Dodecanese campaign

The Dodecanese campaign was the capture and occupation of the Dodecanese islands by German forces during World War II. Following the signing of the Armistice of Cassibile on 3 September 1943, Italy switched sides and joined the Allies. As a result, the Germans made plans to seize control of the Dodecanese, which were under Italian control. The Allies planned to use the islands as bases to strike against German targets in the Balkans, which the Germans aimed to forestall.

Beginning in early September 1943, invading German troops defeated both the Italian garrison in the Dodecanese and British forces sent to support them, aided by the fact that Allied units were operating without sufficient air cover. Most of the Dodecanese islands fell to German forces within two months, resulting in one of Germany's last major victories during the conflict.^[1] The Germans continued to occupy the Dodecanese islands they had captured until the end of the war in 1945, when they surrendered to British forces.

The Aegean Sea is part of the Mediterranean from Greece to the western coast of Turkey. The Sporades are in the north, the Cyclades in the south and the twelve islands of the Dodecanese are in the south-eastern Aegean, most close to the Turkish shore and usually grouped with Rhodes and Kastellorizo.^[2][a] The islands had been under Italian control since the Italo-Turkish War in 1911. During Italian rule, the islands became a focus of Italian colonial ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes, the largest of the islands, was a military and air base. The island of Leros, with its excellent deep-water port of Portolago (now Lakki) was developed into a fortified air base, "the Corregidor of the Mediterranean" (Benito Mussolini) but these developments were mostly a bluff to deter the Greeks from attacking the archipelago and served as a latent threat to Greece and Turkey. As Italian colonial ambitions developed in the 1930s, the naval and air bases on the islands became a military threat to the Egyptian coast. The Italians made little use of the islands during the war and their supply became a liability. A British attempt to contest Italian control of the Dodecanese, Operation Abstention (25–28 February 1941) was thwarted, when Italian forces recaptured Kastellorizo from the Royal Marines and No. 50 Commando.^[4]

Kos is an island that is 26.5 mi (42.6 km) long and 1 to 6.3 mi (1.6 to 10.1 km) wide. The south coast of the island is steep and hills from Cape Foca in the east, westwards to Pili and further on, Mt. Dicheo is the highest hill at 2,776 ft (846 m). The hills decline in height to the west end of the island. The steep southern slopes are rocky and the northern slopes, less steep, descend to pine forests and farmland. There are many sandy beaches and large salt flats at Lambi and Tingachi (now Tigaki). Kos town and port is at the east end of the island and a road runs from the town to Cefalo (now Kefalos) in the west.^[5] In September 1943, the c. 3,500 Italian infantry of the 10th Regiment, 50th Infantry Division Regina had four coastal guns, a few obsolescent anti-aircraft guns and its infantry was spread around the island, with little anti-aircraft protection.^[6] No defences had been dug, the sites of the four coastal guns were well chosen but the guns were old, in the open and lacked fire-control.^[7]

The Regia Aeronautica had detached the 396° Squadriglia, 154 Gruppo CT, to Kos in 1943, that in September had four serviceable fighters out of eight, two C.202s a CR.42 and a G.50, with two pilots.^[8] The island had plenty of food for the 20,000 Greek civilian inhabitants, the Italian and British troops and water was easily available in the towns and villages but lacking in the hinterland. Kos town had a sheltered harbour but the water was shallow, it lacked equipment and had only one berth. One of the Italian pilots took off in the CR.42 on 10 September and flew to Rhodes. Later that evening the remaining pilot spotted six Heinkel He 111 bombers and claimed one shot down. On 11 September, two German aircraft attacked Antimachia, destroyed two aircraft and damaged one.^[9]

Leros is at the northern end of the Dodecanese, with Kalymnos to the south. The island is about 9 mi (14 km) long and varies from .65 to 4 mi (1.05 to 6.44 km) wide with islets off the coast. The island is rocky with narrow valleys and hills, the highest being Mt Scumbarda at the south end at 1,096 ft (334 m). The coast is indented and has steep cliffs with several sandy beaches in the centre of the island in Grifo, Alinda and Gurna bays. The capital is Leros (now Platanos) is in a narrow valley in the north-central part of the island, with the Appetici promontory (590 ft (180 m) and Meraviglia to the south at 669 ft (204 m). There is a road from Leros town to the main port of Portolago (now Lakki) with side-roads to Italian gun-positions on the high ground. The Italian colonial forces lived in houses and the Greek inhabitants farmed terraces on the slopes of the hills, herded goats and as fishermen.^[10]

By May 1943, Adolf Hitler had begun to contemplate the possibility of Italian defection from the Axis. The high command of the German armed forces, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) prepared an assessment of the situation if Italy made a separate peace and planned the reinforcement of German troops in Italy (Unternehmen Alaric) and the Balkans (Unternehmen Constantine) that were combined into Unternehmen Achse (Operation Axis) after the overthrow of Mussolini and the Allied invasion of Sicily, the orders being promulgated from 28 to 30 July. On the announcement of the Armistice of Cassibile (3 September 1943) announced on 8 September, the operation began with a weeks' notice. Italian troops were to be disarmed and made to choose between disbandment and fighting on with the Germans.^[11]

Transport infrastructure such as the passes in the Apennines, railways, ports and the ships of the Regia Marina, merchant ships, aircraft and airfields of the Regia Aeronautica, military bases and equipment were to be taken under German military control.^[11] The German army in the Mediterranean was reinforced to 38 divisions and a new Army Group F (Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs) created in the Balkans, with the former commander in chief, Generaloberst Alexander Löhr, taking over the subordinate Army Group E in Greece and the Aegean. The 22nd Air Landing Division was occupying most of Crete and Sturm Division Rhodos (Assault Division Rhodes, Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Ulrich Kleemann) had been built up on the island of Rhodes since January 1943.^[12]

The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had desired to draw Turkey into the war since 1940, because Turkish adherence to the Allies would turn the Axis flank in Greece and the Balkans that would be another drain on German military resources, cut the German Black Sea route into the Eastern Mediterranean, threaten German Balkan allies and open another supply route to the USSR. Airfields on Turkey would be able to contribute to the strategic bombing campaign, particularly the Romanian oil industry. The Russians thought that if Turkey entered the war, the Germans would divert a minimum of ten divisions. Despite British blandishments, the Turkish government was unmoved, defeat would lead to German occupation and victory would benefit the USSR.^[13]

The Americans were not enthused at the prospect of being saddled with the responsibility of equipping the 46 divisions of the Turkish army, along with all the other armies being supplied by Lend-Lease. There was no optimism at the Casablanca Conference (14−24 January 1943) and First Quebec Conference (17–24 August 1943) for a forward policy in the Aegean. Despite the American lack of enthusiasm, Churchill thought that the defection of Italy on 8 September and the collapse of the Axis position in the Mediterranean made an Aegean strategy feasible, "This is the time to play high".^[13]

In the spring of 1943, plans began to be laid for offensive action in the Aegean. The British had wanted to gain control of the Aegean since Italy joined in the war but until autumn 1943 the means for such a policy had been lacking. General Dwight D. Eisenhower had been given first call on resources at the Third Washington Conference (12−25 May 1943) except for seven divisions due to be sent to Britain and two British divisions ready to support Turkey against an Axis attack. Naval forces were distributed around the world and the Mediterranean Air Command had been reinforced for the Allied invasion of Sicily (9 July – 17 August 1943) only. General Henry Maitland Wilson, the Commander in Chief Middle East Land Forces had no power to divert troops from Sicily or Italy and permanent uncertainty over the forces at his disposal for an Aegean enterprise. A directive issued to Wilson on 12 February 1943 required him to prepare for operations in the eastern Mediterranean and No. 2 Planning Staff (later Force 292) Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson, Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul and Rear-Admiral Geoffrey Miles began to draft plans.^[14][b]

Rhodes was the principal object of the Planning Staff, along with Scarpanto (now Karpathos) and then islands further north, to open the route to Smyrna (now Izmir).^[14][c] By late July three plans for Accolade were ready, a promenade to Rhodes if the Italians collapsed and the Germans withdrew, a quick exploitation if the Italians gave in but the Germans remained and a methodical invasion should the Italians and Germans be prepared to defend the Island. A planning assumption was that Eisenhower would not use all the forces at his disposal and would lend naval and air forces, possibly troops but this created permanent uncertainty for the planners, whose plans were difficult to devise due to the distance of the Dodecanese from Egypt and the airfields available to the Luftwaffe at Scarpanto [45 mi (72 km) from Rhodes], Crete [160 mi (260 km)] and southern Greece [270 mi (430 km)]. The distance from Alexandria to Kos via the strait between Rhodes and Karpathos is 370 nmi (690 km; 430 mi) and between Rhodes and the Turkish mainland is 400 nmi (740 km; 460 mi). Kos to Leros is 30 mi (48 km) and Leros to Samos is 40 mi (64 km).^[15]

The nearest RAF bases to Rhodes were in Cyprus, about 270 mi (430 km) away and Gambut, about 350 mi (560 km) distant as the war had receded from Egypt after the Second Battle of El Alamein in 1942. The Allied air forces had been concentrated in the central Mediterranean for the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. Allied single-engined fighters had nothing like the range to operate over such distances and it would be necessary to operate them from the Turkish mainland or to develop airfields on Kos sufficient for four fighter squadrons. Twin engined fighters like the Beaufighter operating from Cyprus or Gambut were no substitute against Messerschmitt Bf 109s and the small number of Lightnings in the Mediterranean offered no prospect of success, despite its superior performance. During planning, it was assumed that only single-engined fighters could protect assault landings and that this ruled out Accolade. In August, Allied operations in Italy allowed the hope that German resources had been withdrawn from the Aegean, that Eisenhower could spare heavy bombers to attack Luftwaffe airfields in Greece and Crete and lend four Lightning squadrons.^[16]

On 25 July, Mussolini fell and two days later, Churchill prodded the Chiefs of Staff Committee to keep Accolade in mind and on ! August, Wilson signalled that the minimum of shipping needed for Accolade was an HQ ship, eight Landing ship, infantry (large) [LSI (l)] or Landing Ship Personnel and eighteen MT ships. There were eight LSI (l) in Egypt but five were due to sail to India and the committee signalled on 2 August that most of the air and sea forces would have to come from the central Mediterranean. Wilson was told to take an opportunistic policy in the Aegean. The ship voyages to India were cancelled and some supplies for Turkey were stopped and the staff was told to beg and borrow from Eisenhower eight ships and landing craft, four Lightning squadrons, a parachute battalion and its aircraft and smaller units of specialists by 14–15 August. The British would have a brigade ready by 18 August and another by 22 August. Eisenhower agreed but later than hoped and less the Lightnings or transport aircraft but on 12 August had second thoughts lest Accolade divert resources from Operation Avalanche, the landings at Salerno, due on 9 September and urge the postponement of Accolade. By the end of August anything more ambitious than an unopposed landing on Rhodes or Crete was impossible using only British resources but by 7 September several small operations had been planned to begin with the announcement of the armistice.^[17]

After the disappointments over American support, the British prepared small operations. A detachment of the Special Air Service was to go to Kastellorizo, close to Turkey and about 80 mi (130 km) east of Rhodes to rally the Italian garrison and establish a base for small craft. Other groups were to go further afield, Kos in particular because it had an airfield and room for more, as did Scarpanto (now Karpathos). A mission was to go to Rhodes to contact Major General Michele Scaroina and Admiral Inigo Campioni and see if they would begin hostilities against the German garrison.^[18][d] If the mission succeeded, the 234th Infantry Brigade (Major-General Francis Brittorous) and tanks would sail to Rhodes in three merchant ships, that were available but not built for assault loading and would need the harbour to unload. Despite Turnbull flying to Rhodes and Jellicoe and a companion parachuting on 9/10 September, Kleemann arrested Scaroina and attacked the Italian garrison. When Campioni was told that British troops could not arrive before 15 September, he ordered the Italians to surrender on 11 September.^[19]

Despite being forestalled on Rhodes, the British decided to occupy Kos, 60 mi (97 km) north-west of Rhodes and use the airfield at Antimachia and to take Leros, another 35 mi (56 km) to the north-west of Kos. Leros had a good anchorage and some port facilities but no airfield. Samos, 40 mi (64 km) further on than Leros, separated from Turkey by a narrow channel and on the route to Smyrna (Izmir) was also to be occupied and the islands would be bases for a "piratical war on enemy communications in the Aegean". Parties were to land on other islands to reconnoitre, encourage Italian garrisons to side with the Allies and to resist German pressure. Domination of the Dodecanese would need Rhodes that was to be taken and on 1 October plans to capture Rhodes were accepted, using the part-assembled 8th Indian Infantry Division and the 9th Armoured Brigade. Eisenhower had offered four warships, three LSI and transport aircraft, any more being found by the British. Intelligence revealed that the Luftwaffe in the Aegean was being reinforced and that to hold Kos, these aircraft must be destroyed, as short-range fighters needed the airfield at Antimachia.^[20]

On 12 September a Special Boat Service (SBS) detachment of 55 men (Major David Sutherland) sailed for Kos from Kastellorizo in a motley of craft and RN motor launches as 38 US bombers attacked the airfields on Rhodes. The SBS arrived on 14 September and contacted the Italian commander who wanted to cooperate. The SBS party moved to Antimachia about 13 mi (21 km) from Kos town.^[9] At dawn on 14 September, a Beaufighter delivered an RAF wireless party to Antimachia airfield, as another circled overhead and at dusk Six Spitfire Mk Vs of 7 Squadron SAAF arrived from Cyprus, with the rest preparing to transfer and ground crews being delivered by three Dakotas of 216 Squadron escorted by six Beaufighters of 46 Squadron despite being fired on by Italian anti-aircraft guns in error.^[21]

On the night of 14/15 September, seven Dakotas flew from RAF Mafraq in Jordan to Nicosia to transport 120 paratroops, a mortar section and a machine-gun section of A Company, 11th Battalion, the Parachute Regiment and a headquarters group to Kos that night, the SBS marking the drop zone and Italian troops spreading straw and hay on the ground. As soon as they landed, the paratroops joined the Italians in preparing defences most exposed to seaborne landings but the coast was 80 mi (130 km) long and with the numbers available, keeping watch would be difficult. The main defensive effort was to be made around Antimachia airfield and another site for an airstrip was chosen at Lambia, north of Kos town.^[21]

On the morning of 15 September, 216 Squadron Dakotas flew a party of 42 men from 2909 Squadron Royal Air Force Regiment flew from RAF Ramat David in Palestine to Antimachia, with nine 20 mm Hispano anti-aircraft guns but the stony ground was impossible to dig in and it was slow work building blast walls. Two Spitfires at a time kept a standing patrol and another two were on instant readiness but no Luftwaffe aircraft intervened. The SBS was relieved and departed for Samos and another SBS party arrived and moved to Simi. The commander of Force 292, Lieutenant-General Desmond Anderson arrived during the morning, carried out an inspection then left for the other islands. An Italian observation post reported that seven Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft with two Bf 109 fighter escorts. the standing patrol attacked the formation as it flew over Stampalia (now Astypalaia) at 300 ft (91 m) and shot down a Ju 52.^[22]

At dawn on 16 September, a German Junkers Ju 88 bomber appeared over Kos, bombed Italian coastal artillery, then bombed Antimachia. The Hispano gunners damaged it and as it flew out to sea and it was shot down by the standing patrol. The British redeployed the Hispanos and the DLI filled in the craters. Later in the morning, C Company of the 1st Battalion, Durham Light Infantry (DLI, Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Kirby) arrived by air and took post around the airfield. The 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA also arrived by air but its 40 mm Bofors guns were being transported by sea. Parties of the 9th Indian Field Company RE and a medical unit arrived by caïque, Motor Launch and destroyer. The rest of the DLI were delivered by air (the 11th Parachute Battalion withdrew on 25 September). Another party of 58 men of 2909 Squadron, RAF Regiment arrived on 17 September with another seven 20 mm Hispano cannon, five being sent to Kos town.^[23]

On 17 September, A company and B Company, the 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, a communications party, base staff and stores arrived at Leros on the destroyers HMS Croome and HMS Hurworth. The British found the port operational, with the Italians sympathetic, despite low morale and poor organisation. The commander of Force 292, Lieutenant-General Desmond Anderson visited on 15 September. Liaison parties went to Leros and Samos.^[24]

Sturm-Division Rhodos a well-armed, mobile force of 6,000–7,000 men, had evolved into the principal German force in the Dodecanese with another 1,500 German troops on the island of Scarpanto (now Karpathos) to the west of Rhodes. The island was the administrative centre of the Dodecanese Islands that had three military airfields.^[25] Because of its size and geographical position, Rhodes was the principal military objective for both sides. On 8 September 1943, the Italian garrison on the island of Kastelorizo surrendered to a British detachment, that was reinforced during the following days by ships of the Allied navies.^[26]

On 9 September, a British delegation, led by George Jellicoe, parachuted onto Rhodes, to persuade the Italian commander, Ammiraglio Inigo Campioni, to join the Allies. Kleemann attacked the 40,000-strong Italian garrison on 9 September and forced it to surrender by 11 September. The loss of Rhodes was a serious blow to Allied hopes.^[27] By 19 September, Karpathos, Kasos and the Italian-occupied islands of the Sporades and the Cyclades were in German hands. On 23 September, the 22nd Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Friedrich-Wilhelm Müller), that garrisoned Fortress Crete, was ordered to take Kos and Leros.^[28]

Having identified the vital role of Kos that had the only Allied landing grounds, Fliegerkorps X bombed it and Allied positions, from 18 September. Reinforcements gave the Germans 362 operational aircraft in the Aegean by 1 October.^[29] The British forces on Kos numbered about 1,500 men, 680 of whom were infantry, the rest being mainly RAF personnel and c. 3,500 Italians of the 10th Regiment, 50th Infantry Division Regina. On 3 October, the Germans made amphibious and airborne landings with the code-name Unternehmen Eisbär (Operation Polar Bear) and reached the outskirts of Kos town later that day. The British withdrew under cover of night and surrendered the next day. The fall of Kos was disastrous to the Allies, since it deprived them of air cover. The Germans captured 1,388 British and 3,145 Italian prisoners. On 4 October, German troops committed the Massacre of Kos, killing the captured Italian commander of the island, Colonnello Felice Leggio, and nearly 100 of his officers.^[30]

The Allied garrison of Leros consisted of most of the 234th Infantry Brigade with c. 3,000 men of the 2nd The Royal Irish Fusiliers (Lieutenant Colonel Maurice French), the 4th The Buffs (The Royal East Kent Regiment), 1st The King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster) and the 2nd Company, 2nd Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (Brigadier Robert Tilney), who assumed command on 5 November. There were also c. 8,500 Italians, mostly naval personnel, under Ammiraglio Luigi Mascherpa.^[31]

After the fall of Kos, the Italian garrison of Kalymnos surrendered, providing the Germans with a valuable base for operations against Leros. Unternehmen Leopard (Operation Leopard) was originally scheduled for 9 October but on 7 October, the Royal Navy intercepted and destroyed the German convoy headed for Kos. Several hundred men and most of the few German heavy landing craft were lost; replacements were transported by rail and it was not until 5 November that the Germans had assembled a fleet of 24 light infantry landing craft. To avoid interception by the Allied navies, they were dispersed among several Aegean islands and camouflaged. Despite Allied efforts to locate and sink the invasion fleet, as well as repeated shelling of the ports of German-held islands, the Germans suffered few losses and were able to assemble their invasion force, under Generalleutnant Müller, for Unternehmen Taifun (Operation Typhoon) on 12 November.^[32]

The German invasion force consisted of personnel from all branches of the Wehrmacht, including veterans from the 22nd Infantry Division, a Fallschirmjäger (paratroop) battalion and an amphibious operations company Küstenjäger (Coast Raiders) from the Brandenburger special operation units.^[33] The Luftwaffe began an air offensive against Leros on 26 September which caused significant casualties and damage to the garrison and supporting naval forces. In the early hours of 12 November, the invasion force in two groups approached the island from east and west. Despite failures in some areas, the Germans established a bridgehead, while airborne forces landed on Mt Rachi, in the middle of the island. After repulsing Allied counter-attacks and being reinforced the following night, the Germans quickly cut the island in two and the Allies surrendered on 16 November. The Germans suffered 520 casualties and captured 3,200 British and 5,350 Italian soldiers.^[34]

After the fall of Leros, Samos and the other smaller islands were evacuated. German Ju 87 (Stukas) of I Gruppe, Stukageschwader 3 bombed Samos on 17 November, prompting the 2,500-strong Italian garrison to surrender on 22 November. Along with the occupation of the smaller islands of Patmos, Fournoi and Ikaria on 18 November, the Germans completed their conquest of the Dodecanese, which they held until the end of the war.Only the island of Kastellorizo, off the Turkish coast, was retained by the British and was never threatened.

The large number of islands in the Aegean Sea forced the Allies and Germans to rely on naval vessels for reinforcements and supplies. At first the naval effort by both sides was small, most of the Allied shipping and warships had been transferred to the central Mediterranean for the invasion of Italy, while the Germans did not have a large naval force in the Aegean. Vice-Admiral Werner Lange, the German Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Aegean, tried to reinforce German garrisons and carry out offensive operations against Allied garrisons and transport Italian prisoners of war to the mainland. On 16 September, eight Beaufighters of 227 Squadron from Cyprus found a German convoy south-west of Naxos with two merchant ships, escort vessels and three Arado Ar 196 floatplane escorts. One of the Arados was damaged and forced down and the ships bombed and strafed against massed return-fire. The smaller ship was near-missed, sank quickly and the Beaufighters returned undamaged.^[35]

On 17 September the destroyers HMS Eclipse, Faulknor and the Greek RHN Vasillissa Olga departed Alexandria at 8:00 a.m. to sweep between Rhodes and Stampalia (Astypalaia). At 7:30 p.m. the flotilla received a reconnaissance aircraft report of a convoy of the merchant ships Pluto (3,830 GRT) and Paula (3,754 GRT) with escorts and the destroyers planned to attack the ships between Astypalaia and Kandeliusa near Kos. At 0:17 a.m. the merchant ships and their escort, UJ2104 (Darvik) were spotted and the flotilla manoeuvred to silhouette the ships against the moon. At 0:39 a.m. the destroyers opened fire at 2,000 yd (1,800 m), Eclipse and Faulknor engaged Paula and Faulknor hit the target with its first salvo, after the third salvo changed target to UJ 2104 and hit it at once. Vasillissa Olga engaged Pluto and both ships caught fire, Faulknor sank Paula by torpedo and Paula exploded soon afterwards. The destroyers raced south at 29 kn (54 km/h; 33 mph) for the Scarpanto (now (Karpathos]]) Strait, got beyond the range of Luftwaffe bombers by dawn and returned to port at Haifa.^[36][e]

On 14 September, the Greek submarine RHN Katsonis, was rammed and sunk by U-boat hunter UJ 2101. On 26 September, 25 Ju 88s sank RHN Vasilissa Olga and HMS Intrepid at Lakki Bay, Leros. On 1 October, the Italian destroyer Euro and on 9 October HMS Panther were sunk and the cruiser HMS Carlisle seriously damaged. The short range of Hunt-class destroyers prevented HMS Aldenham, RHN Pindos and RHN Themistoklis from intercepting the German invasion convoy headed for Kos. After the loss of Kos and its air cover, the Allied navies concentrated on supplying Leros and Samos, mostly under the cover of night. From 22 to 24 October, Hurworth and Eclipse were mined and sunk in a German minefield east of Kalymnos (north of Kos) and RHN Adrias lost its prow, escaped to the Turkish coast and after makeshift repairs, sailed to Alexandria.^[37]

On 23 September, Eclipse damaged the torpedo boat TA10 and sank the steamer Gaetano Donizetti that was carrying 1,576 Italian prisoners of war of whom about 1,200 were killed.^[38] Another disaster occurred a month later, when United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-25 Mitchells and RAF Beaufighters sank the cargo ship Sinfra, which was carrying 2,389 Italian prisoners, 71 Greek prisoners and 204 German guards, of whom only 539 were saved.^[39][f]

On the night of 10/11 November, the destroyers HMS Petard, Rockwood and ORP Krakowiak bombarded Kalymnos and Faulknor bombarded Kos, where German forces were assembling to attack Leros. The German convoy reached Leros on 12 November, escorted by over 25 ships, mostly submarine chasers, torpedo boats and minesweepers. During the subsequent nights, Allied destroyers failed to find and destroy the German vessels, limiting themselves to bombarding the German positions on Leros. With the fall of Leros on 16 November, the Allied ships were withdrawn, evacuating the remaining British garrisons. By that time, the Germans had also used Dornier Do 217s of Kampfgeschwader 100 (KG 100), with their new Henschel Hs 293 radio-controlled missiles, scoring two hits. One caused severe damage to Rockwood on 11 November and another sank HMS Dulverton two days later. The Allies lost six destroyers sunk and two cruisers and two destroyers damaged between 7 September and 28 November 1943.^[40]

The Dodecanese campaign was one of the last British defeats in World War II and one of the last German victories, while others have labelled it a fiasco which was badly conceived, planned and executed as a "shoestring strategy".^[41] The German victory was predominantly due to their possession of air superiority, which caused great loss to the Allies, especially in ships and enabled the Germans to supply their forces. The revival of German fortunes in the eastern Mediterranean helped restore Spanish confidence in the German war effort, shaken by the Allied landings in Operation Torch the landings in North Africa and Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily and ensured several more months of Spanish tungsten exports for German war industry.^[42]

British code-breakers decrypted a warning signal on 14 September as British troops landed on Kos that contradicts the official history account by Molony et al. A German report about the invasion of Kos was decrypted on 5 October but soon afterwards, another signal was decrypted of landing craft being dispatched to Syros, mid-way between Athens and Leros for future operations. Signals about a convoy from Athens to Kos, postponed several times and an attack order at 1:00 a.m. on 11 November, followed by a repeated signal on 12 November. After the invasion, two signals were decrypted of British resistance and one that the situation was deteriorating on the night of 14/15 and that the heavy equipment that afternoon was vital.^[43]

The German occupation of the Dodecanese islands sealed the fate of Jews living there. Although Italy had passed the anti-Jewish law of the Manifesto of Race in 1938, Jews living on the Dodecanese islands (and Italian-occupied Greece) experienced much less antisemitism than in the German and Bulgarian occupied zones of Greece, which culminated in March 1943 with deportations to the death camps in occupied Poland. The Italian surrender, the German takeover and the failure of the Allied offensive meant that the haven disappeared. Most of the Dodecanese Jews were murdered by the Germans; 1,700 members of the ancient Jewish community of Rhodes (of a population of about 2,000 people) were rounded up by the Gestapo in July 1944 and only some 160 of them survived deportation.^[44]

About 4,800 British troops were killed or captured; 26 naval vessels and the RAF lost 115 aircraft and20 were damaged. Luftwaffe losses are harder to quantify but contemporary reports have 135 aircraft shot down and 126 damaged but in 2008 Smith and Walker suggested that the loss was unlikely to be more than 120. The German communiqué after the capture of Leros claimed 3,200 British and 5,700 Italian troops for a loss of 1,109 troops, 41 per cent of the total. Müller wrote that the cost of capturing Kos and Leros was 260 men killed, 746 wounded and 162 missing; the British took 177 German prisoners off the island.^[45] In 2010 Ian Gooderson wrote that the German success was costly, 1,109 casualties being suffered by the 4,500 German troops involved. Fifteen of the 45 vessels used by the Germans had been sunk or damaged. From the end of September to mid-November the Germans lost 35,000 GRT of merchant shipping and 21 small naval vessels; the Luftwaffe lost 156 aircraft.^[46] The Germans transferred Italian prisoners in overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels, that led to several accidents. On the night of 12/13 February 1944, the 2,127 GRT ship SS Oria, was lost off Cape Sounion, trying to evade a submarine attack and more than 4,000 Italians were killed in the disaster.^[47]

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• Special Operations in the Dodecanese Archived 29 May 2010 at the Wayback Machine
• Account of the Battle of Leros Archived 14 May 2009 at the Wayback Machine
• Time lines of World War II