Taliban propaganda

Since the 2001 fall of their national government in Afghanistan, Taliban propaganda has developed into a sophisticated public relations machine that is shaping perceptions in Afghanistan and abroad. Although polls show the movement remains unpopular, the insurgents have readily exploited a sense of growing alienation fostered by years of broken government promises, official corruption, and the rising death toll among civilians from airstrikes and other military actions. "The result is weakening public support for nation-building, even though few actively support the Taliban," says a report from the International Crisis Group, a think tank that monitors conflicts. An American official in Afghanistan agrees: "We cannot afford to be passive [communicators] any longer if we're going to turn this around."^[1]

Thomas Howard Johnson, who served as the American Special Envoy to Afghanistan (1989–92), says that "nearly the entire propaganda production platform for the Taliban’s information campaign carried out inside Afghanistan is located in Pakistan and overseen by ISI", including the magazines Al Somood, In Fight, Shahamat, Elhan, Murchal, the monthly pamphlet Srak and media studios and video production facilities of Alemarah, al Hijirat and Mana-ul Jihad.^[2] It was often alleged that there has been a great deal of help coming from the Pakistan's ISI (Inter–State Services). After the Fall of Kabul in August 2021, the Taliban have introduced a new propaganda in Afghanistan.^[3]

A primary focus in the Taliban's media message is the history of wars between Christians and Muslims. The Taliban emphasize religious and cultural differences between the West and the East, the idea of the clash of civilizations, denounce the West as oppressive against Islam, call the war on terror a war against Islam, and condemn the international forces as "occupiers and invaders." They portray the government of Afghanistan as its puppet, and the reconstruction works as "efforts of Christianizing Afghanistan," by using civilian casualties of air strikes and media reports of prisoners' abuses and mistreatment in their favor.^[4]

Early Taliban post-December 2001 media efforts were limited and cautious, reflecting the precarious nature of their position. The first media spokesman appointed after the collapse of the regime was Abdul Latif Hakimi. When Pakistani authorities arrested Hakimi on 4 October 2005, he was replaced by as many as three successors. One of these new spokesmen, Muhammad Hanif, was himself arrested in January 2007. The main aim of Taliban media activities during this time was to publicize, in an often exaggerated fashion, Taliban operations undertaken in Afghanistan. This was achieved mainly through contact with Pakistani or international press, usually through radio, telephone or newspapers.^[5]

Taliban propaganda often portrays the government of Hamid Karzai as morally bankrupt minions of the United States. For example, a press release from August 2010, promulgated after a Washington Post report describing ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and Karzai's aides, called the Karzai government a "puppet multidimensional administration whose members are morally, politically and financially corrupt". The group also tends to dismiss the coalition forces as weak and on the verge of collapse.^[6]

In October of 2010, the Taliban began portraying themselves as a viable alternative to the Karzai government, promising to promote transparency and reduce corruption. Unusually, they also claimed they would respect the rights of women. An anonymous intelligence official interviewed by The Washington Post speculated this may have been a reaction to a story from Time magazine about a woman who was mutilated by the Taliban.^[6]

When the Taliban attempt to rally rural people within Afghanistan to their cause, they will often characterize the coalition as an army of "occupiers" who want to destroy Islam, typically by citing various Islamic texts and certain fatwas. Those who support the coalition and the Karzai administration are portrayed as betraying Islam, while those who oppose them and support the Taliban are seen as fulfilling a holy duty to defend the faith. If a village leader or group of village dwellers provide aid to the Karzai government or the coalition, the Taliban will typically send them threatening letters to sway them into withdrawing support.^[4]

The Taliban know how to take advantage of Western media outlets. For instance, on Aug. 18, the Taliban ambushed a French patrol about 30 miles from the Afghan capital, an attack that left 10 soldiers dead. Several weeks later, militants involved in the attack appeared in a glossy, eight-page magazine spread in Paris-Match, a leading French newsweekly, flaunting the weapons, uniforms and personal effects of the dead soldiers. Back in France, support for the war dropped to a new low. Defense Minister Herve Morin noted that the Taliban "understood that public opinion is probably the Achilles' heel" of the international community.^[1]

Along with four regional commands, the Afghan Taliban have 10 committees which address specific issues. Some of the members of the committees are also members of the Quetta Shura. One of these committees - Culture and Information - deals with Taliban propaganda. This committee is led by Amir Khan Muttaqi.^[7]

• Maulvi Qudratullah Jamal served as the Taliban's chief of propaganda from 2002 to 2005. He now runs an investigative committee that deals with complaints from Afghan citizens against local Taliban personnel. Jamal also operates as a liaison to the Taliban's global supporters.^[7]

The formal spokesmen of the Taliban insurgents are the most active and effective measure of the group's propaganda front. They are appointed by Mullah Omar through a formal decree or statement, delivered to the media by a top aide. This was not the case with Mufti Latifullah Hakimi, the first full-time Taliban spokesman, but all the later spokesmen were appointed this way. After his arrest on October 4, 2005, the number of spokesmen was increased to two: one for their activities in the southern and western provinces (Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan, Helmand, Herat, Nimroz, Farah, Badghis, Ghor and Sar-e-Pul) and the other for eastern, central and northern provinces (Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamiyan, Daykundi, Faryab, Ghazni, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Laghman, Logar, Nangrahar, Nuristan, Paktia, Paktika, Panjsher, Parwan, Samangan, Takhar, and Wardak). Currently, Qari Mohammad Yousuf Ahmadi acts as spokesman for the former provinces and Zabiullah Mujahid for the latter.^[7]

These spokesmen never provide regular and exact information about their fighters' casualties nor their attack tactics, operations, commanders' whereabouts and their own identities. But they are very fast in contacting local and international media for taking responsibility of attacks, claims of successes, formal statements, rejecting government officials' and international forces' claims, and other such issues.^[7]

Within the Taliban there are other groups who have their own spokesmen. For example, the Salafi (Wahhabi) Taliban in the eastern Kunar and Nuristan provinces, the Tora Bora Military Front in Nangrahar, and the Haqqani Network in the provinces bordering Waziristan (Khost, Paktia, Paktika) have their own spokesmen who contact the media on their own. Sometimes field commanders also contact the media for immediate effects of their attacks because they believe in the importance of a propaganda war. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami, which associates himself and cooperates with the Taliban because of the "common enemy," has its own spokesman and it is observed, particularly in the case of major attacks, (for example, the attack on French troops in Sarobi and the attack on a new year's celebrations in Kabul) that both Taliban's and Hekmatyar's spokesman claimed to have them carried out. Though he was member of the Taliban's leadership council, Mullah Dadullah, who was killed by the coalition forces in May 2007, had his own spokesman.^[7]

The Taliban generally disseminate propaganda using decentralized, conventional methods, such leaflets and secret radio broadcasts. They have been particularly effective at preaching their messages at mosques and other public places. The coalition forces have difficulty counteracting these in-person methods, as their troops usually lack the knowledge and training to refute Taliban propagandists and often need to rely on Afghan officials. The Taliban also use newer forms of media, such as Facebook and Twitter.^[6]

Internet has proved the fastest and the most useful propaganda tool for the Taliban during recent years.^[4]

• Websites: The Taliban maintain their own websites, packed with news, sermons, photos, videos, audio clips, articles on conducting guerilla warfare, and press releases and statements from their various spokesmen. Many of these sites are multilingual and include information in Pashto, Dari, Arabic, Urdu, and English. They are difficult to take down, as whenever coalition agencies shut down a web site, it often resurfaces under a different name and server configuration.^[4] One such site, the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" (based on the regime that ruled the country from 1996 to 2001), frequently switches service providers to avoid being shut down. A Washington Post investigation determined that it was hosted by a firm based in Houston for over a year, without the firm's knowledge.^[1] Some Taliban spokesmen also communicate with the public through Internet forums.^[4]
• Videos: Propaganda videos published on Facebook and YouTube help spread the Taliban's message to audiences and are used to attract aid and volunteers from outside Afghanistan and Pakistan.^[1] Taliban spokesmen are known for exploiting captives through propaganda such as Private Bergdahl who was captured in June 2009. Three videos of the missing private have been released, including one at Christmastime. In April 2010, a seven-minute video of the POW followed.
• Email: The Taliban frequently use email to speak with reporters and media agencies, take responsibility for attacks, provide information and clarifications, and send press releases. Taliban spokesmen are often reachable via email, and many insurgents are willing to do email interviews.^[4]

The Taliban also disseminate propaganda videos through DVDs. Many of these cheap, mass-produced DVDs show Taliban insurgents executing enemies and conducting attacks against coalition forces. One particularly popular video features a montage of Afghan mujahideen fighting Soviet forces during the Soviet–Afghan War, in effect attempting to depict coalition forces as invaders. Other DVDs depict atrocities allegedly conducted by the coalition forces.^[1]

The Taliban method for night letters usually entails a warning delivered under a gate or nailed to a door in the dead of night.^[8] During the run-up to the 2010 Afghan parliamentary elections, the Taliban intimidated villagers in certain areas from voting. People in the villages would not vote because the Taliban left letters at night warning they will cut off the finger of anyone if they find it marked with the election ink used to prevent multiple voting.^[9]

Various different groups within the Taliban print their own magazines, often publishing them openly and distributing them for free in Peshawar and the adjacent areas. Some are written in Pashto, while others cater to Urdu and Arabic speakers. These magazines are generally quite biased and only include stories and articles if they support the Taliban's extremist narrative. They often feature long interviews with insurgent commanders, distorted news accounts, photos of victims, and discussions of politics and religion.^[4]

According to analyst and counterinsurgency expert Abdulhadi Hairan, many of these magazines "exploit a particular incident or issue by elevating it with seemingly related background information to provoke the local people to stand up for violence." For example, a 2010 issue of Shahamat (The Bravery), a Taliban propaganda magazine published in Pashto, describes an incident in the Maidan Wardak Province in the following terms:

The latest sad news is that the Christian Crusaders (Americans) have burned a copy of the Holy Quran in Wardak province and have thus shown their enmity with Islam and the Muslims... The saddest aspect of this incident is that the American invaders have committed this heinous crime in a province (Wardak) that has been known for long as home to mujahedeen (the holy warriors). The people of this province have taken active part in past and current jihadi movements. The people of this province have always defended their country bravely and heroically. The people of this province had played a historical role in the war against British occupiers...^[4]

Other Taliban magazines magazines, which vary in frequency of publication, length, languages (Pashto but also Dari, Urdu and Arabic) and so on, include Al Somood (Resistance), Srak (Beam of Light), Tora Bora Magazine, In Fight, Elham (Inspiration/Revelation), Murchal (Trench), Mesaq-i-Esaar (Covenant of Sacrifice), Ihsas (Feelings), Resalat (Duty), Zamir (Conscience), Hittin, Wahdat, Nawa-I Afghan Jihad (Voice or melody of the Afghan Jihad), Likwal’ Hewad, and Khabroona.^[10]

In May 2009, Time claimed that American forces had "reportedly" launched a campaign in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to take down Taliban-affiliated websites and jam Taliban radio stations. The magazine also stated that the Afghan government had set up a $1.2 million media center, as part of an effort to fill in gaps in coverage that might be exploited by Taliban propagandists. The center was built with help from international groups and was staffed by "Western-trained spin doctors". The head of the center, Waheed Omer, told Time that his priorities were giving journalists enough positive stories to report and getting stories out quickly.^[1]

• The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters). Thomas H. Johnson, Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 18, No. 3, 317–344, September 2007
• Johnson, Thomas H., Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2019). ISBN 9780190840600