Lex Vatinia

The lex Vatinia (probably passed in May or early June 59 BC)[1][2][3] also known as the lex Vatinia de provincia Caesaris[4] or the lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris,[5] was a law which made Gaius Julius Caesar proconsular governor of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years.[6][7][3] It was named after and proposed, in the tribal assembly, by plebeian tribune Publius Vatinius.[8] Along with the provinces, it also gave him the three legions already present there and the privilege of naming his own legates.[9] Caesar also received Titus Labienus as legatus cum imperio in the law; Labienus' appointment may have been a sign of friendship between Pompey and Caesar.[10]

Impact

Caesar initially seemed prepared for a war of choice against the Dacian kingdom.[11] However, after the unexpected death of the governor of Transalpine Gaul, and at the proposal of Pompey and Piso,[6] the senate also added to Caesar's assigned provinces the further Gaul as well, giving him another legion.[8] According to Cicero and Suetonius, the senate's assignment was done out of fear that if they did not do so, a tribune would introduce and the people would pass further legislation doing the assignment regardless.[12]

The army assigned to Caesar in the Gauls and Illyricum proved useful in Caesar's civil war and, in the immediate term, for the protection of Caesar's legislative programme against repeal.[13] The law – importantly – gave Caesar, as governor of the provinces, a chance to show his martial quality with great potential for military glory. To that end, he campaigned extensively in Germany, Britain, and Gaul. The specific provinces also furnished a substantial number of Roman citizens recruitable for his campaigns.[8]

Caesar's position in Transalpine Gaul was annually reviewed by the senate.[14] When the five year term expired, Caesar met with Pompey, Crassus, and others at the so-called Luca Conference where they renewed their political alliance and pushed through legislation to extend Caesar's Gallic commands.[15]

The granting of a proconsulship in Gaul also gave Caesar legal immunity against prosecution by his political enemies and a number of armies.[16] While Caesar did not appear to desire a war against his countrymen upon his prorogation pro consule to Gaul and Illyricum, by 49 BC, amid a confrontation with the senate Caesar decided to go to war to protect his personal interests.[16][17][18]

References

  1. ^ Taylor 1968, p. 173.
  2. ^ Drogula 2015, p. 306.
  3. ^ a b Jameson 1970, p. 645.
  4. ^ Jehne, Martin (2017). "Why the anti-Caesarians failed: political communication on the eve of the civil war". In Rosillo-Lopez, Christina (ed.). Political communication in the Roman World. Brill. p. 210. ISBN 978-90-04-35084-7.
  5. ^ Taylor, Lily Ross (1951). "On the Chronology of Caesar's First Consulship". American Journal of Philology. 72 (3): 254–268. doi:10.2307/292075. ISSN 0002-9475. JSTOR 292075.
  6. ^ a b von Ungern-Sternberg, Jurgen (2014). "The Crisis of the Republic". In Flower, Harriet (ed.). Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 91. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521807948. ISBN 978-1-139-00033-8.
  7. ^ Drogula 2015, p. 371.
  8. ^ a b c Chrissanthos, Stefan (2019). The Year of Julius and Caesar: 59 BC and the Transformation of the Roman Republic. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 73. ISBN 978-1-4214-2969-4. OCLC 1057781585.
  9. ^ Taylor 1968, p. 182.
  10. ^ Drogula 2015, p. 336.
  11. ^ Drogula 2015, p. 316.
  12. ^ Drogula 2015, p. 316, citing Cic. Att. 8.3.3; Suet. Iul. 22.1.
  13. ^ Taylor 1968, p. 188, quoting from: Syme, Ronald (1944). "Review of Caesar der Politiker und Staatsman". The Journal of Roman Studies. 34: 98. doi:10.2307/296786. ISSN 0075-4358. JSTOR 296786. S2CID 162600706.
  14. ^ Jameson 1970, p. 646.
  15. ^ Gruen, Erich S. (1969). "Pompey, the Roman Aristocracy, and the Conference of Luca". Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 18 (1): 100. ISSN 0018-2311. JSTOR 4435061.
  16. ^ a b Bucher, Gregory S (2011). "Caesar: the view from Rome". The Classical Outlook. 88 (3): 82–87. ISSN 0009-8361. JSTOR 43940076.
  17. ^ Ehrhardt, C. T. H. R. (1995). "Crossing the Rubicon". Antichthon. 29: 30–41. doi:10.1017/S0066477400000927. ISSN 0066-4774. S2CID 142429003.
  18. ^ Morstein-Marx, Robert (2007). "Caesar's Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His "Ratio Absentis" in the Approach to the Civil War". Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 56 (2): 159–178. doi:10.25162/historia-2007-0013. ISSN 0018-2311. JSTOR 25598386. S2CID 159090397.

Bibliography

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