Pro-Beijing camp (Taiwan)
Pro-Beijing camp 臺灣親中共派 | |
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| Founded | 1990s |
| Ideology | Chinese unification One country, two systems Anti–Taiwan independence Majority: Conservatism (Taiwanese) Factions: Socialism |
| Political position | Majority: Right-wing to far-right[1] Factions: Left-wing |
| Pro-Beijing camp | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese | 臺灣親中共派 | ||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Taiwan's pro-Communist factions | ||||||||||||
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| Alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||||
| Chinese | 急統派 | ||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Radical pro-unification faction | ||||||||||||
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The pro-Beijing camp or pro-PRC camp refers to a group or individual in Taiwan that is friendly to the People's Republic of China (PRC), supports the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and is oriented toward Chinese unification. The CCP uses both carrots and sticks to strengthen pro-Beijing political forces in Taiwan to form a "united front"; while threatening war with Taiwan, it also provides opportunities for commercial and cultural exchange.
Overview
Both pro-Beijing camp and pan-Blue Coalition support "One China"; while the pan-Blue Coalition defines the Republic of China as "One China", but pro-Beijing camp generally recognize the People's Republic of China as "One China". However, some political parties, such as the pro-Beijing New Party, do not deny the Republic of China and support peaceful unification with the People's Republic of China.
In 2022, the Director of Taiwan's National Security Bureau stated that the Chinese Communist Party provides training to local online influencers as part of its "cognitive warfare" for political propaganda.[2] In 2023, the Republic of China's Mainland Affairs Council stated in a report that the CCP was increasing its cross-strait propaganda efforts in Taiwan through cognitive warfare.[3]
According to Sinologist Gerry Groot, the erosion of the "one country, two systems" framework in Hong Kong had a profound impact on Taiwan's political landscape. Following the 2020 enactment of the National Security Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—a response to mass demonstrations and dissent in Hong Kong—Groot argues that the "clear and effective end of Hong Kong’s judicial independence" occurred twenty-seven years ahead of schedule. This perceived abrogation of CCP promises was closely observed in Taiwan, where it "made the work of the tiny minority of pro-unification activists even harder and reinforced the skepticism of others regarding the value of CCP promises." Furthermore, Groot notes that these developments in Hong Kong played a crucial role in the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, aiding the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen while undermining the campaign of the Kuomintang candidate, Han Kuo-yu.[4]
The organized crime groups in Taiwan, driven by financial incentives also support the PRC unification efforts.[5][6]
Political stance
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| Neoauthoritarianism in China |
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In Taiwanese political standards, Taiwanese–Chinese nationalism has been regarded as right/conservative and Taiwan independence movement as left/progressive; the pro-Beijing camp is also called the "radical pro-unification factions" (急統派) and is considered "far-right" (極右); because the PRC is a one-party dictatorship and authoritarian nationalist regime but Taiwan is a liberal democracy.[1]
Political parties
- Labor Party (1989–present)
- New Party (1993–present)
- For Public Good Party (2002–present)
- Chinese Unification Promotion Party (2005–present)
- Chinese Democratic Progressive Party[n 1] (2005–2020)
- Communist Party of the Republic of China (2009–2018)
- Taiwan Democratic Communist Party (2009–2020)
- Taiwan People's Communist Party (2017–present)
- Patriot Alliance Association (2018–present)[n 2]
Kuomintang continues to be opposed to communism, as anti-communism is written under Article 2 of Kuomintang's party charter. However, some politicians, including Hung Hsiu-chu, are classified as "pro-Beijing".[7][8] Although the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) positions itself as a centrist party, its cooperative relationship with the PRC has prompted belief that it aligns more closely with conservatism.[9][10]
Prominent individuals
- Chang An-lo
- Chou Ching-chun
- Hung Hsiu-chu[7][8]
- Hsieh Chi-ta
- Wang Bing-Chung
- Wu Cherng-dean
- Yok Mu-ming
See also
Notes
- ^ Not to be confused with the Democratic Progressive Party, a pro–Taiwan independence group.
- ^ It is the day the Patriot Alliance Association (PAA) was founded as a political party; the PAA was founded as a political organization in November 12, 1993.
References
- ^ a b 蕭嘉弘 (2018-09-21). "台灣急統派不是民主極右勢力！". 民報 Taiwan People News. Archived from the original on 2023-06-18.
- ^ "Some Taiwanese Youtubers on CCP payroll: intelligence chief". Focus Taiwan. Retrieved 2022-05-17.
- ^ "China to increase 'united front' efforts: MAC report". Taipei Times. 2023-05-16. Retrieved 2023-05-19.
- ^ Groot, Gerry (October 19, 2022). "The Life and Death of United Front Promises From Revolution to (Re)-Unification Past, Present and Future". China Brief. Jamestown. Retrieved October 19, 2022.
- ^ Purbrick, Martin (September 5, 2025). "Criminal Organizations as Vectors of Influence in Taiwan". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved September 11, 2025.
- ^ Purbrick, Martin (June 7, 2025). "Hongmen Associations Have Links to United Front and Organized Crime". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved September 11, 2025.
- ^ a b "Taiwan's ruling party replaces pro-Beijing candidate Hung Hsiu-chu". CNBC. 19 October 2015.
- ^ a b "The Strange Case of the KMT's Hung Hsiu-chu". The Diplomat. 23 June 2015.
With the more moderate members of the KMT seemingly standing by, Hung has forged ahead with a radical pro-Beijing policy that has much in common with the pro-unification New Party.
- ^ "獨家／無視黨內規範？白中央委員再赴海峽論壇黨內震怒 民眾黨將移送中評會". FTNN新聞網. 2025-06-21.
- ^ "民眾黨指「大陸地區」非外國 吳思瑤批：黃國昌能到北京人大咆哮？". Newtalk新聞網. 2025-08-12.