Imperial Commissioner (China)

The Imperial Commissioner (Mandarin Chinese: 钦差大臣; pinyin: Qīnchāi Dàchén; Manchu: ᡥᡝᠰᡝ ᡳ<ᠲᠠᡣᡡᠷᠠᡥᠠᠠᠮᠪᠠᠨ) was a high-ranking position in the Qing government and Ming government of the late Qing and Ming dynasties of China. The position itself is the highest rank in both governments, only below the position of Emperor. The position's officeholder is also appointed directly by the emperor. The position initially originated from the Han Dynasty, but modernised into the modern Imperial Commissioner in the later Ming Dynasty.

The concept of an Imperial Commissioner dates back to the Han Dynasty, when the Emperor of the Han often dispatched Special Commissioners (特使, Tèshǐ) for diplomatic missions, with an example being Zhang Qian's expedition to Central Asia, crossing regions in Xinjiang, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan.^[1] Starting from the Sui Dynasty, investigating censors were also deployed, and they were similar to the Imperial Commissioner in some aspects. However, the Investigating Censors remained mainly limited responsibility-wise, as they were only used for provincial supervision and issuing governmental reports back to the emperor. In the Tang Dynasty, the system's structure improved, as they began using Commissioners with Extraordinary Powers (採訪使, Cǎifǎngshǐ and later 觀察使, Guāncháshǐ) to govern and administrate regions, and engage in border patrol. They also helped with overseeing regional military campaign, and sometimes were appointed military supervisors or military commanders after retiring or leaving the role of Commissioner with Extraordinary Powers.^[2] In the Song Dynasty, the Song Emperors maintained a relatively similar system to that of the Tang Dynasty, but employed the principle of temporary commissioners. Temporary commissioners usually maintained order throughout the country, utilising their position to suppress rebellion and the rise of warlordism.^[3]

In the Ming Dynasty, posterior to the collapse of the Yuan Dynasty, the Ming emperors utilised Grand Coordinators (巡撫, Xúnfǔ) and Supreme Commanders (總督, Zǒngdū). Unlike Imperial Commissioners, these posts evolved into de facto provincial officials. The Imperial Commissioner was founded in 1555, following the Wokou (Japanese pirates) invasion into the Ming Dynasty from Japan. However, the position of Imperial Commissioner remained intermittent and infrequently used, only prominent during eras of external or internal instability.^[4]

In the early Qing Dynasty, during the reigns of the Shunzhi Emperor and the Kangxi Emperor in the 17th century and early 18th century, the role of Imperial Commissioner disappeared, and was used as a more flexible role of top governance instead of the established Imperial Commissioner used in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Imperial Commissioner was instead only named as a commissioner, and consisted mostly of Manchu princes and residents of the Manchu Eight Banners. These commissioners were dispatched to oversee military campaigns in southern Han coastal provinces like Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, and Zhejiang, and manage relations with Mongolia to increase Manchu-Mongol intermarriage and prepare for the Qing annexation of Outer Mongolia, which would occur in 1691 during Kangxi rule.^[5]

During the reign of the Qianlong Emperor in the 18th century, the position shifted in becoming a position used for crisis management in the Qing, and was used to suppress rebellions that were present during the Ten Great Campaigns launched by the Qianlong Emperor. These rebellions included the White Lotus Rebellion and the Jinchuan campaigns. The commissioners were also used for negotiations with foreign countries like the British Empire like during the 1793 British Macartney Diplomatic Mission. The Qianlong Emperor maintained tight control, expecting detailed memorials and often setting strict limits on their mandate. The commissioners also retained some of their older responsibilities during the early eras of the Qing, like commanding the Qing campaign in the Dzungar Khanate and negotiating new borders with the Russian Empire concerning the invasion.^[6] During the reigns of the Jiaqing Emperor and early Daoguang Emperor, as administrative corruption and social unrest grew, the commissioner was increasingly used for internal investigation and reform, until it was shaped into the Imperial Commissioner in 1838 during Daoguang reign.

During the rule of the Jiajing Emperor in the 16th century, the Ming Dynasty was suffering from a Wokou crisis. The Wokou were Japanese pirate fleets consisting of Japanese ronin and Chinese smugglers, and they had been attacking Korea and China since the 13th century, often invading provinces like Zhejiang, Fujian, and Jiangnan, defeating Ming Dynasty Military Garrisons with concerning ease, as the military personnel (weisuo), were ineffective and corrupt. In 1555, a force of around 70 wokou marched from the coast of the Ming all the way to the outskirts of Nanjing, showcasing the Ming's lack of discipline in their military.^[7] In response, the Jiajing Emperor appointed Tan Lun, a Ming official known for his military acumen, as Imperial Commissioner, Xunfu (巡抚) and later Zongdu (总督) with plenipotentiary powers to manage the issue. In 1555, he arrived on the coast, and held concurrent responsibilities from 1555 to 1556 of Right Vice Censor-in-Chief (右副都御史), Superintendent of Fujian and Zhejiang, and military commissioner. During his post, the Jiajing Emperor issued him a mandate: "unify coastal defenses, recruit and train effective troops, and expel the wokou. You have the authority to levy funds, appoint and dismiss officers, and execute military law." ^[8] During his appointment, he also cooperated with military generals Qi Jiguang and Yu Dayou. The three famously utilised Qi Jiguang's tactic of recruiting miners and farmers from Zhejiang to form the legendary "Qi Family Army" (戚家军), trained in innovative "mandarin duck" infantry tactics to counter pirate swordsmen and samurai.^[9] To prevent the Wokou from moving to a neighbouring province, Tan Lun coordinated the movements of Qi Jiguang's forces in Zhejiang with Yu Dayou's fleet in Fujian, preventing the pirates from simply fleeing to a neighboring jurisdiction.^[10] His tactics caused the campaign to conclude by the early 1560s.

In 1564, three years after ending his term as Grand Secretariat, Yan Song, a Han Chinese scholar was appointed as Imperial Commissioner by the Jiajing Emperor and essentially governed the entire Ming Dynasty alongside his son, Yan Shifan, while the Jiajing Emperor was busy attempting to achieve Taoist immorality. Unlike Tan Lun, Yan Song's increased political power in the Ming allowed him to issue imperial edicts, and he also managed reports and information between the dynasty and the emperor. He also appointed and promoted officials across the dynasty based on loyalty and bribes, creating a network of clients known as the "Yan Party" (严党).^[11] During his tenure as Imperial Commissioner, Yan Song continued to struggle with wokou raids on the coast, that had reappeared after Tan Lun's resignation. Unlike, Tan Lun, his defensive tactics were poor, as his greedy nature prompted him to demote effective officials and commanders if they did not pay him bribes, while assigning ineffective officials to coastal defences regardless of their competence if they did. Qi Jiguang and Yu Dayou, who continued to govern coastal provinces, had their orders rejected by Yan Song. Yan Song also stole from military funds.^[12] Furthermore, after the Yuan Dynasty was expelled from China proper in 1368, the Northern Yuan, the remainders of the Yuan Dynasty residing in the Mongolian Plateau, had been continuously attacking the Ming since its expulsion, and in 1550, the Northern Yuan, led by Altan Khan had sieged Beijing. In 1563, Zeng Xian, a Ming Dynasty official, advocated a strong and offensive strategy to expel the Yuan. Yan Song, fearing a rival's success, fabricated charges against him. Zeng Xian was executed in 1565, decapitating the hawkish faction and ensuring a passive, corrupt, and lucrative (for Yan) policy of buying off the Mongols with tribute.^[13] He then replaced Zeng Xian with Qiu Luan, who was notoriously corrupt and ineffective. In 1572, Yan Song was exposed to the Jiajing Emperor by Xu Jie, causing Yan Song's dismissal and Yan Shifan's execution, with the official verdict from the Imperial Clan Court stating "He stole state power, deceived the sovereign, harbored traitorous motives, and colluded with bandits. His corruption poisoned all within the seas."

In 1640, Hong Chengchou was appointed by the Chongzhen Emperor as Imperial Commissioner to manage peasant rebellions that had been disrupting the Ming since 1628, and external threats up north from the Later Jin Empire. In the North, the Later Jin Empire, led by Hong Taiji, had been pressuring the Shanhai Pass, the pathway between China proper and Manchuria. The pass was solely guarded by Wu Sangui, a Ming official who always kept the gates of the pass closed to stop the Later Jin from advancing. Meanwhile, devastating famines were happening left and right in Central China, introduced and driven by rebel leaders Zhang Xianzhong and Li Zicheng. Due to his prior experience in suppressing rebel armies in Shaanxi and Henan, Hong Chengchou's appointment as Imperial Commissioner by the Chongzhen Emperor was seen as fitting for the two concurrent issues of invasions from the north and rebellion from the south.^[14] During his appointment as Imperial Commissioner from 1640 to 1642, he simultaneously held multiple responsibilities and positions much like Yan Song and Tan Lun. These responsibilities included being the Minister of War, Right Vice Censor-in-Chief (右副都御史), Imperial Commissioner for the Suppression of the Eastern Barbarians (钦差总督蓟辽军务), and Governor of the Liaodong Peninsula, Jizhou, and Tianjin.^[15] As the Imperial Commissioner, he was also responsible for commanding and repositioning Ming soldiers in Northeastern China, including the Guanning Iron Cavalry (关宁铁骑), an elite, heavily armored Ming Dynasty cavalry unit stationed in the Guangning area (Shanhaiguan-Ningyuan) to counter Later Jin Dynasty forces. Additionally, Hong had specifically chosen to only manage the invasion from the north, as it was perceived as more significant than the rebellions in the south, leading him to also appoint and dismiss subordinate generals and civil administrators in the south to manage the threat of a revolution. Unlike Yan Song and Tan Lun however, the Chongzhen Emperor allowed Hong to use tax and supplies from neighbouring provinces like Zhili, Shandong, and Shanxi to help fund and support the military, and he was allowed to execute military law without approval from the emperor or the Imperial Clan Court. Hong first arrived in the North in 1641, and his primary responsibility there was to relieve the besieged cities of Jinzhou and Songshan. Jinzhou and Songshan were the two major Ming cities between the recently established Later Jin capital of Shenyang, and the Ming capital, Beijing, and the Later Jin were planning to besiege and annex the two cities, before eventually forcing the Shanhai Pass to open. To relieve the siege, Hong established a fortified supply line to the besieged garrisons, attempting to provide them with sufficient resources to break the siege. Hong utilised this technique as he attempted to avoid field battles, due to the fact that he knew his army, which had been redirected by the Imperial Clan Court from heavy battles with Ming rebel forces to the North, were most definitely exhausted. Back in the Forbidden City in Beijing, the Chongzhen Emperor was under heavy pressure by the Imperial Clan Court due to his risky decision of giving so much authority to Hong. In response, Hong constantly justified his cautious strategy against critics who demanded immediate, heroic offensives, and he secured military funding and military reinforcements from a bankrupt central government, showing capability.^[16] As Hong's forces were extremely underpaid and undersupplied, Hong personally inspected front-line positions to bolster morale, executed deserters and corrupt officers to enforce discipline, and attempted to coordinate with naval forces in the Bohai Sea to resupply Jinzhou by sea (which failed). In late 1641, the Later Jin initiated the Battle of Song-Jin, which lasted until 1642 and was fought first in Songshan, then in Jinzhou. In the first Battle of Songshan, Hong's Ming army was encircled by Later Jin forces and annihilated, and Hong himself was besieged in Songshan for 6 months, until the city fell in March 1642. Shortly after, forces in Jinzhou surrendered.^[17]

Imperial Commissioners received a sword of office from the emperor.

• 1555: Tan Lun wokou suppression
• 1564: Yan Song
• 1640: Hong Chengchou against the Qing

• 1838: Lin Zexu (First Opium War)
• 1840: Qishan (Qing dynasty)
• 1841: Yishan (official)
• 1842: Qiying
• 1850: Lin Zexu (Taiping Rebellion)
• 1850: Ye Mingchen (Taiping Rebellion)
• 1852: Qishan (Taiping Rebellion)
• 1854: Xiang Rong
• 1858: Qiying
• 1860: Yixin, Prince Gong
• 1871: Shen Baozhen
• 1875: Zuo Zongtang
• 1885: Zuo Zongtang
• 1895: Li Hongzhang
• 1896: Li Hongzhang
• 1911: Zhao Erxun
• 1911: Yuan Shikai

• Commissioner