploited when a group of 23 jihadists escaped from a Political Security Organization prison in February 2006. The US focused on other, more notable escapees at the time,^[5] but it was Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Qasim al-Raymi who reorganized and led al-Qaeda in Yemen. Their ranks included a newer, more radicalized generation of jihadists intent on overthrowing the Yemeni government and refusing any dialogue with it. The group waged numerous attacks in Yemen throughout the following years at an increasing rate.^[2] By March 2008 it had begun attacking local American targets, culminating in an assault on the US embassy in Sanaa on September 17 which left 18 people dead. The attack, comparable in scale to the USS Cole bombing, served as "a wake-up call for all of Washington."^[6]

In January 2009, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was announced as a merger between the al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. During the year, the newly-founded group perpetrated several high-profile attacks in Yemen, notably a pair of bombings targeting South Korean nationals in March. Its regional threat was amplified after it claimed responsibility for an assassination attempt on Saudi prince Muhammad bin Nayef in August.^[7]

Barack Obama, the newly inaugurated President of the United States, had only been in office for a few days when a video announcing the formation of AQAP was released on January 23, 2009.^[8] Of particular concern to the US government was the fact that two of the four AQAP leaders featured in the video, Saudi nationals Said Ali al-Shihri and Muhammad al-Awfi, were previously incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. From the early stages of his presidency, Obama and his administration were intent on covert military intervention against AQAP in Yemen, though publicly their focus was still on addressing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.^[9] Incoming administration officials were in "complete shock" with the underdeveloped US intelligence network in Yemen in relation to the substantial threat from AQAP, underscored by the embassy attack the previous year.^[10]

Deputy homeland security advisor John Brennan was Obama's primary policy advisor regarding Yemen. The planned closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, a priority for the Obama administration, led to complications with the Yemeni government, as the US was reluctant to transfer Yemeni nationals detained at the camp to the latter's custody. Brennan's negotiations with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh to allow counterterrorism operations in the country were often linked to Saleh's demands regarding the detainees, who he used as bargaining chips.^[11]

Obama opted for a military-centric approach to Yemen, overseen by US Central Command head General David Petraeus and led by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under Vice Admiral William H. McRaven.^[11] McRaven initially envisioned a counterterrorism system similar to that in Iraq, where special forces would capture militant leaders, interrogate them, and utilize the newfound intelligence to launch further raids. He was forced to rethink his strategy as the Obama administration believed that Saleh would not permit a permanent US presence in the country or any sort of kill or capture-style operation.^[12] Petraeus authorized a directive in April for more expansive American military presence in Yemen, including unilateral strikes against AQAP.^[13]

Several senior American officials visited Yemen throughout 2009 to pressure Saleh into addressing the AQAP threat. Saleh, in turn, proved to be more cooperative with the Americans over time.^[10] During a meeting with CIA deputy director Steven Kappes in May which focused on intelligence cooperation, Saleh made clear that he considered AQAP his main priority rather than local threats such as the Houthis or the southern secessionists. Ambassador Stephen Seche later began informal negotiations for US aircraft to fly over Yemen's territorial waters under the pretense of combating weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. In July, Petraeus visited Saleh to both confirm a boost in foreign aid and urge him to directly combat AQAP. A raid by Yemeni special forces the next month targeting an AQAP cell was a failure, but assisted the US to portray the Yemeni government as directly on the frontlines against AQAP, disguising future US intervention.^[14]

The attempted assassination of Nayef further underscored with Washington the necessity of combating AQAP.^[15] When Brennan returned to Yemen in September, Saleh told him that he would grant the US authority to conduct unilateral counterterrorism operations in Yemen, on the condition that he was to avoid blame for any terrorist attacks by AQAP in response.^[10] This meeting effectively served as the go-ahead for the US government to begin authorizing special operations in Yemen. Later in the month, shortly after a meeting with Obama and other top officials, Petraeus signed off on the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order, a directive which authorized US special forces to conduct covert military operations outside of official battlefields such as Yemen.^[16] Petraeus' directive also permitted more expansive intelligence-gathering efforts by the military.^[15] In October, a meeting between McRaven and Saleh, ostensibly for discussing cooperation between Yemen and the US in combating AQAP, ended in Saleh granting McRaven's request for JSOC surveillance drones to fly over Yemen and for "the implementation of some special operations similar to what is happening in Pakistan and Somalia."^[17]

The drawdown in Iraq allowed JSOC to reassign more personnel to Yemen, leading to an expansion of the military and intelligence presence at the Sanaa embassy.^[15] The latter half of 2009 saw an uptick in analysts and agents arriving at the embassy to expand intelligence-gathering on AQAP. However, this also led to further difficulties and risks for agents operating in the country and attempting to infiltrate AQAP, resulting in US agencies turning to Yemeni human intelligence, which was viewed as less reliable. Signals intelligence was therefore prioritized, with eavesdropping by the local Special Collection Service station playing a large role.^[18]

By early December 2009, the intelligence community in Yemen had acquired evidence that AQAP was in the final stages of preparing terrorist attacks on undetermined local Western targets.^[19] According to National Counterterrorism Center head Michael Leiter, the US "surged resources for targeting in Yemen" in response, despite not knowing the specific threat.^[20] A months-long JSOC search determined that near the remote Abyan village of al-Majalah, where locals had seen surveillance aircraft passing by,^[21] AQAP commander Saleh Saleh Mohammed Ali al-Anbouri, better known as Mohammed al-Kazemi,^[22] was in charge of a training camp for suicide bombers who were likely planning to attack the local US embassy.^[23]

A former Afghan Arab, Kazemi had been arrested in 2005 by local authorities on charges related to terrorism and released in 2007. Afterwards, he and his family moved to al-Majalah and he claimed to have renounced jihadism.^[24] In contrast, American intelligence reports indicated that Kazemi was an operational commander within AQAP. These reports implicated Kazemi in the 2007 Marib bombing, and indicated that he was in the final stages of planning the embassy attack.^[25] Strong support for military action from Petraeus was tempered with caution from national security advisor James L. Jones, who was skeptical of the quality of US intelligence in the region. Obama approved military action to interdict the pending attack.^[26]

On December 16, McRaven headed an interagency video conference which proposed multiple targeted killings in Yemen conducted by JSOC within 24 hours.^[27] Under a top-secret special access program^[28] with the codename "Operation Copper Dune", JSOC planned to launch strikes against three targets given code names of several cities in Ohio. The primary target, Kazemi, was called Objective "Akron", and had been located at the training camp near al-Majalah, while Objectives "Toledo" and "Cleveland" were identified as additional targets.^[29] Petraeus had hastily included Cleveland as a target generated from fresh intelligence on their location.^[20] State Department and Department of Defense legal advisor's Harold Koh and Jeh Johnson were given 45 minutes in advance to review the intelligence on the targets and approve them from a legal perspective.^[30]

During the meeting, which involved around 75 security officials and lawyers, Johnson told deputy national security advisor Tom Donilon that he considered the strikes on Akron and Toledo legally permissible, but advised against Cleveland due to a higher likelihood of civilian casualties.^[31][20] The meeting also discussed the method of attack for the operation given that capturing the targets was not an option. It concluded that JSOC would utilize a US Navy submarine off the coast of Yemen armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles for the strikes.^[30] Soon after the meeting concluded JSOC launched surveillance aircraft to monitor the targets.^[28] Petraeus viewed live video feed from the locations at CENTCOM headquarters,^[32] while Johnson saw it from a command center at the Pentagon's "E" ring.^[31]

Both Koh and Johnson considered they were given too little time to provide informed legal advice on the strikes, and were pressured by the military into approving them via "their ability to create an atmosphere of do-or-die urgency".^[30][33] The pressure to act hastily was complicated by the limitations in place at the nearest US base in the region, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which did not permitted the military to launch armed drones from its territory.^[32] Most armed Predator and Reaper drones under JSOC control were deployed in Afghanistan, leaving less favoured cruise missiles as the only available option.^[34]

The strike on al-Majalah was described by a military official as a "JSOC operation with borrowed Navy subs, borrowed Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy surveillance aircraft and close coordination with CIA and DIA on the ground in Yemen. Counting the crew of the sub we're talking 350–400 [people] in the loop."^[36] Johnson recalled viewing live surveillance footage of militants running drills at the targeted training facility.^[31] Several other American officials who viewed the surveillance corroborated the claim.^[37]

Soon after the operation was authorized, a coded message was sent out to US vessels in the Arabian Sea.^[38] At 6:00 a.m. local time on December 17, as many as five BGM-109D Tomahawk missiles were launched by a US submarine at al-Majalah, hitting a rugged area on the edge of the village.^[39] Surveillance footage captured the destruction of the training camp along with the deaths of the previously seen militants.^[31] However, in addition to the camp, the bombings also encompassed two nearby settlements of civilian huts meters away, totaling 30 homes occupied by sleeping Bedouins.^[40][41][42] American officials interviewed by Dexter Filkins of The New Yorker had "seemed genuinely perplexed" by the civilian casualties, exclusively recalling a training camp at the settlement through the surveillance footage. Filkins concluded that "the cameras missed the women and children".^[37]

According to a Yemeni official, JSOC was supposed to strike a single encampment belonging to the militants but had targeted all settlements in the area, possibly due to faulty information from Yemeni intelligence services.^[43] The specific Tomahawk model used in the attack was intentionally designed for dispersing numerous cluster munitions over a wide region. Accounting for the 166 BLU-97A/B Combined Effects submunitions loaded in one missile, as many as 830 bomblets were estimated to have struck al-Majalah.^[44] Each bomblet carries nearly 200 pieces of shrapnel and contains an incendiary intended to ignite flammable materials in the area.^[45] Of the 30 huts in the vicinity of the attack, 12 were completely destroyed while the rest were severely burned.^[35][45]

A Yemeni government-endorsed inquiry determined that 55 people had died in the al-Majalah strike.^[37] The inquiry reported that local authorities believed 14 suspected militants were killed, although the number was unverifiable as the only militant who was definitively identified was Kazemi.^[45] Regardless, a video released by AQAP's al-Malahem Media branch on May 26, 2010, confirmed the death of Kazemi and several other militants alongside him at al-Majalah.^[46] Six newcomers to the village who were helping Kazemi dig a well twenty days prior were killed, their bodies being extracted from the site along with some other injured men by a group of masked gunmen shortly after the strike took place.^[47][21]

The majority of people killed in al-Majalah were civilians. The report listed a total 41 individuals killed in the strike from two extended families; 14 from the Haydara family and 27 from the Anbouri family.^[21] Of those killed, nine were women, five of whom were pregnant, while 21 were children.^[48] Kazemi's wife and four children were among them.^[21] A leaked US cable described the civilians as "largely nomadic, Bedouin families who lived in tents near the AQAP training camp."^[49] The villagers, described as one of the poorest tribes in the region,^[50] were paid by the militants to provide shelter, food and laundry to the camp, but were likely not otherwise affiliated with AQAP.^[51] A tribesman said the locals had agreed to host the militants at their camp because they promised to dig them a well.^[42] Survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch were not aware of Kazemi's involvement in militant activities or the presence of a training camp.^[47] Many local livestock were put out by the locals to graze at the time and were caught in the blast,^[39] with up to 1,500 goats, sheep, cows and donkeys possibly dying.^[51]

Simultaneously with the al-Majalah strike, JSOC launched a separate cruise missile attack on an AQAP safehouse in Arhab district, north of Sanaa, on December 17. Ground forces from Yemen's Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), in coordination with the Intelligence Support Activity unit of JSOC, raided the premises shortly afterwards. The main target of the operation was AQAP commander Qasim al-Raymi.^[28] Officials said that the raid had disrupted an AQAP cell involved in a plot to bomb the British embassy along with numerous other Western targets in Sanaa.^[41] Three would-be suicide bombers were killed, including former Guantanamo Bay detainee Hani Abdo Shaalan.^[41][52] Initial reports claimed the militants had died in a shootout with the CTU,^[41] though an AQAP obituary posted in 2011 said Shaalan was killed by an American missile.^[53] Within the destroyed compound, CTU forces detained another militant still wearing their suicide vest.^[52] Raymi escaped the raid alongside cell leader Hizam Mujali, though his brother Arif Mujali as well as six other militants were captured.^[41] The Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C., uploaded a seven-minute YouTube video of CTU forces conducting the raid.^[54]

Nearly a week after the first two strikes, a video conference was held to determine the legality of a third missile strike on a compound in Shabwah. Present in the meeting was the Pentagon's deputy general counsel, Robert Taylor, as well as Joint Chiefs of Staff general counsel James W. Crawford III.^[20] US and Yemeni intelligence believed that their target, a farmhouse in the remote settlement of Rafadh owned by AQAP commander Fahd al-Quso, was the site of a meeting between AQAP leaders Wuhayshi and Shihri.^[55][41] Among other sources, the interrogation of the would-be suicide bomber captured by the CTU during the Arhab raid contributed towards the intelligence preceding the strike.^[56]

Several sources have claimed that an additional or even primary target of the strike was Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American jihadist cleric who attracted scrutiny after it was revealed he had communicated via email with Nidal Hasan, a US Army officer who killed 13 people in a mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5. Authorities determined that Awlaki did not have a significant role in the shooting.^[57] According to journalist Charlie Savage, none of the numerous officials involved in the strike that he interviewed recalled Awlaki being a target. Savage claimed this notion was caused by a misunderstanding of the Obama administration's policy at the time regarding his killing. The elimination of Wuhayshi and Shihri was the objective of the strike, but with US officials believing there to be a reasonable chance that Awlaki may have been present at the meeting, they deemed it acceptable to launch a strike on the former two regardless of the latter's American citizenship. If Awlaki was killed, his death would be classified as that of an enemy combatant.^[58]

The JSOC strike on Rafadh was carried out by a Navy vessel during the early hours of December 24.^[20][59] Hundreds living in the remote settlement were awoken by the blast. Five members of AQAP were killed as they were sleeping in the targeted building, which was destroyed by the missiles.^[2] They were reportedly the same group of militants who gave a widely-publicized speech at a rally in al-Majalah days before.^[60] However, none of the targeted AQAP leaders were killed in the strike.^[61] It is unclear if Wuhayshi or Shihri had ever been at the building in the first place. Individuals in contact with Awlaki reported that he was not in the building or near the area at the time of the attack, nor was he affiliated with the individuals killed.^[62] According to Morten Storm, an undercover Danish spy in AQAP, Awlaki sent him a text message which read "Phew. Maaaaaan—that was close," after the attack.^[58][63]

In al-Majalah, survivors and other people from nearby washed and prepared for burial the bodies of those killed that were intact and identifiable.^[64] These bodies were buried individually in a row along a highway leading to the village and marked with gravestones.^[42] Other victims, whose bodies were intermingled and indistinguishable from each other, were buried in a mass grave, which also contained some animal remains for the same reason.^[21][51] Human Rights Watch reported that local authorities "failed to provide even the most basic rescue assistance such as transporting the wounded to hospitals, helping identify the dead and wounded, or securing the area".^[65] In Rafadh, a resident buried the dead militants before a tribal meeting was held, which concluded in Quso and other militants being evicted from the settlement.^[2]

At a rally attended by thousands from across the country in al-Majalah on December 21, organized by tribal leader and politician Saleh bin Fareed to show international media that the strike was a civilian massacre perpetrated by the US, a group of AQAP members unexpectedly gave a speech condemning the American and Yemeni governments and vowing revenge for the deaths of civilians. A video of the speech was broadcast by Al Jazeera and distributed by international news outlets, resulting in the rally, which was meant to show that the victims of the attack were not militants, being seen as a pro-AQAP gathering.^[66][60]

Days after the al-Majalah attack, Yemen's House of Representatives endorsed the opening of an investigation, officially titled the Republic of Yemen, Special Parliamentarian Investigating Committee Report On Security Events In the Province of Abyan.^[43] Headed by Himyar Abdullah al-Ahmar, a delegation of 15 members of parliament were sent to the village to survey al-Majalah, interview locals and gather eyewitness accounts. The investigation was complete and published on February 7, 2010, confirming the militant and civilian death toll along with a list of the civilians killed.^[21] Investigators found the entire area to be burnt and destroyed upon their arrival, along with multiple unexploded bomblets.^[45]

The report claimed "there were errors in the geographic coordinates and the determination of the location" for the strike. It upheld that Kazemi was an AQAP commander, and had transferred money to at least 20 foreign militants in Yemen, but also determined that he had been moving freely in the region and in areas with multiple security checkpoints, making it possible for him to have been captured or eliminated by other means.^[67] The Yemeni parliament approved the commission's findings in March 2010, and demanded that a judicial investigation be opened into the bombing to identify those responsible. It also issued an official apology to the victims of the attack, labeling it a mistake and promising financial compensation.^[21]

The cluster bomblets in al-Majalah which did not explode during the strike were embedded within the terrain, forming an effective minefield of unexploded ordnance.^[68] The munitions were spread around the area in a 1.5 kilometer radius. At least four people died after the initial strikes due to the munitions. Two people were killed at al-Majalah during a December 21 rally, while one was killed later in the day when they attempted to remove a bomblet from their car which they had collected earlier. On January 24, 2012, a child threw away a bomblet he had brought to his home and it exploded, injuring him and his brother and killing his father.^[69]

The Yemeni government had offered to clear al-Majalah of remaining explosives but this was rejected by the locals, who instead wanted assistance from an international organization out of fear that authorities would not sufficiently clear the area and would use the opportunity to cover up their responsibility for the strike.^[70] Four years later, al-Majalah remained uninhabitable due to the presence of unexploded bomblets.^[71]

A similar scene took place in Rafadh, where many residents were forced to move away from the bomb site because of damage inflicted to their nearby homes and lingering cluster munitions. With no government assistance, some had dealt with the bomblets by shooting and intentionally detonating them to clear the area.^[72]

A US cable reported that the Yemeni government had originally allocated approximately $100,000 to the Governor of Abyan to split between the families of the al-Majalah victims.^[73] The government later offered to increase the money to 5.5 million rials, equaling around $25,000 per civilian killed, and added 10 Toyota Hiluxes as a down payment, but the victims families instead wanted 10 million rials, equalling to $51,000, as well a pledge from the government to hold the perpetrators of the attack responsible. The government refused to negotiate with the victims. Some families began accepting government compensation plans for property damage by mid-2013. A total of 37 million rials (around $170,000) was divided between 10 families, averaging $17,000 each. The sum covered the civilians killed and loss of property such as livestock, but not the houses which were destroyed.^[74] On 22 October 2013, the Yemeni embassy in Washington, D.C., declared that all surviving families of the attack had been compensated.^[75]

The Yemeni and US governments agreed to portray the strikes as Yemen's own doing.^[47] Due to strong anti-American sentiment within the Yemeni public, admitting the US had militarily intervened in their own country would have harmed the Saleh administration's reputation locally.^[76] For the strikes on al-Majalah and Arhab, Yemeni officials claimed the military had carried out a series of simultaneous ground raids and airstrikes which killed 34 militants and arrested 17.^[77] MiG-29 fighter jets flew over al-Majalah shortly after the strikes to support the claims of them being a Yemeni Air Force operation.^[51] Media reports wrote of Obama calling Saleh on the day of the strikes to congratulate him on his successful operations.^[77] Later in January, the state-ran Saba News Agency published an in-depth report on the operations, claiming that civilian deaths were unavoidable and the US cluster munitions at the sites were mines planted by AQAP, allowing the government to exclude independent investigators from visiting the scenes of the strikes.^[78]

Despite the cover-up, by the day after the first strikes several anonymous American officials had spoken to news agencies contradicting the official story. The New York Times reported that "American firepower" was involved in the strike, while ABC News was the first outlet to confirm the usage of US cruise missiles.^[32] Al Jazeera had broadcast footage of al-Majalah depicting munitions used in the attack.^[77] Sebastian Gorka, an instructor at the Joint Special Operations University involved in training Yemeni forces, confirmed the nature of the operations and called them "a very distinct signal from the Obama administration that they are serious in assisting Yemen to remove these al-Qaeda facilities from its soil."^[56]

On September 30, 2010, during an interview with pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat, Yemeni foreign minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi admitted for the first time that the US had conducted the strikes. According to him, no further strikes had been conducted after December as the "Yemeni government ascertained they weren't achieving results." Upon being questioned, a US Department of Defense spokesperson did not confirm Qirbi's statement.^[79]

Local independent journalist Abdulelah Haider Shaye was the "first journalist to file authoritative reports on the US role in al-Majalah" according to Human Rights Watch.^[80] Hearing of the attacks soon after they took place, he traveled to the settlement and quickly determined that the US had conducted the strike.^[28] He provided several media outlets, including Al Jazeera, with descriptions of the civilian casualties as well as photographs depicting the remnants of the munitions used in the strike, some of which bore the inscription "Made in the USA". Shaye's work, utilized by American news agencies and human rights organizations, contributed towards the refuting of the official explanation of the attacks.^[28][81]

Shaye continued to report on the al-Majalah attack and other US operations in Yemen throughout 2010. In July, he was kidnapped and threatened by Yemeni intelligence agents, who warned him not to further discuss the attacks. After describing his detention in an Al Jazeera interview, his house was raided by the CTU on August 16, 2010, and he was subsequently kept in solitary confinement for over a month. The Yemeni court indicted Shaye on charges of supporting AQAP in September.^[82] He was convicted in January 2011 and sentenced to five years in prison, but was pardoned by Saleh weeks later due to tribal pressure. He was imprisoned again in February after Obama had called Saleh to voice concern over his release.^[83] On July 23, 2013, Shaye was released from prison and was permitted to serve the rest of his term under house arrest through a decision by Saleh's successor, President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.^[84]

Amnesty International released a report on June 7, 2010, containing several photographs of American bomb and missile remnants in al-Majalah. The photos, obtained by the group earlier in March, showed various damaged components of a BGM-109D Tomahawk as well as an unexploded BLU-97A/B submunition traced to the Kansas Army Ammunition Plant. The report noted that the type of missile used was only known to be in the US military's arsenal and not Yemen's. Regional deputy director Phillip Lewis viewed the lack of an attempt to capture the militants before launching strike as "at the very least unlawful", and the civilian casualties on top of it "grossly irresponsible, particularly given the likely use of cluster munitions".^[45] US Department of Defense officials did not comment on the report, while American media "paid scant attention" according to Michael Isikoff.^[85]

On November 28, 2010, WikiLeaks began distributing and publishing collections of classified US government cables. Among them were several cables relating to the strikes, which were still unacknowledged by the US.^[85] A cable dated to December 21, 2009, recorded US ambassador Stephen Seche's concern with the perceived indifference of the Yemeni government towards media reports on the strikes, which were describing high civilian casualties as well as US involvement. Interior minister Rashad al-Alimi told him "any evidence of greater US involvement such as fragments of US munitions found at the sites—could be explained away as equipment purchased from the US." Saleh voiced eagerness for continued operations, with Alimi declaring that Yemen "'must maintain the status quo' with regard to the official denial of US involvement in order to ensure additional 'positive operations' against AQAP".^[86]

Another cable described a meeting in Sanaa between Saleh, Alimi, and Petraeus on January 2, 2010. While discussing the strikes, Saleh lamented civilian casualties in the al-Majalah attack, but Petraeus claimed the only civilians who died were Kazemi's wife and two children. Saleh proceeded to engage in a "lengthy and confusing aside" with other Yemeni officials at the meeting regarding the death count; the writer commented "Saleh's conversation... suggests he has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in Abyan." Several investigations into the civilian death toll of the strike suggest that Petraeus may have been the one who was ill-informed.^[87] Gregory D. Johnsen claims the misunderstanding was partly the result of a new policy within the US government classifying all military-age males as combatants unless proven otherwise.^[88] Later in the meeting, Saleh denied authorization for US ground operations in the country, but granted permission for usage of fixed-wing aircraft and precision-guided munitions in further strikes.^[89] Saleh told Petraeus: "We'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours". Alimi then joked that he had lied to parliament when he spoke about the nature of the strikes.^{[87][89][88][90][85]}

Including all the leaked cables, Reuters considered these to be "among the most potentially damaging to US national security interests".^[91] They effectively confirmed the secretive US military intervention in Yemen to the public.^[85] Johnsen believed AQAP would immediately take advantage of the leaks as they supported the narrative of US-imposed war being waged in Yemen similar to Iraq or Afghanistan and the Saleh administration lying to the public and parliament.^[91][85][92] He said it "won't necessarily surprise a great many people within the elite circles in Yemen" but would likely have a greater impact on AQAP recruiting efforts in tribal communities.^[92] Islah MP Shoqi al-Qadha said confirmation of American involvement in the strikes would provoke public anger, but that lies to the parliament were "something we have gotten used to here."^[93]

From a narrow viewpoint centered on the immediate threat, JSOC may have initially considered the strike on al-Majalah to be a success due to the elimination of Kazemi and his men.^[21] However, the strikes did not impede AQAP's plan to have suicide bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab board Northwest Airlines Flight 253, an American passenger jet travelling from Amsterdam, Netherlands to Detroit, Michigan. Abdulmutallab had boarded the flight by the time the strike on Rafadh took place, and did not manage to bring down the plane on December 25, 2009, only because the explosives hidden in his underwear failed to detonate.^[94] Despite the killing of some lesser commanders in the group in the al-Majalah strike, the militants comprising the top leadership of AQAP, such as Wuhayshi and Shihri, had survived the attacks. Edmund Hull, former US ambassador to Yemen, compared the results to that of the drone strikes in Pakistan at the time, which had not led to the defeat of al-Qaeda as its main leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, were still alive.^[95]

The results of the attacks were effectively negated by the heavy civilian casualties in al-Majalah; journalists Chris Woods and Scott Shane respectively labeled the operations a "tactical and strategic failure" and a "resonant catastrophe" for this reason,^[1][96] while Hull believed it contributed to them being "significantly less effective" compared to the 2002 Marib airstrike, which he had overseen during his tenure as ambassador.^[97] Multiple commentators noted that the munitions used in the strikes; Tomahawk cruise missiles loaded with cluster munitions, were innately inaccurate and unfit for precise targeted killing operations.^[96][1][65] Savage mentioned that the civilian casualties in al-Majalah had ultimately stemmed from faulty intelligence, noting questions as to whether the strike might be considered a war crime, and whether the civilians deaths could be considered reasonable in terms of targeting law and collateral damage.^[20] According to a White House aide, an after action report verified the civilian deaths in al-Majalah weeks after the strikes took place. He said Obama "wasn't happy with it, and so we went through a very long process led by Brennan to tighten up how we take lethal action in Yemen."^[96]

The killing of civilians in al-Majalah, particularly the deaths of many women and children, led to outrage among the population of Abyan against both the US and the Yemeni government.^[2] Human rights lawyer Khaled al-Ansi said the attacks "widen the circle of people who hate the US and anyone affected by these strikes will be prone to sympathizing with al-Qaeda, not because they like the group but due to the common enemy."^[93]

AQAP utilized imagery of the victims of the al-Majalah attack in their propaganda to capitalize on this anger, thereby strengthening the group.^[49][1] During 2010, nearly every AQAP claim of responsibility for an attack mentioned taking revenge for al-Majalah. Many tribesmen who had lost their kin in the attacks joined AQAP to enact revenge against the US.^[98] Local parliamentarian Ali al-Shal said popular support for AQAP in the al-Majalah area had significantly increased after the attacks, to the point that it became almost too dangerous for government officials to visit.^[2] The revelation of a cover-up campaign further aggravated the public,^[1] and provided AQAP a propaganda victory to solidify its narratives regarding the US and Yemeni government.^[93][85] Regarding the operations as a whole, Shane concluded:

Anyone who studied the asymmetric battle against terrorism recognized the crucial role played by perceptions of fairness and injustice, good intentions and bad, competent allies and blunderers. But the campaign had begun with clumsy cover-ups of American involvement, cruise missiles and cluster bombs utterly unsuited for precise strikes, and collateral damage so extreme that it would permanently poison public opinion. With a single strike, the United States had yielded the moral high ground in Yemen.^[96]

• March–May 2025 United States attacks in Yemen

• Hull, Edmund (2011). High-Value Target: Countering Al Qaeda in Yemen. Potomac Books. ISBN 9781597977548.
• Johnsen, Gregory D. (November 26, 2012). "Targets". The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's war in Arabia. Scribe. ISBN 9781922072108.
• Klaidman, Daniel (2012). Kill Or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. ISBN 9780547547893.
• Mazzetti, Mark (April 9, 2013). The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth. Penguin Random House. ISBN 9781101617946.
• Savage, Charlie (2017). "Targeted Killing". Power Wars: The Relentless Rise of Presidential Authority and Secrecy. Hachette Book Group. ISBN 9780316286602.
• Scahill, Jeremy (2013). Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield. Nation Books. ISBN 9781568587271.
• Shane, Scott (2016). Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone. Crown Publishing Group. ISBN 9780804140317.
• Woods, Chris (2015). Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190202590.
• Tayler, Letta (October 22, 2013). 'Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda': The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen (PDF). Human Rights Watch. ISBN 978-1-62313-0701.