United States government sanctions

United States government sanctions are financial and trade restrictions imposed against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions whose actions contradict U.S. foreign policy or national security goals.^[1] Financial sanctions are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), while export controls are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).^[2]

Restrictions against sanctioned targets vary in severity. Comprehensive sanctions currently target Cuba, Iran,^[3] North Korea, Russia, and certain conflict regions of Ukraine, heavily restricting nearly all trade and financial transactions between U.S. persons and those regions. Targeted sanctions focus on specific individuals or entities engaged in activities contrary to U.S. foreign policy or national security goals. The U.S. also implements "secondary sanctions," which risk a sanctions designation against a non-U.S. person who transacts with sanctioned parties in violation of U.S. sanctions law, even where no U.S.-jurisdictional nexus existed.

In 2024, the Washington Post reported that the United States imposed "three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body, targeting a third of all nations with some kind of financial penalty on people, properties or organizations."^[4] According to Manu Karuka, an American studies academician at Columbia University, the United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions between the 1990s and circa 2023.^[5] A 2025 study funded by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, authored by Mark Weisbrot, Francisco Rodríguez, and Silvio Rendón, and published in The Lancet, estimated that unilateral sanctions by all parties—including those of the United States, United Nations, and European Union—were associated with as many as 564,258 deaths annually between 1971 and 2021.^[6]

After the failure of the Embargo Act of 1807, the federal government of the United States took little interest in imposing embargoes and economic sanctions against foreign countries until the 20th century. United States trade policy was entirely a matter of economic policy. After World War I, interest revived. President Woodrow Wilson promoted such sanctions as a method for the League of Nations to enforce peace.^[7] However, he failed to bring the United States into the League, and the U.S. did not join the 1935 League sanctions against Italy.^[8]

According to communications studies academic Stuart H. Davis and political scientist Immanuel Ness, trends in whether the United States has unilaterally or multilaterally imposed sanctions have changed over time.^[9] During the Cold War, the United States led unilateral sanctions against Cuba, China, and North Korea.^[9] Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, United States sanctions became increasingly multilateral.^[9] During the 1990s, the United States imposed sanctions against countries it viewed as rogue states—such as Zimbabwe, Yugoslavia, and Iraq—in conjunction with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization.^[9] Davis and Ness state that in the 2000s, and with increasing frequency in the 2010s, the United States acted less multilaterally as it imposed sanctions against perceived geopolitical competitors such as Russia and China, or countries that were the site of "proxy conflicts" such as Yemen and Syria.^[9]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and some members of the United States Congress asked the United States to suspend its sanctions regimes as a way to help alleviate the pandemic's impact on people in sanctioned countries.^[10] Members of Congress who argued for suspension included Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Ilhan Omar.^[11]

According to a 2024 analysis by The Washington Post, 60% of low-income countries were under some form of U.S. financial sanction, and the U.S. imposes three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body.^[4]

Several laws delegate embargo power to the President:

• Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917^[12]
• Foreign Assistance Act of 1961^[12]
• International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
• Export Administration Act of 1979

Several laws specifically prohibit trade with certain countries:

• Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963
• Cuban Democracy Act of 1992^[12]
• Helms–Burton Act of 1996 (Cuba)^[12]
• Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
• Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Cuba)^[12]
• Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2006
• Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010

• Bureau of Industry and Security
• Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
• Office of Foreign Assets Control
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection
• United States Department of Commerce (Export Administration Regulations, EAR)
• United States Department of Defense
• United States Department of Energy (nuclear technology)
• United States Department of Homeland Security (border crossings)
• United States Department of Justice (including ATF and FBI)
• United States Department of State (International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR)
• United States Department of the Treasury

Types of restrictions the United States may impose through sanctions include:

• bans on arms-related exports,^[13]
• controls over dual-use technology exports,
• restrictions on economic assistance,
• financial restrictions such as:
  • authority to prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in financial transactions with listed individuals, entities, or governments, except by license from the U.S. government,
  • requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions,
  • diplomatic immunity waived, to allow families of terrorism victims to file for civil damages in U.S. courts,
  • tax credits for companies and individuals denied for income earned in listed countries,
  • duty-free goods exemption suspended for imports from those countries, and
  • prohibition of U.S. Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by listed countries,^[14]
• visa restrictions preventing certain individuals from entering the U.S.

The U.S. does not maintain a single list of countries U.S. persons cannot do business with, as its sanctions program varies in scope. Although some sanctions programs are broad and target entire jurisdictions ("comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions"), most are "targeted" sanctions focused on specific entities, individuals, or economic sectors.^[15] Depending on the nature of the restriction, U.S. sanctions are announced and implemented by different executive departments, typically the Treasury Department (OFAC)^[16] or the Commerce Department (BIS),^[17] and sometimes in conjunction with the State, Defense, or Energy departments.^[2]

Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions are subject to the most restrictive sanctions measures. Most transactions between a U.S. person and any person or entity "ordinarily resident" in a comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction are restricted.^[18] In addition to the general sanctions listed below, transactions involving entities or individuals from these countries on OFAC's SDN List or BIS' Entity List are also restricted.

In jurisdictions not subject to comprehensive sanctions, only transactions related to specific parties are prohibited.^[18] Jurisdictions that face targeted sanctions may continue to do business with the United States, with restrictions only placed on specific categories of individuals or entities, and anyone worldwide who materially supports or provides financial, logistical, or technological support for them.

According to OFAC, there are approximately 12,000 names on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN list),^[16] which is the most restrictive category of targeted U.S. sanctions, targeting U.S.-designated terrorists, officials and beneficiaries of certain authoritarian regimes, and international criminals such as drug traffickers by blocking their U.S. assets and restricting U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.^[31]

The following jurisdictions have a specific OFAC sanctions program for SDN designations targeting individuals or entities engaging in sanctionable activities:^[32]

Building off the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, named after Sergei Magnitsky who died in Russian custody after uncovering corruption, the U.S. can enact sanctions against any individual or entity worldwide who it says engages in severe human rights abuses and corruption that degrade the rule of law, perpetuate violent conflicts, and facilitate the activities of dangerous persons.^[57] The following jurisdictions are frequently targeted by U.S. sanctions related to human rights abuses but are not specifically targeted under a country-specific sanctions program:

Some jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under counter-terrorism authorities include:

Some jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under anti-drug trafficking or transnational criminal organizations-related authorities include:

The U.S. government maintains a policy of denial for any exports of defense articles or defense services to the following countries:^[83][84]

The U.S. government also enforces stricter restrictions on a more expansive definition of defense items, including the export of any U.S.-origin item that "supports or contributes" to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, development, or production of military items to specified countries. The same countries are also subject to additional license requirements for certain exports to the targeted countries' "military end users," defined as their national armed services, national police, national intelligence services, and anyone whose activities "support or contribute to military end uses."^[86]

• Cambodia^[87]
• China
• Myanmar
• Nicaragua
• Venezuela

Russia and Belarus are subject to the same restrictions as the military end use/user rule, with more expansive coverage that includes foreign-produced items made using U.S.-origin software or technology, manufactured by plants or major components that are products of the U.S.^[88]

• Belarus
• Russia

The increase in the use of economic leverage as a U.S. foreign policy tool has prompted debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.^[95] According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the U.S. and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era, noting that "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly."^[96] British diplomat Jeremy Greenstock said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government."^[97]

Critics of sanctions' effectiveness are widespread. According to Daniel T. Griswold of the Cato Institute, sanctions have failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries while barring American companies from economic opportunities and harming the poorest people in sanctioned countries.^[98] A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that sanctions achieved their goals in fewer than 20% of cases. Stuart Davis states that sanctions almost never lead to the overthrow of sanctioned governments or compliance by those governments, and that the more common outcome is the entrenchment in power of state elites in the sanctioned country.^[99] In a study of U.S. sanctions from 1981 to 2000, political scientist Dursan Peksen found sanctions to be counterproductive, failing to improve human rights and instead leading to a further decrease in sanctioned countries' "respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment."^[100] Former CIA Deputy Director David Cohen wrote that the logic of coercive sanctions "does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."^[101] Political scientist Lisa Martin criticized a game theory view of sanctions, arguing that proponents characterize success so broadly—applying it to outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion"—that the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.^[102]

Academic Jeremy Garlick writes that sanctions against Russia have, at least in the short term, backfired both economically and geopolitically, benefiting Russia's economy and bringing Russia and China closer together.^[103] Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Asian countries—primarily China and India—absorbed an increasing share of Russian oil and gas. Because Russian imports from the West declined after sanctions, Russia's trade balance rose sharply, increasing cash reserves.^[103] By June 2022, the Russian ruble had risen sharply and was among the world's best-performing currencies.^[103]

In October 2025, the United States imposed sanctions against Russia's largest oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil,^[104] and threatened secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions and companies continuing to do business with them,^[105] with particular implications for customers in China and India.^[106]

Critics have raised humanitarian concerns about the impact of U.S. sanctions on civilian populations. Daniel T. Griswold, writing from a conservative Christian perspective, argues that sanctions limit a sanctioned country's people from exercising political liberties and market freedom.^[107] In 1997, the American Association for World Health stated the US embargo against Cuba contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies.^[108]

The impact of sanctions on mortality has been the subject of several studies. Economist Helen Yaffe estimates U.S. sanctions on Venezuela caused the deaths of 100,000 people between 2014 and 2020 due to difficulty importing medicine and health care equipment.^[108] A study by Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs estimated sanctions contributed to approximately 40,000 excess deaths in Venezuela between 2017 and 2018,^[109][110] though critics argued the impact of sanctions could not be adequately separated from pre-existing negative trends.^[111][112]

Comprehensive sanctions on Iraq by the United Nations Security Council during the 1990s were linked to widespread malnutrition, shortages of medicine, and deterioration of water and electricity infrastructure.^[110] A 1999 UNICEF study estimated between 400,000 and 500,000 excess deaths among children under 5 since 1991; however, surveys conducted after 2003 found no evidence of a large sustained rise in under-5 mortality beginning in 1991. A 2017 study in The BMJ by Tim Dyson and Valeria Cetorelli concluded that "Saddam Hussein's government successfully manipulated the 1999 survey in order to convey a very false impression."^[113]

In the case of Cuba, a declassified 1960 U.S. State Department memorandum by diplomat Lester D. Mallory argued that "every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba" by denying money and supplies in order "to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government."^{[110][114][115]}

A 2025 study funded by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, authored by Mark Weisbrot, Francisco Rodríguez, and Silvio Rendón and published in The Lancet, estimated that unilateral sanctions by all parties—including those of the United States, United Nations, and European Union—were associated with as many as 564,258 deaths annually between 1971 and 2021. The study found "significant causal association between sanctions and increased mortality" with "the strongest effects for unilateral, economic, and US sanctions."^[6] Writing in Al Jazeera about this study, Jason Hickel, Dylan Sullivan, and Omer Tayyab estimated that unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union since 1970 were associated with approximately 38 million deaths worldwide, with more than half of the victims being children and the elderly, and that sanctions kill several times more people each year than die as direct casualties of war.^[110][116]

Secondary U.S. sanctions prohibit any trading in U.S. dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals, or organizations under the U.S. sanctions regime, affecting non-U.S. persons even where no U.S.-jurisdictional nexus existed.^[117] Primary sanctions, by contrast, restrict only U.S. companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with sanctioned countries or entities.^[118]

According to Rawi Abdelal, secondary sanctions often create friction between the U.S. and Europe because they reflect U.S. interference in the affairs and interests of the European Union (EU), and their increasing use is perceived in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty.^[117] Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions.^[96] Abdelal also argues that the U.S.'s overuse of sanctions risks gradual isolation and the continuing decline of U.S. influence in an emerging multipolar world.^[119]

In June 2025, a majority of U.S. senators supported secondary sanctions against Russia that would impose 500% tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil, natural gas, uranium, and other exports.^[120] On July 31, 2025, the U.S. announced its first "secondary tariff," targeting India to penalize its trade with Russia, with Indian exports facing an extra 25% tariff beginning August 27, 2025.^[121]

Business-studies academic Tim Beal views the U.S.'s imposition of financial sanctions as a factor increasing dedollarization efforts, citing responses such as the Russian-developed System for Transfers of Financial Messages (SPFS), the China-supported Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), and the European Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) that followed the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.^[122]

Historian Renate Bridenthal wrote that "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony," citing the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.^[123]

• State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. list)
• Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List
• United States sanctions on Bangladesh
• Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
• Rogue state
• Economic sanctions against the United States
• Permanent normal trade relations
• Arms Export Control Act
• Criticism of United States foreign policy
• European Union sanctions
• United Kingdom sanctions
• United States foreign adversaries

• Abdelal, Rawi; Bros, Aurélie (2020). "The End of Transatlanticism?: How Sanctions Are Dividing the West". Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development. 16 (16). Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development: 114–135. JSTOR 48573754.
• Davis, Stuart; Ness, Immanuel, eds. (2023). Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. Haymarket Books. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  • Beal, Tim. "2: Sanctions as Instrument of Coercion: Characteristics, Limitations, and Consequences". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 27–50.
  • Bridenthal, Renate. "19: Blowback to US Sanctions Policy". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 323–332.
  • Davis, Stuart. "4: Economic Sanctions, Communications Infrastructures, and the Destruction of Communicative Sovereignty". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 63–76.
  • Davis, Stuart; Ness, Immanuel. "1: Introduction: Why Are Economic Sanctions a Form of War?". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 1–26.
  • Karuka, Manu. "3: Hunger Politics: Sanctions as Siege Warfare". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 51–62.
  • Ness, Immanuel. "6: Transnational Allies of Sanctions: NGO Human Rights Organizations' Role in Reinforcing Economic Oppression". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 91–104.
  • Wilpert, Gregory. "16: The US War on Venezuela". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 273–289.
  • Yaffe, Helen. "8: US Sanctions Cuba 'to Bring About Hunger, Desperation and the Overthrow of the Government'". In Davis (ed) 2023, pp. 129–147.
• Garlick, Jeremy (2024). Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-25231-8.
• Lenway, Stefanie Ann (1988). "Between war and Commerce: economic sanctions as a tool of statecraft". International Organization. 42 (2). Cambridge University Press: 397–426. doi:10.1017/S0020818300032860. S2CID 154337246.
• Ong, Andrew (2023). Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-7071-5. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctv2t8b78b.
• Zhang, Chuchu (2025). China's Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum?. Changing Dynamics in Asia-Middle East Relations series. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-032-76275-3.

• Krugman, Paul, "The American Way of Economic war: Is Washington Overusing Its Most Powerful Weapons?" (review of Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy, Henry Holt, 2023, 288 pp.), Foreign Affairs, vol. 103, no. 1 (January/February 2024), pp. 150–156.
• Mulder, Nicholas. The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (2022) also see online review

• Sanctions Programs and Country Information (United States Department of the Treasury)
• Commerce Control List (Bureau of Industry and Security)