Davison v. Von Lingen

Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U.S. 40 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a stipulation that a chartered ship was to sail from its current berth to a destination was a condition precedent to the contract, which was broken when the vessel did not sail directly to the destination.^[1] In the manner of cases named after ships, this case is also called The Whickham.

On 1 August 1879, a charter-party was entered into between the owners of the steam-ship Whickham and the firm of A. Schumacher & Co., composed of George A. Von Lingen, Carl A. Von Lingen, and William G. Atkinson. The charter-party stipulated that the ship was "now sailed, or about to sail, from Benizaf, with cargo, for Philadelphia". Before signing the charter party, the charterers asked to have in it a guarantee that the steamer would reach Philadelphia in time to load a cargo for Europe in August, but this was refused. They declined to have inserted the words "sailed from, or loading at Benizaf."^[1]

At the time, the steamer was at "Benizaf"^[a] in Morocco, only three-elevenths loaded. On August 7, the ship left port intended to eventually reach Philadelphia, but it headed for a stop in Gibraltar. It left port again, now headed to Philadelphia, on August 9.^[1]

On learning when the steamer left Gibraltar, they proceeded to look for another vessel. The unloading of the steamer at Philadelphia was completed September 7, but the charterers repudiated the contract.^[1]

The contract was broken when the vessel was found not to have left on time.^[1]

• Text of Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U.S. 40 (1885) is available from: Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress