John Robert Jones
J. R. Jones | |
|---|---|
Jones in 1941 | |
| Born | John Robert Jones 4 September 1911 Pwllheli, Caernarfonshire, Wales. |
| Died | 3 June 1970 (aged 58) Swansea, Wales |
| Burial place | Pwllheli |
| Occupation | Philosopher |
| Academic background | |
| Education | University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Balliol College, Oxford |
| Academic work | |
| Institutions | University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, University College of Swansea |
John Robert Jones (4 September 1911 – 3 June 1970), was a Welsh philosopher.[1]
He was born in Pwllheli, and went to school there before going on to study philosophy at the (then) University College of Wales, Aberystwyth in 1929. He graduated with first class honours and did research for an MA there before going on to on to take his D.Phil. at Balliol College, Oxford.[2]
In 1939 he returned to Aberystwyth to lecture in philosophy, and in 1952 was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the then University College of Swansea. In 1961 he was visiting professor at Chapel Hill University, North Carolina. [2] On his return to Wales, he became more politically active, speaking out against the investiture of Charles, Prince of Wales in 1969, resigning from the Gorsedd of Bards in protest.[1] He held his Chair of Philosophy until his untimely death in 1970.[3]
As a philosopher, he was influenced by Wittgenstein and Simone Weil. His writings dealt mainly with three problems: the nature of the self, the nature of perception, and the nature of universals.[4]
Jones died on 3 June 1970. at his home in, Swansea, his funeral service was held at Penmount Chapel, Pwllheli, on 6 June. [5]
Works
Welsh
- Yr Argyfwng Gwacter Ystyr (1964)
- Prydeindod (1966)
- A rhaid i'r iaith ein gwahanu? (1967)
- Ni fyn y taeog mo'i ryddhau (1968)
- Yr ewyllys i barhau (1969)
- Gwaedd yng Nghymru (1970)
- Ac Onide (1970)
English
- "Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular". The Philosophical Review. 58 (2): 152–170. 1949. doi:10.2307/2181389. ISSN 0031-8108.
- "The Self in Sensory Cognition". Mind. 58 (229): 40–61. 1949. ISSN 0026-4423.[6]
- "Our Knowledge of Other Persons". Philosophy. 25 (93): 134–148. 1950. ISSN 0031-8191.
- Religion as True Myth: Inaugural Lecture of the Professor of Philosophy (PDF). University College of Swansea. 1953.
- "Sense Data: A Suggested Source of the Fallacy". Mind. 63 (250): 180–202. 1954. ISSN 0026-4423. JSTOR 2251255.
- with Miles, T. R. (1956). "Symposium: Self-Knowledge". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. 30: 120–156. ISSN 0309-7013.
- "The Two Contexts of Mental Concepts". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 59: 105–124. 1958. ISSN 0066-7374.
- "Love as Perception of Meaning" in: Phillips, D. Z., ed. (1967). Religion and understanding. New York : Macmillan.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - "The Inaugural Address: How Do I Know Who I Am?". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. 41: 1–18. 1967. ISSN 0309-7013.
- with Phillips, D. Z. (1970). "Belief and loss of belief: A discussion". Sophia. 9 (1): 1–7. doi:10.1007/BF02779105. ISSN 0038-1527. reprinted in Phillips, D. Z. (1993) Wittgenstein and Religion ISBN 978-0-333-58620-4.[8]
Notes
References
- ^ a b Mary Beynon Davies (2001). "Jones, John Robert (1911-1970), philosopher and patriot". Dictionary of Welsh Biography. National Library of Wales. Retrieved 4 October 2022.
- ^ a b Brown, Stuart (2005). "JONES, John Robert (1911-70)". Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 493.
- ^ "Jones, John Robert, 1911-1970 - National Library of Wales Archives and Manuscripts". archives.library.wales. Retrieved 17 November 2025.
- ^ Gealy, Walford (2009). "J. R. Jones: 'How Do I Know Who I Am?': The Passage from Objects to Gramma". In Edelman, John T. (ed.). Sense and reality: essays out of Swansea. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein society. Frankfurt: Ontos. ISBN 978-3-86838-041-5.
- ^ Anon (5 June 1970). "Deaths". The Times. p. 20.
- ^ Heider, F (July 1949). "Jones, J. R. The Self in Sensory Cognition". Psychological Abstracts. 23 (7). American Psychological Association: 371.
From the point of view that the self is a persistent particular, the unity of the self consists in the fact that a number of mental events belong to the same self and are owned by it. In opposition to this view is the serial theory of the self, proposed by positivistic phenomenalists, which reduces the fact of belonging to 'the same self' to relations between mental events. The serial theory commits a serious omission in taking the mental events as unanalyzed units and in not considering the complexity of the internal structure of mental events. The author attempts to interpret the fact that 'being aware of something' seems to refer to a persistent self within the frame of the serial theory
- ^ Flew, A. G. N. (1949). ""Selves"". Mind. 58 (231): 355–358. ISSN 0026-4423.
- ^ Clack, Brian R. (1995). "D. Z. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion". Religious Studies. 31 (1): 111–120. ISSN 0034-4125.