Daisaku Kōmoto

Daisaku Kōmoto (河本 大作, Kōmoto Daisaku; January 24, 1883 – August 25, 1955^[1]) was a soldier in the Japanese Imperial Japanese Army active during the early Shōwa period. He held the rank of Colonel. He is known as the mastermind of the assassination of Zhang Zuolin.

Kōmoto was born on January 24, 1883, in Mikazuki Village, Sayō District, Hyōgo Prefecture (present-day Sayō Town), as the second son of the landowner Sanji Kōmoto. After graduating from higher elementary school, the Osaka Army Local Junior Cadet School, and the Central Junior Cadet School, he graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy (15th class, 97th in order of merit, Infantry) in November 1903. The following year, he was dispatched to the Russo-Japanese War and was severely wounded. He graduated from the Army War College (26th class, 24th in order of merit) in 1914. He served as a staff officer of the Central China Expeditionary Army, attached to the General Staff Office, as an assistant military attaché at the Japanese legation in China, as a military science instructor at the Army War College, and in March 1926, as a colonel, became a staff officer of the Kwantung Army.^[2] Subsequently, due to the assassination of Zhang Zuolin in June 1928, he was suspended, placed on the waiting list, and then transferred to the reserve.^[3] The 15th class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy included Nogi Maresuke's second son, Yasunori (Infantry, killed in the Russo-Japanese War), as a classmate.

In March 1928, tensions were rising in Manchuria between the Fengtian clique and the Japanese side.^[4] The cause was Zhang Zuolin's unilateral strengthening of the management of "parallel lines to the SMR". In response, the SMR, the Consulate General, and the Kwantung Army were all indignant, viewing this as an "ungrateful anti-Japanese action".^[4] At the center of this were Kōmoto, a senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army, and Kenji Doihara, an adviser to the Fengtian military governor.^[4] While the details of Kōmoto's plan are unclear, it appears he was considering a kind of coup d'état without obtaining the permission of the army commander.^[4][a]

Furthermore, according to the recorded political discourse of Takekuni Machino, when Kōmoto became a unit commander in Kyushu, he acted irresponsibly, borrowing 2,000–3,000 yen from a loan shark, which he couldn't repay and was sued. He wrote a letter to Zhang Zuolin, asking if he could privately repay the debt to avoid it becoming a big issue, and Zhang arranged 3,000 yen for him. In his thank-you letter addressed to Zhang Zuolin, Kōmoto even wrote that if he were dismissed from the army over this matter, he would like Zhang to somehow take him on as a subordinate.^[5]

thumb|The scene of the assassination|260x260ピクセル On June 4, 1928, a train of the South Manchuria Railway carrying Zhang Zuolin, who was returning from Beijing to Manchuria under pressure from Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition, was bombed near Fengtian. Zhang Zuolin was severely injured and died two days later (the Huanggutun incident).^[6][7] Initially, Japanese newspapers speculated it might have been the work of spies (plainclothes soldiers) from Chiang Kai-shek's National Revolutionary Army, referring to it as the "Major Manchurian Incident". However, subsequent investigations revealed that Kōmoto, a senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army, planned the incident and used Captain Tetsuo Tōmiya of the Independent Garrison Unit responsible for on-site security, and Lieutenant Sadatoshi Kirihara (an engineer) seconded from the Korean Army to carry it out.^[6][7] Tōmiya allegedly killed two Chinese coolies to make it appear as though the bombing was the work of the Northern Expeditionary Army.^[6]

From immediately after the incident, rumors circulated about the Kwantung Army's involvement. Reports from the Fengtian Consul General to the Foreign Minister noted that many local Japanese journalists believed the Kwantung Army was responsible. In a letter sent to an acquaintance in Tokyo a few months before the incident, Kōmoto himself wrote: "Wouldn't it be fine if one or two like Zhang Zuolin died like dogs? This time, for sure, I'm going to do it... My only hope is to make it rain blood in Manchuria and Mongolia."^[8] While the Kwantung Army Commander, Chōtarō Muraoka, had secretly ordered Lieutenant Colonel Yoshiharu Takeshita to have the China Garrison Army carry out an operation to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, Kōmoto reportedly stopped this and carried out his own plan.

Regarding the handling of this incident, Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka initially reported to the Emperor Shōwa that there was a possibility the Japanese army was involved, and if true, would be dealt with strictly. However, subsequent reports were vague, and according to those close to the Emperor, this incurred the Emperor's wrath and contributed to the cabinet's eventual resignation.^[9] Kōmoto was not subjected to a court-martial; instead, in April 1929, he received a relatively light administrative punishment of being transferred to the reserve.^[9] According to Saionji-kō to Seikyoku (Prince Saionji and the Political Situation), written by Haruo Kumada, the political secretary of Kinmochi Saionji, and the Emperor Shōwa's Monologue, it was said that if a court-martial were held and interrogations conducted, Kōmoto would reveal all of Japan's machinations, so the court-martial was abandoned and he was transferred to the reserve.

Regarding this outcome, Army General Iwane Matsui, who viewed Zhang Zuolin as a bulwark against communism, opposed the leniency and continued to insist that Kōmoto was the mastermind and should be severely punished.

Russian historical novelist Dmitry Prokhorov has introduced a theory that the assassination of Zhang Zuolin was not masterminded by Kōmoto, but rather by the GRU (Soviet military intelligence).^[10] However, from the time of the incident, Japan's political leadership and local officials considered Kōmoto to be the perpetrator, and the involvement of the Japanese Army or Kwantung Army in the incident was already a subject of concern.^[11][12] It was only after the war, due to revelations by Tanaka Ryūkichi at the Tokyo Trial, that the true nature of Zhang's assassination became widely known to the Japanese public.^[13][14] Furthermore, after the war, Kōmoto himself confessed to assassinating Zhang Zuolin while in a detention center in Taiyuan, China.^[15] Prior to this, Kōmoto's brother-in-law, Reiji Hirano, had taken dictation from Kōmoto to compile Kōmoto Daisaku Den (Biography of Daisaku Kōmoto) at someone's request, giving a copy to Kōmoto's family.^[16] Soon after the war, this account was introduced in Bungeishunjū by an acquaintance of Kōmoto's under the title Watashi ga Chōsakurin o Koroshita (I Killed Zhang Zuolin).^[16] The content largely matches the Chinese authorities' published account, which may be partly because the Chinese side used Hirano's reconstructed version (based on memory) to verify Kōmoto's confessions. Additionally, there is ample corroborating testimony from military associates supporting the theory of Kōmoto's guilt.^[17] In contrast to this, it is often argued in Japan that Tanaka's testimony at the Tokyo Trials was perjury tailored to suit GHQ's agenda, or that Kōmoto's confession and Hirano's account were the result of brainwashing in detention camps under Communist control or were motivated by self-interest given Kōmoto's situation.^[18]

In an NHK General TV program aired on August 14, 2020 (Mokugeki! Nippon, "Called the Grandchild of a 'Great Villain' ~ Contemplation 92 Years After the Assassination of Zhang Zuolin ~"), Professor Ryu Ketsu of the Waseda University Faculty of Social Sciences mentioned that in the Japanese-untranslated portions of Kōmoto's post-war confessions from the Taiyuan detention center, Kōmoto stated that even after being placed in the reserve, he continued to cooperate with the military during the Manchurian Incident of 1931, involving himself in funding activities and acting as a liaison between the military and civilians, and that he recognized the subjugation of Manchuria as an invasion.^[19]

In 1931, while on a business trip in Manchuria, he developed acute appendicitis complicated by peritonitis in Fengtian and underwent surgery at the SMR hospital. Fearing he might reveal secrets under anesthesia, a friend held his arms down and he underwent the surgery without anesthesia, thrashing wildly on the operating table from the pain.^[20]

Meanwhile, despite the assassination being a classified matter that the Japanese government and military officially denied involvement in, Kōmoto would talk about it as if it were a source of pride among insiders, and many heard him do so.^[17] At such times, years after the event, he would often justify himself to those unaware of the circumstances at the time, claiming that prior to this incident, Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment and hatred towards Japan had been intense, but that it abruptly ceased overnight after the incident, albeit temporarily.^[21] In reality, however, anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese who believed the Japanese were responsible intensified at the time; security cordons were set up around the SMR附属地, with only Japanese being subjected to body searches;^[22] a Japanese student (4th-year old-system middle school) was stabbed with a bayonet by Fengtian soldiers;^[23] Japanese residents began evacuating from within Fengtian's walled city;^[23] Consul General Hayashi ordered Japanese residents in the SMR附属地 to evacuate;^[24] and wealthy Chinese who previously sought refuge in the SMR附属地 during crises for Zhang Zuolin's faction now avoided Japanese-controlled land.^[25]

Afterward, using connections from his Kwantung Army days, he became a director of the South Manchuria Railway in 1932^[26] and chairman of the Manchuria Coal Mining Company, which consolidated all coal mines in Manchuria, in 1934. It is said he was able to be active in China because he had connections with Puyi, the later Emperor of Manchukuo, and the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan, making him a useful figure for Japan.^[20] In February 1935, as chairman of the SMR's Economic Research Committee, he conducted statistical surveys on population increases in Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces.

In 1942, through the mediation of Tadashi Hanaya, chief of staff of the First Army, he became president of Shanxi Industrial Co., Ltd., a company under the umbrella of the North China Development Company established to promote Japan-China economic cooperation, handling iron ore and light industrial products. He continued to live in North China even after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.

After the war, Shanxi Industrial in Taiyuan, Shanxi, was requisitioned by the Republic of China and renamed Northwest Industrial Construction Company. Following instructions from the ROC, Kōmoto became the company's supreme advisor, continuing to manage its operations. Half of the Japanese civilians who had worked for the company before the war returned to Japan at the war's end, but the other half remained under the same conditions as before, with Kōmoto himself staying on under the title of "General Advisor." The total number, including family members, exceeded 1,200. Their decision to stay was influenced by Kōmoto's persuasion.

Subsequently, Kōmoto became chairman of the Japanese Residents' Club, cooperating with Yan Xishan's Nationalist Shanxi army alongside Japanese in Taiyuan to fight against the Chinese Communist Party forces,^[b] but in 1949, the Communist forces captured Taiyuan. Kōmoto became a prisoner of war and was held in the Taiyuan War Criminals Detention Center as a war criminal of the newly established People's Republic of China.

During interrogations by the Chinese authorities, Kōmoto confessed the truth of the incident, stating that the Kwantung Army planned the assassination because Zhang Zuolin's power had become too great and was an obstacle to the development of the SMR, and that responsibility lay with the Kwantung Army. He said that although they attempted a cover-up, it failed, and when the Army Ministry demanded the Kwantung Army identify the person responsible, the commander struggled over whom to designate, and he himself decided to take full responsibility.^[20]

On August 25, 1955, Kōmoto died of illness in a detention center in the People's Republic of China. He was 72 years old.

Although he is now referred to as the culprit of the incident, he was not called as a witness nor interrogated regarding the assassination of Zhang Zuolin during the GHQ-led International Military Tribunal for the Far East after the war, nor during Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing Military Tribunal, partly because he was in politically unstable northern China, where the Nationalists and Communists were vying for power, at the time.

It is said that within the detention center, he received verbal abuse from other Japanese detainees, such as "We're in this mess because of you."^[8] Kōmoto's remains were returned to his homeland on December 18, 1955, aboard the 12th repatriation ship from Communist China (the Kōan Maru), which arrived at Maizuru Port, along with other Japanese internees and remains.^[27]

A funeral was held for him on January 31, 1956, at Aoyama Funeral Hall. It was a grand affair attended by many former army associates and people connected to Manchukuo. A memorial address was contributed by his friend Shūmei Ōkawa, who praised him: "Kōmoto was, both mentally and physically, strangely flexible yet strong. He could bend and stretch freely and never broke. He was extremely cautious yet very bold, thought meticulously, prepared thoroughly, and carried out his actions calmly."^[28]

The history of his hometown, Mikazuki Town, reportedly described Kōmoto as follows: "His utmost sincerity in serving the nation and his resolute action will be long recorded."^[29] A memorial stone was erected in 1965 on the grounds of Meikō-ji, a temple next to his birthplace, by local supporters. The inscription reportedly reads "Became a war criminal and died of illness in a detention camp."^[30]

Court ranks

• May 17, 1904: Senior Eighth Rank^[31]
• August 18, 1905: Junior Seventh Rank^[32]
• September 30, 1910: Senior Seventh Rank^[33]
• October 30, 1915: Junior Sixth Rank^[34]
• November 30, 1920: Senior Sixth Rank^[35]
• December 28, 1925: Junior Fifth Rank^[36]
• August 9, 1930: Senior Fifth Rank^[37]

Orders and medals

Permission to wear foreign decorations

• Hirano Reiji (1959). Manshū no Inbōsha Kōmoto Daisaku no Unmeiteki na Ato. Jiyū Kokuminsha. ASIN B000JASZRG.
• Sagara Shunsuke (December 1995) [1985]. Akai Yūhi no Manshū Nogahara ni Kisai Kōmoto Daisaku no Shōgai. Kōjinsha NF Bunko. Kōjinsha. ISBN 4-7698-2107-7.

• Arima Manabu (2010) [2002]. Nihon no Rekishi 23 Teikoku no Shōwa. Kōdansha Gakujutsu Bunko. Kōdansha. ISBN 4-06-268923-5.
• Itō Yukio (2010) [2002]. Nihon no Rekishi 22 Seitō Seiji to Tennō. Kōdansha Gakujutsu Bunko. Kōdansha. ISBN 978-4-06-291922-7.
• Usui Katsumi (1974). Manshū Jihen. Chūkō Shinsho. Chūōkōronsha. ISBN 4-12-100377-2.
• Kobayashi Michihiko (2020). Kindai Nihon to Gunbu 1868-1945. Kōdansha Gendai Shinsho. Kōdansha. ISBN 978-4-06-518744-9.
• Hata Ikuhiko, ed. (1991). Nihon Riku Kaigun Sōgō Jiten. University of Tokyo Press. ISBN 978-4130360609.
• Hosaka Masayasu (2006). Shōwa Rikugun no Kenkyū 下. Asahi Bunko. Asahi Shimbunsha.