First Battle of Bedriacum

The First Battle of Bedriacum, also known as the First Battle of Cremona, was a military engagement fought on 14 April AD 69 between the forces of Otho and Vitellius, two rival claimants to the throne of the Roman Empire during the Year of the Four Emperors that followed the deaths of Nero and Galba. It took place near Bedriacum (modern Calvatone), about 35 km from Cremona in what is now Lombardy. Because the action was fought between the two towns, the battle is known by both names.^[1]

The defeat of Otho's forces effectively decided the brief civil war between the two emperors. On hearing the news Otho took his own life two days later, while Vitellius continued his march on Rome and was acknowledged emperor by the Senate.

After the engagements at the Locus Castorum and the Po crossings, and various minor clashes between Vitellius's army and the Othonian forces of Marcius Macer, it was resolved that Otho himself would not lead the decisive battle. Instead he was to await the outcome south of the Po, withdrawing toward Brixellum. The decision deprived the field army of the valuable praetorian cohorts, which remained with the emperor, together with the scouts and a substantial cavalry contingent. It also undermined the morale of those left to fight, since they trusted only Otho, and not his subordinate commanders, just as he in turn trusted only them.^[1]

Otho pressed for battle as soon as possible, in line with the decision already taken, but Suetonius Paulinus, Marius Celsus and Annius Gallus all opposed him. They argued that the enemy could not be reinforced, while they themselves would shortly be supported by the Legio XIV Gemina and had many other legions available. The Vitellian army, moreover, was short of grain; if the war could be prolonged into the summer, the Germans, unused to the warmer climate, would be weakened. The Othonians, in contrast, had money, supplies and troops accustomed to the Italian climate, as well as the ability to hold out for a long time behind the line of the Po and in fortified cities such as Placentia, which had already withstood a siege.^[2] The army's real commanders, however, despite their lack of experience, were Otho's brother Titianus as commander-in-chief and the praetorian prefect Licinius Proculus. They made decisions guided by flattery and avoided being contradicted; Paulinus and Celsus, on the other hand, were not listened to, and served only to cover the mistakes of others by appearing officially as commanders.^[3]

Otho departed, and the army advanced its camp six kilometres from Bedriacum toward Cremona, where the generals debated how to bring on the engagement. They then marched a further sixteen kilometres to the confluence of the Po and the Arda to meet the enemy, approaching to within a short distance of an enemy who had only marched six kilometres and was lightly equipped. Celsus and Paulinus opposed exposing the soldiers, since the Vitellians were much fresher and would not hesitate to attack. A Numidian horseman, however, arrived with Otho's orders to press forward, an instruction supported by Titianus and Proculus, who imposed their authority.^[4]

On the same day, while Caecina was supervising the construction of a bridge over which Alfenus Varus and the Batavi would shortly fight against Marcius Macer, he received word that the enemy was close. Returning to camp, he found that Fabius Valens had already given the signal for battle. While the legions were drawing lots for their positions in the line, the cavalry advanced at speed, and only the Legio I Italica prevented the few Othonian troops from forcing it back behind the ramparts. When the cavalry was put to flight, the Italica drew its swords and threatened the fugitives, compelling them to renew the attack. The Vitellians formed their line without confusion, since although the enemy was near, dense thickets concealed his weapons and so prevented panic among the troops.^[5]

The Othonians, by contrast, advanced in disorder, with wagons mixed in among the troops and along a passage too narrow even for an orderly formation, because of the deep ditches on either side. The soldiers crowded around their standards or searched for them, and confusion reigned among those who, according to their courage, sought to take up positions in the first or last rank.^[5]

A false rumour spread through Otho's army that the Vitellian forces had abandoned their cause and gone over to Otho. It is unclear whether the rumour was spread by Vitellian spies or arose within the Othonian ranks, but it had the effect of leading many Othonians, abandoning their warlike ardour, to salute the enemy unexpectedly. The Vitellians answered with a hostile murmur, which made many Othonians who were ignorant of the reason for the greeting suspect treachery.^[6]

The Vitellian line then attacked with great force, superior in numbers and zeal. Although scattered, tired and outnumbered, the Othonians fought bravely. The fighting often took place on rough ground, among trees and vineyards, in scattered groups or close-packed bodies; on the raised causeway they fought shield against shield and hand to hand once they had exhausted their javelins.^[6]

Between the Po and the road, by chance, the Vitellian Legio XXI Rapax clashed with the Othonian Legio I Adiutrix—the first major engagement for the Adiutrix, although Tacitus also mentions it at the Battle of Locus Castorum. The Adiutrix, eager for glory, routed the enemy's vanguard and captured its eagle. The men of the Rapax, stung into action, rallied and counter-attacked with such vigour that they drove back the Adiutrix, seized many enemy standards, and killed the legate Orfidius Benignus. On another part of the field the Vitellian Legio V Alaudae engaged a detachment of Legio XIII Gemina—already mentioned by Tacitus at Locus Castorum—which was forced to give ground. The vexillatio of Legio XIV present on the field was surrounded by superior numbers.^[7]

The Othonian commanders had long since fled, and Caecina and Valens directed the reserves, reinforcing the points where they were needed. At the critical moment, the Batavian cohorts of Alfenus Varus, victorious in their action against Marcius Macer on the Po, arrived and struck the Othonian flank.^[7]

With the centre of the Othonian line broken, the survivors fled in disorder back to Bedriacum, along a long road strewn with the fallen. The slaughter was very great, since no prisoners were taken in the Roman civil wars.^[8]

Suetonius Paulinus and Licinius Proculus avoided the camp by taking different routes. The fugitive soldiers, gripped by an irrational panic, turned on the legate of the XIII Legion when he entered the camp while it was still daylight, abusing and striking him with accusations of desertion and treason: not because he was guilty, but because the crowd is wont to reproach others for its own weakness. Titianus and Celsus escaped under cover of darkness, evading the rage of the soldiers. They argued that Otho's army had not deployed many of the troops who were with the emperor, including detachments from three legions sent from Moesia (VII Claudia, VIII Augusta and III Gallica) together with numerous soldiers who had remained near Bedriacum. To this they contrasted the heavy losses suffered by Vitellius, whose cavalry had been driven back and whose eagle had been captured.^[7]

The Vitellian army took up a position eight kilometres from Bedriacum, either delaying the attack or awaiting a surrender. This was the case even though the soldiers had no shelter for the night, having marched out only to fight. The next day the Othonians sent an embassy to negotiate terms, which the Vitellians accepted. The camp gates were opened, and the soldiers wept for the losses of the civil war. They found the body of the legate Orfidius and burned it according to custom; some other bodies were buried, but the rest were left on the field.^[7]

When Otho received word of the result of the battle, ignoring those who urged him to continue the war on the basis of his substantial military and financial resources—Tacitus remarks that in civil discord money "is much more powerful than arms"^[1]—he decided to take his own life. He died on 16 April AD 69. Vitellius continued his march on Rome, where he made a triumphal entry and was recognised emperor by the Senate; he would in turn be defeated at the Second Battle of Bedriacum six months later by the legions supporting Vespasian.

• Year of the Four Emperors
• Battle of Locus Castorum
• Second Battle of Bedriacum
• Battle of Cremona

• Tacitus. Histories.
• Dupuy, Richard Ernest; Dupuy, Trevor N. (1986). The Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present (2nd revised ed.). Harper & Row. pp. 127–128.
• Greenhalgh, P. A. L. (1975). The Year of the Four Emperors. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
• Grant, Michael (1975). The Twelve Caesars. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
• Wellesley, Kenneth (2000). The Year of the Four Emperors (3rd ed.). Routledge.