Jessica Brown

Jessica Brown is professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews where she researchs in epistemology, philosophical responsibility and methodology. Her main publications include Anti-individualism and knowledge (2004), Fallibilism: evidence and knowledge (2018) and Groups as epistemic and moral agents (2024).

Jessica Brown received her PhD at Oxford University and in her early life she was deeply interested in the nature of a subject's knowledge of her own mind.^[1] After, she started working on a wider range of epistemologic topics such as the nature of knowledge and its representation in society.

In 2007 she started got appointed as a Professor at St Andrews university by creating Arché, a philosophical research centre organising an average of 1 conference per month.

She has written for both MIT and Oxford University Press and in prestigious journals such as Mind and Nous.

Brown's interests are on epistemology, more precisely on contextualism, invariantism and pragmatic encroachment. ^[2] Between 2008 and 2012 she was the principle analyst on an AHRC project which examined the methodological foundations of philosophical enquiry.

• Brown, J. & Gerken, M. (Eds.). (2012). Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Brown, J. (Ed.). (2011). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.