Capture of Siniawan

The capture of Siniawan occurred during the Sarawak Uprising of 1836 on 2 July 1836 and was the second major military action between the Bruneian and Sarawakian armies during the Sarawak Uprising.

After the disastrous defeat of the Bruneians at the Battle of Lidah Tanah. Datu Patinggi Ali was likely embolden and began to target Siniawan. Siniawan was an important objective because was located upriver near Bau, was a major mining and trading settlement and controlled access between the interior and Kuching. By taking Siniawan, the rebels gained full control of the upper Sarawak River.^[1]

The rebels began advancing to Siniawan a month after the siege, which Mahkota had fortified Siniawan likely made during the march and assault on Lidah Tanah.^[2][1]

The rebels were made up of mostly the Bidayuh and Malays who were likely boosted by supposed help from the Sultanate of Sambas.^[3][a]

The Malays were made up of minutemen-like 'levies' and armed retinue of Ali^[4] was as said boosted by support of Sambas and the defeat of Mahkota at Lidah Tanah.^[3][5]

Meanwhile the Bidayuh were boosted in manpower, though made up of desperate ones.^[6][3] The Bidayuh were armed with the mandau,^[7][8] the kliau,^[9][10], spears^[11] and muskets.^[12] However were declining in musketeers.

The garrison were made up of the retainers of the local chiefs in Siniawan, loyal to Brunei and friendly "Dayak" militias.^[13][14] Who were likely asked by Mahkota to reinforce the town.^[15]

The Malay retainers were armed with pisau pedang, pemuras, tarkul and taming shields.^[13][15] They numbered probably around 20-60 men maximum.^[15] Meanwhile the Dayak militias were armed with parang latok, pisau pedang, kliau and muskets and spears^[16][17][13] There were probably also some swivel cannons.^[13][14]

The fortifications of Siniawan were made from heavy timber walls that surrounded the main settlement. Logs were often sharpened at the top to deter climbing, with the walls typically 2–3 m (6 ft 7 in – 9 ft 10 in) high. Wooden towers for lookouts to monitor river approaches which allowed early warning of upriver movements.

On the river, obstacles along the Sarawak River to slow boats. And possibly bamboo or wooden stakes in the river to impede attackers.^[13][15] Along side the mentioned small artillery or swivel guns could be mounted on the riverbank.^[13][14]

The main entry points were also limited to dissuade attackers and heavily guarded. Narrow access routes allowed defenders to concentrate fire on attackers. Secondary walls or barricades within the town for fallback positions somewhat similar to the walls of Constantinople and also allowed defenders to continue resistance even if the outer walls were breached by the attackers.^[13][15]

The Bruneian forces were already demoralised from the previous battle, which Ali likely took advantage of.^[2][1] The garrison was likely outnumbered by the rebels decreasing their morale even more. With the rebels leveraged knowledge of local terrain, The fort’s riverbank and elevated defenses slowed but did not stop the rebels and Ali likely commanded the rebels to conduct coordinated assaults from multiple directions stressing manpower even more. Brunei defenders abandoned the fort rather than face possible defeat and capture.^[13][15]

The defeat of the Bruneians were caused by demoralisation from their previous defeat, more exposed to artillery, less defensible terrain and the Bidayuh knowledge of the land. Which also contributed the rebels as well. With the rebels taking the fort and making new fortifications. The rebels stop moving until late 1835 when they when on march to take Bau from the Bruneians.