Jessica Brown

Jessica Brown is Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. She researches epistemology, philosophical responsibility and methodology. Her main publications include Anti-Individualism and Knowledge (2004), Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge (2018) and Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents (2024).

Education and career

Jessica Brown received her PhD at Oxford University.[1] She is a Professor of Philosophy in the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology at the University of St Andrews.[2]

She was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2018.[3]

Research

Brown's interests are on epistemology, more precisely on contextualism, invariantism and pragmatic encroachment.[4]

Selected works

  • Brown, J. (2004) Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Cambridge: MIT Press.[5][6][7][8][9]
  • Brown, J. & Gerken, M. (Eds.). (2012). Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Brown, J. (Ed.). (2011). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Brown, J. (2018). Fallibism: Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[10][11]
  • Brown, J. (2024). Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[12][13]

References

  1. ^ "Professor Jessica Brown | IAS Durham". Retrieved 2026-03-04.
  2. ^ "Jessica Brown". University of St Andrews Research Portal. Retrieved 2026-03-26.
  3. ^ "Professor Jessica Brown". Royal Society of Edinburgh. Retrieved 2026-03-26.
  4. ^ "Brown Inaugural Address – The Aristotelian Society". Retrieved 2026-03-04.
  5. ^ Goldberg, Sanford (2007). "Review of Anti-Individualism and Knowledge". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 74 (2): 515–518. ISSN 0031-8205.
  6. ^ Sandis, Constantine (2008-03-01). "Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge". Minds and Machines. 18 (1): 145–146. doi:10.1007/s11023-008-9092-8. ISSN 1572-8641.
  7. ^ Wikforss, Asa (2005). "Review of Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge". International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
  8. ^ Gorman, Benjamin A.; Philosophy Documentation Center (2005). "Review of Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, by Jessica Brown". Essays in Philosophy. 6 (1): 249–250. doi:10.5840/eip20056132. ISSN 1526-0569.
  9. ^ Sawyer, Sarah (2005). "Review of Anti-Individualism and Knowledge". The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-). 55 (221): 677–679. ISSN 0031-8094.
  10. ^ Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (2019). "Review of Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge". Mind. 128 (512): 1390–1397. ISSN 0026-4423.
  11. ^ Mcgrath, Matthew (2019). "Review of Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge". The Journal of Philosophy. 116 (11): 637–644. ISSN 0022-362X.
  12. ^ Mellor, Rowan (2025-12-08). "Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents , by Jessica Brown". Mind. doi:10.1093/mind/fzaf022. ISSN 0026-4423.
  13. ^ Perrine, Timothy (2025). "Review of Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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