Eastern Slavonia front

Eastern Slavonia Front (1991–1995)
Part of the Croatian War of Independence
Date19 December 1990 – 12 November 1995 (4 years, 10 months, 3 weeks and 3 days)
Location
Result

Erdut agreement[1]

Territorial
changes
Erdut agreement signed in 12 November 1995, which lead to creation of transitional UN governed Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia and the peaceful reintergration to full Croatian control in 1998
Belligerents
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia
Serbian Krajina
Yugoslavia (1991–1992)
Croatia
Commanders and leaders
Milan Babić
Milan Martić
Milan Milanović
Dušan Lončar
Slobodan Milosević
Franjo Tuđman
Gojko Šušak
Petar Stipetić
Zvonimir Červenko
Strength
145,000 (1991)
50,000 (1995)
70,000 (1991)
200,000 (1995)
Casualties and losses
1,500 killed 2,200 killed
More than 20,000 Croat and other non-Serb civilians are expelled during the occupation of the region

The Eastern Slavonia Front was the only region of the Serbian Krajina which was under Serb control even after Operation Storm which had retaken almost all Serb-controlled territories in Croatia. The region was eventually peacefully reintegrated under full Croatian control after the signing of the Erdut agreement in November 1995.

Log revolution

On December 21, 1990, the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Vojnić, Obrovac, Gračac, Dvor and Kostajnica adopted the "Statute of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" after massive demonstrations, blockades and revolts.[2] The Serb National Council on March 16, 1991, declared Krajina to be independent of Croatia. On May 12, 1991, a referendum was held with over 99 percent of the vote supporting unification with Serbia.[3][4] On 1 April 1991, it declared that it would secede from Croatia.[5] Afterwards the Krajina assembly declared that "the territory of the SAO Krajina is a constitutive part of the unified territory of the Republic of Serbia". The open hostilities of the Croatian War of Independence began in April 1991. As a part of his plea bargain with the prosecution, in 2006 Milan Babić testified against Martić during his ICTY trial, saying Martić "tricked him into agreeing to the Log Revolution".[3] He also testified that the entire war in Croatia was "Martić's responsibility, orchestrated by Belgrade". They were both convicted for ethnic cleansing of Croats and other non-Serbs from Krajina.[6]

1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia

The Campaign was focusing on Eastern Slavonia a lot, fighting for the town of Vukovar was intensive, as Croatian Forces would not give up the Stronghold as easy as the JNA thought. In eastern Slavonia, the JNA responded to the ZNG siege of its garrison in Vukovar, and on 14 September 1991 it deployed troops to relieve the barracks.[7] Independent of that effort, the main thrust of the campaign against Croatia was initially planned to start on 21 September. The southern operational group of the thrust, spearheaded by the 1st Guards Mechanised Division, was expected to lift the ZNG siege of the JNA barracks in Vinkovci, and reach Našice and Slavonski Brod in two to three days. Over the next four to five days, the group was expected to reach the line Okučani–Suhopolje by advancing via the ĐakovoPožega road and the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway, avoiding major population centres. The northern operational group, subordinated to the 12th (Novi Sad) Corps, was to advance from Osijek to Našice and then further west towards Bjelovar.[8] The two operational groups were assigned approximately 57,000 troops and 5,000 supporting personnel.[8] The 17th (Tuzla) Corps was probably tasked with crossing the Sava River—marking the border of Croatia—at Slavonski Brod and Slavonski Šamac to join the westward drive along the motorway, but the crossing never occurred.

Front during the War

Many intensive fights occurred in the area during the main conflict but not as much as in Kninska Krajina, where fighting was at its finest for most of the war.

Battle of Borovo Selo

One of the first battles in the area as well the entire war, was the Battle of Borovo Selo. The clash was precipitated by months of rising ethnic tensions, violence, and armed combat in Pakrac and at the Plitvice Lakes in March.

The immediate cause for the confrontation in the heavily ethnic Serb village of Borovo Selo, just north of Vukovar, was a failed attempt to replace the Yugoslav flag in the village with the flag of Croatia.[9] The unauthorised effort by four Croatian policemen resulted in the capture of two by a Croatian Serb militia in the village.[10]

To retrieve the captives, the Croatian authorities deployed additional police, who drove into an ambush. Twelve Croatian policemen and one Serb paramilitary were killed,[11] before the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) intervened and put an end to the clashes. The two captured policemen were ferried across the Danube and transported to Novi Sad, but were released and returned to Osijek by the evening of 2 May.[10] Vojislav Milić, a paramilitary from Valjevo, was the only fatality among the Serb militia.[12] Four other paramilitaries were wounded.[13]

Some of the police killed at Borovo Selo were found to have been mutilated, their ears cut, their eyes gouged out and their throats slit.[14] These acts were meant to inflame ethnic hatred.[15]

Battle of Osijek

The next major battle was the Battle of Osijek, also known as Siege of Osjek. It involved the artillery bombardment of the Croatian city of Osijek by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), occurring from August 1991 to June 1992 during the Croatian War of Independence. Shelling peaked in late November and December 1991, then diminished in 1992 after the Vance plan was accepted by the combatants.[16] Airstrikes and attacks by JNA infantry and armored units against targets in the city accompanied the bombardment, which caused approximately 800 deaths and resulted in a large portion of the city's population leaving.[16][17]

Croatian sources estimated that 6,000 artillery shells were fired against Osijek over the period.[18] After the JNA captured Vukovar on 18 November 1991, Osijek was the next target for its campaign in Croatia. The JNA units subordinated to the 12th (Novi Sad) Corps, supported by the Serb Volunteer Guard, achieved modest advances in late November and early December, capturing several villages south of Osijek, but the Croatian Army maintained its defensive front and limited the JNA's advances.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Osijek, Croatian authorities charged thirteen JNA officers with war crimes against civilians, but no arrests have been made to date.[19] Croatian authorities also charged the wartime commander of Osijek's defence, Branimir Glavaš, and five others with war crimes committed in the city in 1991. The five were convicted and received sentences ranging between eight and ten years.[20] On 20 January 2015, after serving five years in prison, he was released from prison, after Croatia's Constitutional Court rescinded his war crimes conviction on procedural grounds. His case was sent back to the Supreme Court for retrial.[21]

Vukovar

Then, before main fighting in Osijek, Town of Vukovar was besieged by the Yugoslav Peoples Army and the Serbian Forces, The JNA began to intervene in favour of the rebellion, and conflict broke out in the eastern Croatian region of Slavonia in May 1991. In August, the JNA launched a full-scale attack against Croatian-held territory in eastern Slavonia, including Vukovar. Vukovar was defended by around 1,800 lightly armed soldiers of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) and civilian volunteers, against as many as 36,000 JNA soldiers and Serb paramilitaries equipped with heavy armour and artillery.[22][23][24] During the battle, shells and rockets were fired into the town at a rate of up to 12,000 a day. At the time, it was the fiercest and most protracted battle seen in Europe since 1945, and Vukovar was the first major European town to be entirely destroyed since the Second World War.[25][26]

When Vukovar fell on 18 November 1991, several hundred soldiers and civilians were massacred by Serb forces and at least 20,000 inhabitants were expelled.[27] Overall, around 3,000 people died during the battle. Most of Vukovar was ethnically cleansed of its non-Serb population and became part of the self-declared proto-state known as the Republic of Serbian Krajina. This Battle was a Phyrric Victory for the Yugoslav-Serbian troops, but the town of Vukovar, fully destroyed, was now in the hands of the Serb rebels.

Operation Baranja

Next bigger armed presentation was Operation Baranja, conducted by the Croat Forces the offensive quickly gained ground after the HV advanced north of the Drava River into Baranja. The defending force of the Croatian Serb Territorial Defence Force supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) artillery were caught unprepared and offered light resistance. However, the offensive was not authorised and it was cancelled six hours after it had been launched. An investigation was launched by the HV, and two senior officers were relieved of their duty, before being reassigned to new positions. According to General Martin Špegelj, the decision to abort the offensive was wrong as it meant a missed opportunity to recapture Baranja which had been lost to the JNA in 1991.[28] Admiral Davor Domazet-Lošo pointed out that the offensive presented a significant political problem to Croatian leadership as it meant that the political leaders of Croatia had poor control over its military, or that Croatia was violating its international obligations towards the United Nations (UN) in respect of the Vance plan at the time the country sought to become a member of the UN.[29]

During the fighting, and in its aftermath, the JNA shelled several Croatian settlements and three Croatian civilians living in Croatian Serb-controlled Baranja were killed in retribution.[30] The battle is commemorated annually in the towns of Belišće and Valpovo.[31] The battle had no Croatian success later as they withdrew, and it could be called a Serbian victory, since they retained Osijek and Belišće.

Operation Vukovar '95

Last attempt by the Croat forces was Operation Vukovar '95, a planned military-police operation of the Croatian National Guard in early November 1995 and in mid 1996.[32] The operation was intended to militarily liberate the last remaining occupied part of Croatia after Operation Storm, including the region of Eastern Slavonia.[32] The operation was abandoned due to intervention of UN peacekeepers and the signing of the Erdut Agreement. Immediately after Operation Storm, the Operation Manjinjorgo was carried out as a preparation for the Vukovar military operation,[32] with the goal to mobilize around 30,000 Croatian soldiers from five guard brigades in Eastern Slavonia.

About 100,000 more soldiers were deployed in reserve, in case the Yugoslav Army was involved in the conflict. The Serb forces, however, were well entrenched, protected by minefields. In the occupied territory, the Serbs had about 25,000 soldiers and civilian volunteers at their disposal.[33]

UN Resolution 1037

By putting the signatures of representatives of the Croatian government and Serbs on the Erdut Agreement on 12 November 1995 and the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1037 on 15 January 1996, which established the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the process of returning the region of Eastern Slavonia to Croatian rule began. Even after the adoption of the Erdut Agreement, Yugoslavia and the Serbs believed that there was a real, although relatively small, possibility that Croatia would launch a military operation. Although the operation was abandoned, according to the memories of Mate Granić, parts of the Croatian leadership influenced President Tuđman to launch the military operation.[34] Granić does not specify the exact period when this proposal was made, but it can be assumed that it was the second half of 1996.[33]

According to Granić, he then stated in an interview for the Croatian press that a military takeover of Eastern Slavonia for Croatia would have severe international consequences, and that after that the mentioned operation was aborted Tuđman was allegedly welcomed by Granić's statement to get rid of the pressure from the Ministry of Defense to carry out the mentioned operation.[34]

References

  1. ^ Galbraith, Peter (12 October 2006). "Negotiating Peace in Croatia: a personal account of the road to Erdut". In Blitz, Brad K. (ed.). War and Change in the Balkans. Cambridge University Press. pp. 124–131. ISBN 0-521-86042-3.
  2. ^ "Annex IV : The policy of ethnic cleansing". 2011-03-23. Archived from the original on 2011-03-23. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  3. ^ a b https://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf p. 46. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Accessed 13 September 2009. (On 16 March 1991 another referendum was held which asked "Are you in favour of the SAO Krajina joining the Republic of Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and others who wish to preserve Yugoslavia?". With 99.8% voting in favour, the referendum was approved and the Krajina assembly declared that "the territory of the SAO Krajina is a constitutive part of the unified state territory of the Republic of Serbia".)
  4. ^ https://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf Archived 4 August 2012 at the Wayback Machine. p. 46. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Retrieved 13 September 2009.
  5. ^ Sudetic, Chuck (1991-04-02). "Rebel Serbs Complicate Rift on Yugoslav Unity". The New York Times.
  6. ^ "Summary of Judgement for Milan Martic" (PDF). icty.org. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 12 June 2007.
  7. ^ CIA 2002, p. 99.
  8. ^ a b Marijan, Davor (2012-11-02). "Zamisao i propast napadne operacije Jugoslavenske narodne armije na Hrvatsku u rujnu 1991. godine". Časopis za suvremenu povijest (in Croatian). 44 (2): 251–275. ISSN 0590-9597.
  9. ^ Silber, Laura; Little, Allan (1996). The Death of Yugoslavia. London, England: Penguin Books. p. 141. ISBN 9781575000053.
  10. ^ a b Hockenos, Paul (2003). Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism & the Balkan Wars. Cornell University Press. pp. 58–59. ISBN 978-0-8014-4158-5.
  11. ^ CIA 2002, p. 90.
  12. ^ Thompson, Mark (1999). Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina. Indiana University Press. p. 30. ISBN 978-1-860-20552-1.
  13. ^ Marijan, Davor (2004). Bitka za Vukovar [Battle of Vukovar] (in Croatian). Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest. p. 51. ISBN 9789536324453.
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  18. ^ "HDSSB se neće odreći zločinca" [HDSSB will not give up the criminal]. Nacional (in Croatian). HINA. 27 April 2012. Archived from the original on 13 October 2013.
  19. ^ "Optužnica protiv 13 oficira JNA zbog razaranja Osijeka" [Charges against 13 JNA officers for destruction of Osijek]. Blic (in Serbian). Tanjug. 17 November 2008. Archived from the original on 30 November 2013.
  20. ^ "Croat MP Sentenced To 10 Years For War Crimes". Archived from the original on 2 February 2015.
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  27. ^ "Investigative Summary". www.icty.org. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  28. ^ Špegelj, Martin (2001). Sjećanja vojnika [Memories of a Soldier] (in Croatian). Zagreb, Croatia: Znanje. pp. 333–335. ISBN 9789531951906.
  29. ^ Domazet-Lošo, Davor (27 June 2011). "Markov trg" [Mark's Square]. Jabuka TV (Television interview) (in Croatian). Interviewed by Marko Jurič. Zagreb, Croatia.
  30. ^ "Presuda Krz-39/08-221 (Pavlović, Urukalo, Berberović)" [Judgment Krz-39/08-221 (Pavlović, Urukalo, Berberović)] (PDF) (in Croatian). Osijek County Court. 7 July 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 August 2022. Retrieved 11 May 2015.
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Sources