Huachicol fiscal

Huachicol fiscal is a term in Mexico for a form of fuel fraud in which gasoline and diesel are imported into the country under incorrect tariff classifications to evade taxes and excise duties. The misclassification is done by declaring the fuel in customs declarations as different products with lower or no tax liability. The scheme benefits from the fact that domestic fuel prices in Mexico, which include tax, are at times higher than international fuel prices, providing smugglers with a financial incentive to import and sell it in the country. This criminal activity gained prominence in 2018 and has been tied to corruption cases in ports and government agencies. The term derives from huachicol, a Mexican Spanish slang word originally referring to an adulterated drink and stolen fuel.

Scheme

In Mexico, huachicol fiscal refers to a fraud scheme in which gasoline and diesel are brought into the country under false tariff codes and classifications to circumvent taxes and excise duties.[1][2] Perpetrators typically mislabel the fuel as other products subject to lower or no taxation. The scheme benefits from the fact that fuel prices in Mexico, which are subject to taxes, are at times higher than international fuel prices, which creates a market for such activity.[2][3] The word huachicol is a Mexican Spanish slang term that originally referred to an adulterated alcoholic drink and later came to be associated with stolen fuel.[4] The term huachicol fiscal is distinct from huachicol, as it does not involve the physical theft of fuel but instead refers to tax fraud carried out through the scheme.[2][5]

In the 2010s, fuel prices in Mexico were substantially higher than international prices, partly due to the Special Tax on Production and Services (IEPS), a special excise tax that accounted for a significant portion of the final retail price.[6][7] Criminal groups exploited this structure by purchasing fuel at lower prices abroad, often in the United States, and importing it into Mexico while falsely declaring it as tax-exempt products.[8][9] Such misclassifications commonly include labeling fuel as lubricants or additives. To facilitate the scheme, operators falsified cargo manifests and import documentation and used shell companies to conceal the true nature of the shipments.[10]

Once inside Mexico, the fuel is distributed through criminal or semi-legal networks and sold as ordinary fuel. Because the IEPS tax is evaded, those involved in the scheme are able to capture both the standard commercial profit margin and the roughly 40 percent tax component, while still offering the fuel at market prices.[11] The resulting profits are shared among the criminal group leading the scheme and distributed across a broader network of co-conspirators, including corrupt public officials and private-sector actors who facilitate the scheme by falsifying documentation, providing logistical support, granting access to ports or customs processes, or deliberately failing to enforce regulations.[7]

The scheme has resulted in substantial losses of public revenue for the Mexican government. In 2024, the Mexican Tax Authority (SAT) estimated losses of approximately MXN$200 billion, representing funds that would otherwise have been allocated to public services.[3] This amount was roughly equivalent to Mexico's entire federal security budget that year.[7] Estimates from the Mexican government suggest that the resulting fiscal losses to the state amount to tens of billions of pesos annually.[2][12][13]

Investigations

Beginning in 2018, Mexican civil society organizations and investigative journalists warned of the emergence of huachicol fiscal as a form of fuel-related crime in Mexico. Government responses remained limited, allowing the practice to expand during the 2020s.[3] Investigations by civil society organizations, journalists, and state institutions identified networks of collusion involving senior government officials, customs and port authorities, and politically connected business entities, leading them to conclude that huachicol fiscal constituted a case of systemic corruption.[3][14]

One of the major government responses against huachicol fiscal occurred in 2020, when then President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) announced that he was going to transfer the control of Mexico's ports and customs operations to the Mexican Navy (SEMAR), stating that military oversight would reduce corruption and curb large-scale smuggling.[15] By 2022, all the ports and custom operations were under military control.[11]

"Challenge Procyon" case

In March 2025, the tanker Challenge Procyon was seized by the SEMAR at the port of Tampico, representing a major enforcement action against huachicol fiscal.[16] Mexico's Security Minister, Omar García Harfuch, stated that the tanker carried 10 million liters (approximately 63,000 barrels) of diesel, which were confiscated.[17] Seized shipping documents and government statements indicated that the fuel on board had been imported under false documentation, with the shipment misclassified as oil additives rather than taxable fuel.[18]

Following this incident, Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI) published investigations revealing business ties between Intanza SA de CV, the company that owned the vessel's cargo containing the smuggled fuel, and the director of the Administración del Sistema Portuario Nacional Tampico (ASIPONA Tampico), the port authority.[19] Investigators identified discrepancies in official accounts of the March 2025 seizure. Documents obtained by MCCI indicated that the tanker carried approximately 20 million liters of diesel disguised as industrial additives, whereas public statements by SEMAR reported only 10 million liters. Court filings show that Intanza later sued for the return of the cargo, citing the full 20 million liters.[20] This contrasts with the 10 million liters publicly reported by SEMAR, suggesting that roughly half of the cargo may have been unloaded without official record.[21]

The discrepancy raised questions about oversight at the port of Tampico, indicating possible failures in naval supervision or deliberate tolerance of irregular unloading.[11] A former director of ASIPONA Tampico, Francisco Javier Antonio Martínez, was arrested in September 2025.[22][23]

Farias Laguna Brothers

The Challenge Procyon case and broader huachicol fiscal investigations drew law enforcement attention to the Farías Laguna brothers: Vice Admiral Manuel Roberto Farías Laguna and Counter Admiral Fernando Farías Laguna, both of whom held senior positions within SEMAR. They were arrested in 2025 for suspected involvement in fuel smuggling and were accused of holding management roles in the scheme. Their case attracted public scrutiny due to their familial connection to Admiral José Rafael Ojeda Durán, their uncle, who served as Secretary of SEMAR from 2018 to 2024 under AMLO.[24] Investigators said that the brothers were involved in criminal activities since at least 2022.[25]

In June 2024, Counter Admiral Fernando Rubén Guerrero Alcántar, stationed at the port of Tampico, sent a report to Admiral Ojeda Durán accusing the Farías Laguna brothers of involvement in huachicol fiscal at the port. Guerrero Alcántar submitted the report through naval command channels, including senior leadership, and was later killed while on vacation on November 2024. In January 2025, an investigation file from the Attorney General's Office (FGR) indicated that authorities were considering a potential link between Guerrero Alcántar's death and the accusations he had made.[26][27]

In May 2025, Captain Alejandro Torres Joaquín, a former port official who took the protected witness codename "Santo", surrendered to the FGR to cooperate in the investigation. He also handed over MXN$19.5 million in illicit proceeds from the scheme. Torres Joaquín began working at the port in 2021, citing economic difficulties following his father's illness. Two years later, he was promoted to port director and worked under the Farías Laguna brothers. His testimony became a central component of the investigation into the huachicol fiscal operations in Tampico.[28]

Captain Abraham Jeremías Pérez Ramírez, former chief of port protection, died in his office on 8 September 2025.[29] His death, described as a suicide in the media, drew public attention due to its timing. According to Torres Joaquín's testimony, Pérez Ramírez allegedly accepted bribes to allow fuel shipments to be unloaded without proper inspection. He died one day after charges against other individuals in the investigation became public and had not been formally charged himself.[30]

One day after Pérez Ramírez's death, Captain Adrián Omar del Ángel Zúñiga, former subdirector of customs at the port of Manzanillo, Colima, died during a live-fire training exercise in Puerto Peñasco, Sonora, which was officially declared an accident. The incident drew attention because his successor, Sergio Emmanuel Martínez Covarrubias, was kidnapped and killed just two weeks after taking office.[31][32][33] In January 2026, Mexican government documents revealed that Captain Miguel Ángel Solano Ruiz (Capitán Sol), also stationed at the port of Tampico, was suspected of involvement with the Farías Laguna brothers. He was accused of orchestrating the deaths of Pérez Ramírez and Zúñiga.[34]

Senator Adán Augusto López Hernández

According to FGR files citing Torres Joaquín's testimony, Mexican politician Adán Augusto López Hernández was linked to the Tampico port scheme through a business intermediary, Saúl Vera Ochoa.[35] López Hernández has denied the claims, characterizing them as politically motivated.[36] In August 2020, Vera Ochoa founded Tampico Terminal Marítima S.A. de C.V., which was granted the concession for Muelle Fiscal 289 at the port of Tampico that same month.[37][35] In 2022, Vera Ochoa publicly supported López Hernández's presidential aspirations, while he was serving as a senator.[37][38]

According to Torres Joaquín, Muelle Fiscal 289 was repeatedly used to unload stolen fuel tankers without proper inspections. His testimony identifies Tampico Terminal Marítima as a key logistical point in the illicit fuel import network.[35] Investigators also identified irregularities at Tampico Terminal Marítima. The company is composed of four Tabasco-based firms, all owned by Vera Ochoa or his associates.[a] One of the four shareholders, Acuitab, was incorporated at a notary office owned by López Hernández.[39] Torres Joaquín also testified that he received bribes in exchange for allowing vessels to dock at Muelle Fiscal 289 without inspection. He stated that the payments were delivered by Antonio Dávila Capiterucho, who is listed in the Public Registry of Property and Commerce as the administrator of Tampico Terminal Marítima, the company owned by Vera Ochoa.[35][40] Capiterucho was a former manager of the National Water Commission (CONAGUA).[39]

Investigation aftermath

In September 2025, Mexican authorities arrested 14 individuals, including business executives, former customs officials, and both active and retired high-ranking naval personnel, among them Vice Admiral Manuel Roberto Farías Laguna.[24][41][3]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ^ The companies were Constructora Veasa, Multiservicios RYC, Acuitab, and VOS Grupo Constructor.[39]

References

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  2. ^ a b c d "'Huachicol fiscal'; el contrabando de combustible que perjudica las finanzas de México". Forbes México (in Spanish). 26 May 2025. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  3. ^ a b c d e Núñez González, Leonardo; Amparo Casar, María; Gómez Robledo, Marina; Alvarado Andalón, Ricardo (2025). "Huachicol fiscal: red de corrupción con AMLO y Sheinbaum". contralacorrupcion.mx (in Spanish). Mexicanos Contra la Corrupcion y la Impunidad. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  4. ^ Guerra, Claudia (11 September 2025). "Las dos versiones del huachicol: del robo en ductos al fraude en aduanas". El País (in Spanish).
  5. ^ Mejía Fernández de Lara, Rafael (10 September 2025). "¿Qué es el huachicol fiscal y su diferencia con el robo de combustible tradicional?". Milenio (in Spanish).
  6. ^ Eschenbacher, Stefanie; Khan, Shariq; Eisenhammer, Stephen (22 October 2025). "How a 'dark fleet' of tankers helped a Mexican cartel build a fuel-smuggling empire". Reuters. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  7. ^ a b c Woolston, Sam (16 December 2025). "How Mexico's Fuel Theft Market Went Transnational". InSight Crime. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  8. ^ Mayen, Baruc (10 September 2025). "Huachicol fiscal: el derrame invisible de dinero que preocupa a México". Milenio (in Spanish).
  9. ^ "Qué es el huachicol fiscal?". El Heraldo de Puebla (in Spanish). 9 September 2025.
  10. ^ Cortina, José; Ortega, Alejandro; Cabrera, Raquel; Perezalonso, Sofia (21 October 2025). "Fiscal Fuel Theft and the Mexican Overview". fticonsulting.com. FTI Consulting. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  11. ^ a b c Murray, Christine; Campbell, Chris; Andringa, Peter; Killing, Alison; Joiner, Sam (10 June 2025). "How smuggled US fuel funds Mexico's cartels". Financial Times. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  12. ^ Contreras, Jorge (3 October 2025). "Huachicol fiscal deja pérdidas históricas al erario mexicano por más de 600 mmp". Infobae (in Spanish). Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  13. ^ Mares, Marco A. (7 October 2025). "Huachicol fiscal, 600 mil millones de pesos". El Economista (in Spanish). Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  14. ^ Carabaña, Carlos (20 December 2025). "El gran agujero del huachicol fiscal: 21 aduanas con fugas, dos fronteras permeables y 6.000 millones de dólares perdidos". El País (in Spanish). Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  15. ^ Camhaji, Elías (17 July 2025). "López Obrador anuncia la militarización de puertos y aduanas para frenar el contrabando y el narcotráfico". El País (in Spanish).
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  21. ^ Alamillo, Iván; Ayala, Verónica (5 May 2025). "Documento de la Marina confirma desaparición de 10 millones de litros de huachicol". contralacorrupcion.mx (in Spanish). Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  22. ^ "Detienen a exdirectivo del Sistema Portuario Nacional asociado con huachicoleros". contralacorrupcion.mx (in Spanish). Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad. 6 September 2025. Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  23. ^ Martínez, Jorge (6 September 2025). "Detienen a exfuncionario de la ASIPONA de Tampico". Milenio (in Spanish).
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  30. ^ Contreras, Luis (9 September 2025). "Cuáles eran los señalamientos contra el capitán de la Marina hallado sin vida en Altamira, Tamaulipas". Infobae (in Spanish). Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  31. ^ Rosete, Erika (10 September 2025). "Muere otro miembro de la Marina en un accidente en una práctica de tiro en Sonora". El País (in Spanish). Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  32. ^ Viña, Daniel Alonso (30 May 2023). "Un comando armado asesina al administrador de aduanas de Manzanillo". El País (in Mexican Spanish). Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  33. ^ Leyva, Thalí (13 January 2026). "Ellos son los marinos clave en la red de huachicol fiscal". PolíticoMX (in Spanish). Retrieved 13 January 2026.
  34. ^ Espino, Manuel (2 January 2026). "Investigan a Solano, capitán de la Semar, por muerte de dos marinos". El Universal (in Spanish).
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  37. ^ a b Cortés, Juan Carlos (12 September 2025). "Adán Augusto López niega vínculos con Saúl Vera, implicado en la red de huachicol fiscal". Proceso (in Spanish).
  38. ^ "El empresario Saúl Vera no tiene duda: Adán debe ser el próximo presidente". Carta Abierta (in Spanish). 27 August 2022.
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