Schevkal campaign
| Schevkal campaign (1604-1605) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Russian–Kumyk Wars | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Russia |
Shamkhalate of Tarki Ottoman Empire | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Ivan Buturlin † Osip Pleshchev † Ivan Polev † Kalinnik Zyuzin † Demid Cheremisinov † Ivan Isupov † Vladimir Ivanovich Bakhteyarov (WIA) (POW) |
Sultan Mahmud of Endiree Adil Girey I Muzaffar Pasha of Shemakhi Janissary Agha | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 10,000[2]-50,000[3] | 20,000 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 6,000-7,000 dead[4][1] | Unknown | ||||||
The Schevkal campaign (1604–1605) was a military campaign by the Russian army against the Shamkhalate. These were the first Russian forces to come close to Dagestan since 1594. Russians captured Tarki, but the Kumyks and their allies, under the command of Sultan Mahmud, routed the Russian army at the battle of Karaman.[5] Russian commander, Ivan Buturlin, was killed in the battle, along with 7000 Russian soldiers. The Shamkhalate of Tarki retained independence, and Russian expansion in Dagestan halted for 118 years.
Prelude
Russia had been trying to subjugate Dagestan since the 16th century, but suffered defeat in the 1594 campaign. In 1603, an embassy arrived from the Georgian Tsar Alexander, who wanted to become a Russian citizen in exchange for military support. The Georgian ambassadors told the Russian boyars, "We wept because of the infidels, and therefore we surrender our heads to the Orthodox Tsar, may He protect us. But we weep even now. Our homes, churches, and monasteries are in ruins, our families in captivity, our shoulders under the yoke. Is this what you promised us? And the infidels mock Christians, asking: where is the shield of the White Tsar?". Despite some objections from the Tsar, the Georgians eventually persuaded him to send them aid. They also proposed building a stone fortress in Tarki, another in Tuzluk, and a third in Buynak. The Russian Tsar sent two noble commanders: Ivan Mikhailovich Buturlin and Osip Timofeevich Pleshchev. They were supposed to march with regiments recruited from Kazan and Astrakhan respectively to Dagestan and act with the Terek voivodes, then wait for the Georgian army, which Georgia had promised with an oath. The Russians allocated at least 300,000 rubles for the campaign. [6]
Campaign
Russian Invasion
Russian troops advanced into Dagestan and occupied the main city of Tarki with almost no resistance. The site for the fortress construction was well-chosen: it was flanked by high cliffs on three sides, with forests and orchards along the Caspian Sea coast. The construction of the fortification progressed rapidly, as the Russian forces had access to all necessary materials, including stone, timber, and lime. The settlement was named 'Novy Gorod' (New City), while a second fortress was established at Tuzluk. While a significant portion of the army was engaged in labor, the remainder continued military operations. Moscow's forces conducted campaigns across Dagestan, plundering towns and capturing inhabitants of the settlements. Buturlin dispatched 5,000 warriors to Astrakhan for the winter. During their march, they engaged in battle with the Kumyks. The fierce engagement resulted in a defeat for the highlanders; Karamzin estimated their losses at 3,000 killed. [7]
Battle of Zagem
Meanwhile, the Georgians sought to consolidate their status as Russian subjects. Upon receiving news that Ottoman forces were advancing toward Zagem, an engagement took place on October 7. The Georgians opened fire on the Turks, who retreated with minimal resistance. Georgian warriors captured four banners and several prisoners. On October 8, the Kumyk army was defeated; the spoils of victory were sent to the Russians as a gesture of tribute.
Russo-Georgian negotiations
Simultaneously, King Alexander of Kakheti converted to Islam and, supported by 2,000 elite warriors, khans, and princes dispatched by Shah Abbas I, launched a campaign against Shemakha. The Russian envoy, Tatishchev, attempted to dissuade the King, arguing that Safavid Persia posed a greater threat than the Ottoman Porte. Upon arriving at Alexander’s residence on March 12, Tatishchev heard gunfire and the sounds of battle. It was revealed that the Persians had assassinated King Alexander and his son, Yuri. Their severed heads were presented to Alexander's other son, Constantine, who attempted to justify the Shah’s actions by claiming Alexander’s death was accidental and Yuri’s was an execution for treasonous ties to the Turks. Later, while attempting to explain himself to Tatishchev, Constantine maintained his outward loyalty to the Shah and his adherence to Islam, yet claimed he would remain a protector of Christianity. He concluded with a sharp reproach: 'Where is your firm backbone upon which we might lean in times of need?' Tatishchev subsequently departed from Zagem, formally declaring the assassination of King Alexander a violation of the amicable relations between Russia and Safavid Persia. [8]
The Russians proceeded to inspect Kartli, which had suffered less devastation than eastern Georgia or Kakheti. The region was ruled by Prince George (Yuri), who had succeeded Simon after the latter was captured by the Turks. During the negotiations, the Prince received the Russian envoy Tatishchev warmly. Tatishchev sought George's formal allegiance to Russia and requested that Prince Khosrow (Khozdróy) be sent to Moscow. Although Prince George was shaken by the death of King Alexander, Tatishchev pointed out that Alexander had not been under the official protection of the Russian State. Expressing a desire for a dynastic alliance, George declared his submission to Russia 'with his kingdom and his soul.' Regarding the envoy's requests, the Prince noted that Khosrow was his closest military advisor, yet he expressed a willingness to offer his daughter, Elena, for a marriage alliance if it were 'the will of God and the Russian Sovereign.' Having concluded the negotiations with Prince George, Tatishchev received unexpected and grave news: the Ottoman forces were seeking heavy retribution against the Russians for the previous actions of the Moscow troops. [9]
Russo-Ottoman Relations
The historian Nikolay Karamzin notes that relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire were peculiar: the Ottomans would approach Astrakhan or Moscow without a formal declaration of war, while the Russian Tsars continued to affirm their friendship, treating Ottoman hostilities as errors or misunderstandings. It soon became clear that the Shamkhal, having failed to secure aid from Persia, had appealed to Sultan Mehmed III. The Sultan ordered the Pasha of Derbent and other regional governors to expel the Russians from Dagestan.
Ottoman campaign: Siege of Koysu and Aktash
In the spring of 1605, a combined force of Turks, Kumyks, Lezgins, and Avars advanced on Koysu. The fortress was held by Vladimir Dolgorukov, whose forces were severely depleted as the troops sent for wintering had not yet returned. Unable to withstand the siege, Dolgorukov set fire to the fortification and retreated by sea to the town of Terki. [10] The Ottomans subsequently besieged and captured Aktash, defeating the guard garrison.
Siege of Tarki
News soon arrived that the Turkish Pashas were besieging Buturlin himself in Tarki. Buturlin managed to repel several assaults by the coalition, though both sides suffered heavy casualties. The Turks succeeded in breaching part of the wall, and a stone tower was blown up, killing a choice unit of Moscow streltsy. However, Russians withstood Assault. [11] Recognizing that the fortress could no longer be held, Buturlin entered into negotiations. During a feast held by the two sides, the lead Ottoman Pasha promised to allow the Russians to depart with honor and to provide them with all necessary supplies.
Battle of Karaman
Buturlin placed his trust in the Ottoman Pasha's word. However, Sultan Mut sought vengeance for the incursion into Dagestan. After the Kumyks, Ottomans, and other Caucasian peoples observed Ramadan, they decided to strike.[12] Believing themselves to be in complete safety, the Russian forces neglected even to post sentries. The allied army launched a surprise assault, leading to a fierce battle in which the majority of Russian commanders and soldiers perished.[13]
Aftermath
According to Karamzin, Russian losses were estimated at 6,000 to 7,000 killed[14], while the New Chronicler (Novyi Letopisets) cites a figure of 7,000 dead.[15] The fallen commanders included Buturlin himself and his son; Voivode Pleshcheyev and his two sons, Bogdan and Lev; Voivode Polev; Kallinnik Zyuzin; Demid Cheremisinov; Ivan Isupov; and many others.[16] Among the few survivors was Voivode Vladimir Ivanovich Bakhteyarov, who was 'taken for dead' by the enemy and captured, though he was later released by the Sultan.[17]
Karamzin noted that "for 118 years, this defeat erased all traces of Russian dominion in Dagestan". [18] Boris Godunov entered into negotiations with England, seeking to form an anti-Ottoman coalition. Despite extensive diplomacy with England, the Papacy, and other powers, the Tsardom of Russia achieved little beyond a friendship with the English. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Porte, with which Russia had virtually no diplomatic relations at the time, was at war with Austria. Reports from Greeks seeking service in Russia regarding the internal state of the Ottoman Empire temporarily eased Russian concerns over national security. The two sides also conducted prisoner exchanges; notably, a Russian voivode held captive in Kaffa was released by the Ottoman Sultan.[19]
References
- ^ a b Karamzin 2020, p. 696.
- ^ Егоршина 2023, p. 475.
- ^ The Dutch merchant Isaac Massa (1587-1635) wrote in his brief report on the beginning and origin of wars and unrest in Muscovy: “Tsar Boris ... sent 50,000 people, including Poles and Livonians, and they mostly perished ... so that few returned, and in Moscow there were people who told so much about the country and people there that it would be more than enough for several books, and they said that in some places they met people strong as giants who never part with their weapons, neither in the field behind the plow, nor at home, and their dwellings are built in large caves for there are many mountains and beautiful valleys, and in the mountains there is a lot of cattle ... The one who told us this news was wounded by many arrows on the campaign and told us that he and his comrades wandered for a long time before they reached the Caspian Sea ... So, they returned to Moscow few, having achieved nothing." N. M. Karamzin adds: "This battle is unhappy."
- ^ Unknown Author, "Новый лѣтописец, составленный в царствование Михаила Феодоровича" (on Russian), 1853, p. 57
- ^ Карамзин Н. М. Глава I // История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829. — Т. 11 - С.72
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 60-61
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 61
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 62-63
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 64
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 64-65
- ^ Potto V.A."Кавказская война в отдельных очерках, эпизодах, легендах и биографиях" (on Russian), 1887, V. 1, p. 738
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 72
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 71-72
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 72
- ^ Unknown Author, "Новый лѣтописец, составленный в царствование Михаила Феодоровича" (on Russian), 1853, p. 57
- ^ Unknown Author, "Новый лѣтописец, составленный в царствование Михаила Феодоровича" (on Russian), 1853, p. 57
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 72
- ^ Karamzin N. M. "История государства Российского. — СПб.: Тип. Н. Греча, 1816—1829" (on Russian), Vol. I, p. 72
- ^ Unknown Author, "Новый лѣтописец, составленный в царствование Михаила Феодоровича" (on Russian), 1853, p. 57
Bibliography
- Егоршина, Петрова (2023). История русской армии [The history of the Russian Army] (in Russian). Moscow: Edition of the Russian Imperial Library. ISBN 978-5-699-42397-2.
- Karamzin, Nikolay (2020) [1824]. История Государства Российского [History of the Russian state]. Азбука. ISBN 978-5-4484-4482-1.