Uprisings against Uthman (654–656)

The Uprisings against Uthman (654–656) were the first major civil conflicts in the Rashidun Caliphate, revolving around the policies and legitimacy of its third caliph, Uthman ibn Affan. Disputes escalated into full scale rebellions in Egypt, Iraq and Medina, culminating in the assassination of Caliph Uthman in 656 by Egyptian rebels following the siege of his residence.

The movement was characterized by a diverse coalition of interests. The military vanguard was formed by the qurrāʾ, an elite class of Quran readers and early settlers who opposed the Caliph's fiscal reforms and his reclassification of communal lands.^[11] Uthman demanded that the surplus revenue from the conquered lands, which had been declared state property but remained under the control of the conquering tribesmen, be forwarded to Medina.^[12] Simultaneously, various senior companions of Muhammad and members of the Quraysh became vocal critics of the administration. They accused the Caliph of nepotism and favoring his kinsmen from the Banu Umayya over the earlier converts from the Ansar and Muhajirun.^[13]

The political vacuum created by the collapse of the central government led to the election of Ali as the fourth caliph. This transition was immediately contested by Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Bilad al-Sham, who refused to recognize the new administration and withheld his allegiance.^[14] These events ultimately triggered the outbreak of the First Fitna, a civil war that permanently altered the political and religious landscape of the early Islamic state.^[15][16]

The third caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, faced accusations of systemic nepotism by consolidating administrative power within the Banu Umayya and their parent clan, the Banu Abd-Shams. Under his predecessors, Abu Bakr and Umar, political influence was balanced between the Ansar of Medina and the early Muhajirun. However, Uthman altered this dynamic by appointing kinsmen as governors and granting substantial land and monetary gifts to relatives, most notably Marwan ibn al-Hakam and Sa'id ibn al-As.

The crisis was further exacerbated by Uthman’s efforts to centralize the Caliphate's fiscal affairs. He reclassified provincial crown lands as state assets and ordered that economic surpluses, particularly from Iraq, be forwarded to the central treasury in Medina. This policy directly challenged the autonomy of local tribal settlers who viewed these revenues as communal property. In Kufa, the governor Sa'id ibn al-As famously provoked a riot by declaring the fertile lands of the Sawad to be the "garden of the Quraysh." These centralization efforts, combined with the perceived marginalization of early Islamic elites, fueled organized opposition across Egypt, Iraq, and the Hijaz.^[17][8]

Opposition from senior companions of Muhammad and the Meccan nobility served as the political catalyst for provincial dissent. Talha ibn Ubayd Allah and Aisha emerged as prominent critics of Uthman's administration, reportedly encouraging unrest through correspondence with provincial leaders. This discontent was further fueled by Uthman's perceived mistreatment of established tribal elites, specifically the public beating of a respected member of the Banu Makhzum, a prominent clan of the Meccan Quraysh tribe, and Concurrently, Abu Dharr al-Ghifari campaigned against the growing materialism within the Caliphate and the accumulation of wealth by the Umayyad elite, which led to his eventual exile to al-Rabadha.^[18][19]

A significant faction within the rebel ranks consisted of individuals who would later form the backbone of the Kharijite movement. While not a monolithic group, many were drawn from the qurra of Iraq, who merged political grievances with the theological belief that a caliph's legitimacy was contingent on strict adherence to religious justice.^[20] These "proto-Kharijites" sought to undermine the hegemony of the Quraysh and restore provincial autonomy.^[21] Primarily based in Iraq, they were instrumental in the initial uprising and later formed the Haruriyya.^[22] Despite their eventual break with the fourth caliph, they remained among the most steadfast supporters of Ali until the arbitration of 657.^[23]

The political situation in Kufa deteriorated sharply in 654.^[24][25] In response, Caliph Uthman convened a consultative meeting in Medina with provincial governors and dispatched agents to inspect grievances in Kufa, Basra, Egypt, and the Levant. However, the agent sent to Egypt, Ammar ibn Yasir, who was a supporter of Ali, defected and joined the local rebels.^[26]

When the Kufan governor, Sa'id ibn al-As, departed for the Medina summit, the opposition publicly demanded the Caliph's resignation. These protesters were primarily early settlers whose privileges were threatened by Uthman's centralization and the arrival of new tribal groups. The movement was coordinated by Yazid ibn Qays al-Arhabi, a tribal leader and future figure of the Muhakkima,^[27] who recalled exiled dissidents such as Malik al-Ashtar from Syria. Al-Ashtar mobilized the populace by alleging that the Caliph had ordered a drastic reduction in military and civilian stipends.

Exploiting the governor’s absence, the rebels seized control of the city and deployed armed units to secure the province. They established a strategic garrison at Ayn al-Tamr to block the road to Damascus and stationed 1,000 troops near Hulwan to control the Jibal route. Further forces were positioned at Kashkar, Al-Mada'in, and Jukah to defend against intervention from Basra and to police the Tigris region. Rebel commanders were explicitly instructed to obstruct all federal tax collection.^[28][29]

To cement their control, Al-Ashtar dispatched 500 troops under Malik ibn Ka'ab to intercept Sa'id ibn al-As on his return from Medina. Confronting the governor, the rebels famously declared that he would not drink another drop from the Euphrates, which forced him to retreat to Medina. Despite this military success, the rebels’ appointment of the neutral Abu Musa al-Ash'ari as the new governor proved tactically flawed. His lack of central support and his indecisive leadership left the Kufan administration in a state of political instability.^[30][31]

In 651, the Egyptian governor Abd Allah ibn Sa'd led a military expedition to Nubia that failed to achieve victory and resulted in a peace treaty with the Kingdom of Makuria.^[32] This military setback, combined with the governor’s determination to increase the revenue sent to Medina, caused significant friction with the local garrison. The arrival of new settlers further strained Egyptian resources and marginalized the original conquerors of the province. This discontent peaked in 656 when Ibn Sa'd departed for the consultative meeting in Medina.

In his absence, Muhammad ibn Abi Hudhayfa rejected the governor's authority and launched a revolt in Shammal. He successfully expelled Ibn Sa'd from Fustat and seized control of the provincial government. While a small faction led by Mu'awiya ibn Hudayj remained loyal to the Caliph, the majority of the province pledged allegiance to Ibn Abi Hudhayfa. He drew his primary support from the early Arab settlers whose political influence and monopoly over Egyptian revenues were being undermined by Uthman’s centralization efforts.^[33][34]

To de-escalate the crisis, Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas traveled to Egypt to negotiate with the rebels. However, his mission failed when his tent was attacked and he was wounded, forcing his immediate return to Medina. Following this, approximately 400 protesters formed a delegation led by Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr to confront the Caliph. Although Uthman initially agreed to their demands and issued a letter to improve the governorship, the situation turned violent at Aqaba. There, the rebels intercepted a messenger carrying a secret order from the Caliph to Ibn Sa'd that instructed the governor to arrest the delegation and execute its leaders.^[35] Outraged by what they perceived as a betrayal, the rebels returned to Medina to besiege the Caliph's residence.^[36]

The third Rashidun caliph Uthman led the Hajj pilgrimage in 655 and organized a council of his most prominent governors and advisers to address the growing discontent. While some officials suggested launching new military offensives to distract the public or bribing the dissidents, Amr ibn al-As openly criticized the Caliph. He argued that the administration had gone astray and condemned the Umayyad monopoly over provincial governorships.

Following this council, rebels from Egypt, Kufa, and Basra coordinated a march on Medina to hold Uthman accountable and demand his resignation. The Egyptian contingent included 600 men led by Abd al-Rahman ibn Udays. To avoid early detection, the delegations moved under the guise of performing the Hajj. The factions were divided in their political loyalties as the Egyptians favored Ali, the Basrans supported Talha, and the Kufans backed Zubayr.^[37][38] During this time, the governor of Syria, Mu'awiya I, offered Uthman military assistance or asylum in Damascus, but the Caliph refused to leave the Prophet's city.

Upon arriving at the Medina oasis, the groups established separate camps at Awas, Dhu Kushub, and Dhu-l-Marwah. Their presence shocked the local residents and initially pushed many Medinese to renew their support for the Caliph.^[39] When the rebels approached their preferred candidates for the caliphate, they were met with rejection. Ali personally drove the Egyptian delegation away and sent his son Hasan to guard Uthman's residence alongside the sons of other notable companions. Ali eventually acted as a mediator and suggested the removal of the Egyptian governor, while the rebels demanded the appointment of Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr.^[40]

The rebels initially began a retreat from Medina after receiving assurances of reform. However, they returned three days later after capturing a messenger who carried a letter bearing the Caliph’s seal. The document, addressed to the governor of Egypt, ordered the execution of Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr and other rebel leaders.^[41] Uthman swore by God that he had no knowledge of the letter. This claim led to suspicions against his secretary, Marwan ibn al-Hakam, who held the caliphate’s seal at the time.^[42] While Madelung notes that Ali and Muhammad ibn Maslama suspected Marwan was the true author, historian Hugh N. Kennedy argues that Uthman likely bore responsibility for the order.^[20]

In response to the intercepted letter, the rebels charged Caliph Uthman with incompetence and demanded his resignation. When he refused, the opposition began a formal siege of his residence. Although the rebels initially permitted Uthman to leave for communal prayers, they eventually denied him this right. During a Friday sermon, Uthman and his supporters were pelted with stones until the Caliph was carried home unconscious.^[43][44]

The gates of the residence were defended by a group of young Quraysh nobles, including Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, Muhammad ibn Talha, Hasan ibn Ali, and Husayn ibn Ali. They were joined by other elites such as Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Rahman, a nephew of Zubayr ibn al-Awwam. This young nobleman was killed by the rebels after he attempted to propose a peaceful settlement based on the Quran.^[45] Inside the house, Uthman remained with his wife Na'ila bint al-Furafisa and his secretary Marwan ibn al-Hakam. Despite Uthman forbidding his defenders from escalating the conflict, a clash erupted when the rebels intercepted food supplies sent by Umm Habiba.^[46]

The rebels eventually blocked the supply of water to the house. Uthman appealed to Ali, who sent three large water skins through his Banu Hashim kinsmen, several of whom were reportedly injured while delivering the supplies.^[43] During the standoff, Uthman dispatched Abd Allah ibn Abbas to lead the Hajj and inform the people of Mecca about the insurrection. Fearing that loyalist reinforcements from Syria would soon arrive to crush the revolt, the rebels decided to storm the residence on 17 June 656.

The final assault avoided a direct confrontation with the Hashemite guards at the gate. Instead, a group led by Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr scaled the roofs of neighboring houses to enter Uthman's private quarters. They found the Caliph reciting the Quran. While some accounts state that Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr initially seized the Caliph's beard, he reportedly stepped back after Uthman reminded him of his father’s legacy. The fatal blows were delivered by other rebels, including Kinana ibn Bishr and Sudan ibn Humran. Amr ibn al-Hamiq is described as inflicting multiple wounds on the Caliph’s body during the struggle.^[47]

Uthman’s blood poured over the copy of the Quran he was reading, and his wife Na'ila lost several fingers while attempting to shield him from the blades. After the house was looted, the Umayyad family fled Medina for Mecca and Damascus. They carried with them the severed fingers of Na'ila and the blood-stained clothing of the Caliph as symbols for their future demand for vengeance.^[35]

Mainstream Sunni tradition views the revolution against Uthman as an unlawful rebellion that triggered the first great fitna in Islamic history. While Sunni scholars acknowledge historical reports of grievances regarding his administrative choices, they maintain that these issues did not justify a violent uprising.^[48] The rebels are generally viewed as a misguided or extremist group that violated the sanctity of the caliphate and the city of Medina. Sunni tradition emphasizes that Uthman acted as a martyr who followed the instructions of Muhammad to remain patient and avoid shedding Muslim blood.

This perspective holds that Uthman's financial and administrative decisions were based on his personal legal interpretation of the duty to maintain kinship.^[49] Modern scholarship similarly notes that the behavior of the opposition was often undutiful. This suggests that political rivals used general discontent to fuel a rebellion that they lacked the religious right to initiate.^[50] Rather than viewing the uprising as a pursuit of justice, Sunni tradition focuses on the illegitimacy of the rebels' methods and the catastrophic loss of unity following the assassination of a companion of the Prophet.

Shia Muslims generally view the uprisings as a justified response to the systemic corruption and tribalism that emerged under Uthman's rule.^[51] This perspective holds that the centralization of power within the Umayyad family was a betrayal of the egalitarian principles of Muhammad.^[52] Historical Shia accounts highlight that Uthman gave control of vital provinces like Egypt and Kufa to his kinsmen who used their authority for personal gain. This incurred the hatred of the local populations and led to the collapse of the state.^[53][54]

The Shia tradition emphasizes the mistreatment of respected companions who spoke out against these administrative failures. Figures like Abu Dharr al-Ghifari were exiled for protesting Umayyad excesses while others like Ammar ibn Yasir were physically beaten for presenting complaints against provincial governors.^[55] These acts of state violence against the early believers are seen as the primary catalysts for the revolt. While Ali and his sons sought to prevent total anarchy and provided relief to the besieged caliph, the Shia view maintains that the revolution was the inevitable result of Uthman prioritizing his relatives over Islamic justice.^[56]

The Ibadi school and the early Muhakkima traditions view the uprising as a legitimate religious act rather than a mere political rebellion. According to Ibadi historians, the revolt was a necessary response to Uthman ceasing to act with justice.^[57] In this view, the interception of the caliph's letter served as the final proof that the administration had lost its moral authority. The rebels are viewed as the first true Kharijites, those who went out for the sake of God to uphold the principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong.

Scholarship emphasizes that this event raised fundamental questions regarding the relationship between faith and leadership. For the groups that became the Khawarij, the commission of a grave sin without repentance nullified a leader's right to rule.^[58] From this perspective, Uthman’s refusal to step down necessitated his removal to preserve the integrity of the faith. This ideological shift transformed the assassination from a provincial tax revolt into a foundational event for the Kharijite movement. This defined a leader's legitimacy based on their active adherence to Quranic law rather than their tribal lineage or status as a companion.

Following the assassination of Uthman, Medina entered a state of total anarchy as the central government collapsed. In the absence of a caliph, the Egyptian rebels occupied the city and their representative, Al-Ghafiqi ibn Harb, acted as the de facto governor.^[59][60] The rebel factions attempted to dictate the choice of the next leader through the Shura, an act that deeply alienated the Medinese nobility who viewed it as an illegal restructuring of the Caliphate’s political order.

Despite the pressure from the insurgent groups, Ali initially refused the office and insisted that any pledge of allegiance must be made publicly in the Prophet's Mosque. Five days after the death of Uthman, Ali was formally elected as the fourth caliph.^[61][62] His administration was immediately faced with the consequences of the uprisings. The Umayyad family and other critics of the new caliph used the failure to prosecute Uthman's killers as a casus belli. This political deadlock eventually led to the Battle of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin, marking the beginning of the First Fitna and the permanent division of the Islamic community into sectarian factions.^[63]

• First Fitna
• Kharijite Rebellions against Ali

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