Necessity and duress

Necessity and duress (compulsion) are different defenses in a criminal case.[1][2][3] The defense of duress applies when another person threatens imminent harm if defendant did not act to commit the crime. The defense of necessity applies when defendant is forced by natural circumstances to choose between two evils, and the criminal act is the lesser evil.[1][3][2]

United States

This section is an excerpt from Duress in American law.[edit]

In jurisprudence, duress or coercion refers to a situation whereby a person performs an act as a result of violence, threat, or other pressure against the person. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) defines duress as "any unlawful threat or coercion used... to induce another to act [or not act] in a manner [they] otherwise would not [or would]". Duress is pressure exerted upon a person to coerce that person to perform an act they ordinarily would not perform. The notion of duress must be distinguished both from undue influence in the civil law. In criminal law, duress and necessity are different defenses.[4][5]

Duress has two aspects. One is that it negates the person's consent to an act, such as sexual activity or the entering into a contract; or, secondly, as a possible legal defense or justification to an otherwise unlawful act.[6] Defendants utilizing the duress defense admit to breaking the law but claim that they are not liable because, even though the act broke the law, it was only performed because of extreme, unlawful pressure.[7] In criminal law, a duress defense is similar to a plea of guilty, admitting partial culpability, so that if the defense is not accepted then the criminal act is admitted.

Duress or coercion can also be raised in an allegation of rape or other sexual assault to negate a defense of consent on the part of the person making the allegation.

United Kingdom

This section is an excerpt from Duress in English law.[edit]

Duress in English law is a complete common law defence, operating in favour of those who commit crimes because they are forced or compelled to do so by the circumstances, or the threats of another. The doctrine arises not only in criminal law but also in civil law, where it is relevant to contract law and trusts law.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi law regards contracts entered into without willing consent to be invalid, regarding both coercion and economic duress as causes for invalidity.[8]

Ancient Rome

See also: Vitium in contrahendo, Obligatio ex delicto § Sources of obligationes ex delicto, and Restitutio ad integrum § Ancient Roman law

Jewish law

See also: Self-sacrifice in Jewish law § Murder

Jewish law does not accept duress a defense for the crime of murder, as the Talmud states (on Pesachim 25b, Yoma 82b, and Sanhedrin 74a):

Someone came before Rava[a] and said, "The governor of the city ordered me to slay a certain man, and threatened to kill me if I did not". Rava[a] said to him, "Rather than slay another person, you must permit yourself to be slain, for how do you know that your blood is redder than his; perhaps his blood is redder than yours?"[9][10][11]

Islamic law

See also: Glossary of Islam § Ikrah

Notes

  1. ^ a b Many MSS read Rabbah.

References

  1. ^ a b Handbook on Criminal Law 381 (1972)
  2. ^ a b Criminal Law - Cases and Materials, 7th ed. 2012, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business; John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, Guyora Binder, ISBN 978-1-4548-0698-1, [1]
  3. ^ a b People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977)
  4. ^ People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977)
  5. ^ Handbook on Criminal Law 381 (1972)
  6. ^ Gaines, Larry; Miller, LeRoy (2006). Criminal Justice In Action: The Core. Thomson/Wadsworth. ISBN 0-495-00305-0.
  7. ^ "1st Class Investigations Glossary".
  8. ^ Nuski, Mohamed (29 March 2025). "Interpretation of FIDIC Red Book Contracts under Saudi Law". Retrieved 6 March 2026.
  9. ^ "Pesachim 25b:4". www.sefaria.org. Retrieved 2021-03-04.
  10. ^ "Yoma 82b:1". www.sefaria.org. Retrieved 2021-03-04.
  11. ^ "Sanhedrin 74a:20". www.sefaria.org. Retrieved 2021-03-04.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is available under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 unless otherwise noted. Additional terms may apply for the media files.