Conservatism in Iran

Conservatism in Iran (Persian: محافظه‌کاری, romanized: Mohāfeze-kāri) can vary in meaning from time to time. Until 1979, "conservative" in Iran meant "Monarchists" or "Royalists" who supported Pahlavi. In modern Iranian discourse, the term "conservative" has been replaced by "Principlists", which refers mainly to those who advocate the principles of the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Characteristics

Modern Iranian conservatives generally align on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which demands absolute loyalty to the Supreme Leader of Iran as the ultimate authority.[1] Beyond this theological foundation, their views can be categorized into several key areas:

Economic views

The economic ideology of Iranian conservatives is often characterized by a tension between supporting the traditional Bazaar merchants and managing the state-aligned foundations known as Bonyad. Historically, the "Traditional Right" has been a staunch defender of private property and free-market principles based on Islamic law, opposing the state-led distributive policies of the left.[2] However, more recent "neoconservative" factions have embraced a "Resistance economy" (egtesad-e moghavemati), which emphasizes self-sufficiency and reducing dependence on international oil markets as a response to foreign sanctions.[3]

Foreign policy

See also: Anti-American sentiment in Iran and Anti-Zionism § Islamic perspectives

Conservative foreign policy is rooted in Anti-Westernism and the rejection of what they term "Global Arrogance" (Estekbar-e Jahani), primarily represented by the United States.[4] They advocate for a "Look to the East" (Negah be Shargh) strategy, prioritizing strategic and economic ties with powers like China and Russia. Additionally, they remain committed to "exporting the revolution" and supporting the Axis of Resistance, including groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, as a means of regional deterrence.[5]

Cultural and social views

In the social sphere, conservatives emphasize the preservation of Islamic morality and the protection of the public from "cultural aggression" (tahajom-e farhangi). This includes strict enforcement of mandatory hijab, gender segregation in certain public institutions, and censorship of media deemed un-Islamic.[6] They view the family as the fundamental unit of society and generally oppose liberal reforms concerning women's rights and civil liberties, which they argue are Western impositions designed to erode Iranian-Islamic identity.[7]

History

Qajar era and Constitutional Revolution

See also: Persian Constitutional Revolution

The foundations of modern Iranian conservatism emerged during the late Qajar dynasty, primarily as a reaction to the Persian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) and the influx of Western secular ideals. This period saw the crystallization of a religious conservative opposition among the ulama and traditional elites who viewed constitutionalism as a threat to the established social and religious order.[8]

Fazlullah Nouri became the leading figure of this movement. While initially participating in the revolution, he eventually broke with the constitutionalists to advocate for "government based on Islamic law" (Mashru'eh) rather than "constitutionalism" (Mashruteh). Nouri maintained that any legislative body must be subordinate to Sharia, a doctrine that served as a precursor to the 20th-century development of Khomeinism.[9] Concurrently, the Qajar monarchy, particularly under Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, represented an older form of autocratic conservatism. This faction sought to preserve the absolute authority of the throne against both foreign concessions and domestic calls for liberal reform, often relying on the traditional alliance between the monarchy and the religious establishment.[10]

Pahlavi dynasty

See also: Pahlavism

The Pahlavi dynasty replaced the Qajar dynasty in 1925 after a coup d'état, ruling Iran as a constitutional monarchy from 1925 until 1953 and then as an autocratic monarchy from the U.S.-instigated 1953 coup d'état until 1979.[11]

Fascist and neo-Nazi parties are permitted under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi such as the SUMKA (Iran National Socialist Workers Party), whose members frequently engaged in violent brawls with communists and supporters of the nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. They mirrored the German Nazi Party, using the swastika, black uniforms, and the "Heil" salute and promoted a radical form of "Aryan" Persian nationalism and virulently anti-communist.[12]

In an attempt to introduce reform from above while preserving traditional relations of hierarchy, the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, launched the White Revolution in 1963 as a series of reforms of aggressive modernization, resulting in a great redistribution of wealth from the aristocratic landlord class to Iran's working class and explosive economic growth in subsequent decades.[13]

Islamic Right

See also: Shia Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism in Iran

The conservative camp after the 1979 Revolution was commonly referred to as the "Islamic Right" (Persian: راست اسلامی, romanized: Rast-e Eslami). During the 1980s and 1990s, this faction was defined by its support for the clerical establishment and its ties to the traditional merchant class of the Bazaar.[14]

The "Traditional Right" within this camp emphasized the enforcement of Sharia law and the protection of private property. They frequently opposed the state-led economic policies and land redistribution programs advocated by the "Islamic Left", who later became the Reformists.[15] Major organizations representing this faction included the Combatant Clergy Association and the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom. These groups held significant influence over candidate vetting and state policy.[16]

Following the death of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, the Islamic Right supported the leadership of Ali Khamenei. While they initially aligned with the presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the faction later split as a rift grew between traditionalists and the more technocratic Executives of Construction Party. The rise of the 2nd of Khordad movement in 1997 eventually led this conservative bloc to reorganize and rebrand itself under the "Principlists" label.[17]

Iranian principlists

Main article: Iranian principlists

The Principlists (Persian: اصول‌گرایان, romanized: Osul-Garāyān, lit. 'followers of principles'[17]) are one of two main political camps in post-revolutionary Iran; the Reformists are the other camp. The term hardliners that some Western sources use in the Iranian political context usually refers to the faction.[18] The faction rejects the status quo internationally,[19] but favors domestic preservation.[20]

Within Iranian politics, "principlist" refers to the conservative supporters of the Supreme Leader of Iran and advocates for protecting the ideological "principles" of the Islamic Revolution's early days.[21] According to Hossein Mousavian, "The Principlists constitute the main right-wing/conservative political movement in Iran. They are more religiously oriented and more closely affiliated with the Qom-based clerical establishment than their moderate and reformist rivals".[22]

A declaration issued by The Two Societies, which serves as the Principlists' "manifesto", focuses upon loyalty to Islam and the Iranian Revolution, obedience to the Supreme Leader of Iran, and devotion to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih.[23]

The Principlists currently dominate the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Assembly of Experts, as well as non-elective institutions such as the Guardian Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, along with the Judiciary.[23]

They held the Presidency until the inauguration of Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian on 30 July 2024.[24]

See also

References

  1. ^ Arjomand, Said Amir (2009). After Khomeini. Oxford University Press. pp. 36–40.
  2. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (2008). A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press. pp. 172–175.
  3. ^ Maloney, Suzanne (2015). Iran's Political Economy since the Revolution. Cambridge University Press. pp. 210–215.
  4. ^ Boroujerdi, Mehrzad (1996). Iranian Intellectuals and the West. Syracuse University Press. pp. 147–150.
  5. ^ Takeyh, Ray (2006). Hidden Iran. Times Books. pp. 130–135.
  6. ^ Takeyh, Ray (2006). Hidden Iran. Times Books. pp. 51–55.
  7. ^ Ansari, Ali (2006). Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East. Basic Books. pp. 165–168.
  8. ^ Ervand Abrahamian (1982). Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press. pp. 91–93.
  9. ^ Vanessa Martin (1989). Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906. I.B. Tauris. pp. 123–128.
  10. ^ Abbas Amanat (1997). Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896. I.B. Tauris. pp. 411–415.
  11. ^ Cyrus Ghani; Sīrūs Ghanī (January 6, 2001). Iran and the Rise of the Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power. I.B.Tauris. pp. 147–. ISBN 978-1-86064-629-4.
  12. ^ Ali Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks
  13. ^ "1979: Iran and America". Encyclopedia Britannica.
  14. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (2008). A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press. pp. 172–175.
  15. ^ Baktiari, Bahman (1996). Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran. University Press of Florida. pp. 125–130.
  16. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000). Who Rules Iran?. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. pp. 12–14.
  17. ^ a b Axworthy, Michael (2016), Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, Oxford University Press, p. 430, ISBN 9780190468965
  18. ^ Masoud Kazemzadeh (2008), "Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran", Middle Eastern Studies, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, S2CID 144111986, In Western sources, the term 'hard-liners' is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves Osul-gara. The word osul (plural of asl) means 'fundamentals', or 'principles' or 'tenets', and the verbal suffix -gara means 'those who uphold or promote'. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves Ommat Hezbollah. Ommat is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. Hezbollah literally means 'Party of Allah'. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as mohafezeh-kar ('conservative'). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms eqtedar-gara ('authoritarian') and tamamiyat-khah ('totalitarian') for what many Western observers have termed 'hard-liners'. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners eqtedar-gara.
  19. ^ Robert J. Reardon (2012), Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation, pp. 81–82, ISBN 978-0833076373
  20. ^ Etel Solingen, ed. (2012), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press, p. 222, ISBN 9781107010444
  21. ^ Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi (June 16, 2013). "Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope". Bloomberg. Retrieved March 10, 2015.
  22. ^ Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012), The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press, p. 486, ISBN 9780870033025
  23. ^ a b SHAUL, BAKHASH (12 September 2011). "Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. Retrieved March 10, 2015.
  24. ^ "Masoud Pezeshkian sworn in as Iranian president". www.nhk.or.jp. Archived from the original on August 2, 2024. Retrieved 2 August 2024.
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