Battle of Preveza

The Battle of Preveza (also known as Prevesa) was a naval engagement that occurred on 28 September 1538 near Preveza in the Ionian Sea in northwest Greece, in the same area as the Battle of Actium in 31 BC.^[8] The battle was between an Ottoman fleet and a Holy League fleet and ended as an Ottoman victory. It was amongst the three largest battles in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century, alongside the Battle of Djerba and the Battle of Lepanto.^[9][10]

In 1537, commanding a large Ottoman fleet, Hayreddin Barbarossa captured several Aegean and Ionian islands belonging to the Republic of Venice, namely Syros, Aegina, Ios, Paros, Tinos, Karpathos, Kasos, and Naxos, thus annexing the Duchy of Naxos. He unsuccessfully besieged Corfu, which belonged to the Republic of Venice, and ravaged the Spanish-held Calabrian coast.^[11]

In February 1538, Pope Paul III assembled a Holy League, comprising the Papal States, Habsburg Spain, the Republic of Genoa, the Republic of Venice, and the Knights of Malta, to confront Barbarossa's fleet.^[12] Andrea Doria, the Genoese admiral in service to Emperor Charles V, was in command. The Papal fleet under Admiral Marco Grimani and the Venetian fleet under Vincenzo Cappello arrived first. Doria joined them with the Spanish-Genoese fleet on 22 September 1538.

Before Doria arrived, Grimani attempted to land troops near the Fortress of Preveza but suffered significant casualties in an encounter with Ottoman forces under Murat Reis, causing a retreat to Corfu, where the Holy League assembled its fleet. Barbarossa was at Kos in the Aegean Sea at that time, but soon arrived at Preveza with the rest of the Ottoman fleet after capturing Kefalonia. Sinan Reis, an Ottoman lieutenant, suggested landing troops at Actium on the Gulf of Arta, near Preveza. Barbarossa initially opposed this idea, though it later provedd important in securing Ottoman victory.

According to Fernández Duro, the Christian fleet was composed of 133 galleys, 72 carracks and galleons, and 250 minor vessels, with 50,000 men on board, 16,000 of them being marine infantry. They carried 2,500 cannons. Within the fleet, Doria commanded 49 Spanish and Genoese galleys, Cappello commanded 55 and Grimani captained 27, the rest being undisclosed allied ships.^[13] For his part, Damiani gives a total of 146 galleys, including 30 Spanish, 80 Venetians and 36 Papals, along with 50 galleons and 200 other warships, with 60,000 men.^[1] Crowley gives 139 galleys and 70 sailing ships.^[14]

According to chronicler Martín García Cereceda, who participated in the battle, the fleet featured 141 galleys and 62 sailing ships, with Spanish and Genoese providing 51 galleys and 50 ships, the Venetians 60 galleys and 12 ships, and the Papals 30 galleys.^[15] A Turkish source gives 168 galleys, counting on 52 Genoese galleys, 70 Venetian, 36 Papal and 10 from the Knights of Malta, along with 140 galleons and 300 carracks and troop carriers, with 60,000 men and over 2500 cannons.^[3]

The Ottoman fleet is listed by Duro as featuring 85 galleys, 30 galiots, 25 fustas and an unknown number of brigantines, giving a total of 150 ships, also carrying Turkish troops. ^[16] Damiani gives 130 galleys and 80 minor ships.^[1] Crowley gives 90 galleys and 50 galiots.^[14] The Turkish sources gives 122 galleys and frigates, with 8.000 troopers on board, among them 3.000 Janissaries.^[3]

Although the Christian fleet enjoyed a vast advantage in numbers and means, its inner factionalism would prove a comparable drawback, while in turn the Ottoman fleet featured an unified command.^[16] Tension between the Christian commanders were high, as the Venetians maintained a long time rivalry the Genoese and Spanish, who were in command of the fleet. This hostility would turn out disastrous.^[17]

On September 25, after having located Barbarossa, Doria stationed his armada in front of the mouth of the gulf, where the two fleets observed each other in a stalemate.^[18] Barbarossa could not leave, as he would have been overwhelmed, and the surrounding land was under Ottoman control, so his armada could wait safely. Doria would have won in a direct battle, but he could not assault the gulf as its mouth acted as a bottleneck for his ships. Furthermore, he was unable to manoeuvre his sailing ships, whose artillery he relied on, as strong winds threatened to drive the ships onto the hostile coast if they approached further.^[18]

The Holy League were forced to disembark their landing forces and eliminate the Ottoman artillery before installing their own and turning the gulf against the Ottomans. A plan involving the Spanish Marine Infantry was considered and rejected due to Grimani's previous failure and because explorers could not find anywhere to safely disembark.^[19] The Ottomans attempted to build additional fortifications but were prevented by the artillery fire from the coast. This was the only exchange that day as both sides did not want to risk making a mistake.^[18]

During the night of September 27, Doria ordered his fleet to sail 30 miles south towards Sessola, near Leucade, and raid Lepanto and nearby Turkish positions to force Barbarossa to come out.^[20] Barbarossa quickly ordered his fleet into a Y-shaped formation, with himself in the center, alongside Sinan Reis, Cafer Reis, Şaban Reis and his son Hasan Reis. Seydi Ali Reis commanded the left wing and Salih Reis commanded the right wing. Turgut Reis, accompanied by Murat Reis, Güzelce Mehmet Reis and Sadık Reis, commanded the rear wing with six large galliots.

Christian sources provide mutually incompatible accounts on the movements and intentions of Doria, Grimani and Cappello during the battle. Venetian sources, the mainstream version, portray Doria as causing defeat through inaction, while Hispano-Genoese accounts blame Grimani and Cappello for refusing to follow Doria's battle plan.^[19]

Venetian accounts state that Doria believed Barbarossa was too close to the Ottoman-controlled shore, so he did not order an attack. Cappello and Grimani disagreed with Doria and pushed for an attack. After three hours of discussion, Doria relented, ordering the galleys to turn north, where they would reunite with sailing ships. Weather disrupted his strategy, as a lack of wind caused the sailing ships to lag behind, giving Barbarossa an opportunity to attack them without leaving the Ottoman shore. The captains called for immediate help to ships, which were being attacked by the more mobile Ottoman galleys.^[21]

Doria headed with the Christian galleys towards Barbarossa, trying to trap the Ottomans between them and the sailing ships. However, upon reaching the battle, he turned away, believing Barbarossa was still too close to the coast, and hoping to act as bait for Barbarossa to turn towards. Cappello, having recognised this, did not push Barbarossa further.^[22] Cappello and Grimani grew weary from tactical manoeuvring, so they pushed for Doria to fight, even boarding his flagship.^[23][20] Doria refused, unsuccessfully faking an attack twice before the night fell. He ordered all Christian vessels to escape the next morning.^[23]

Imperial sources state that Doria ordered the fleet to be ready after seeing Barbarossa leaving Arta. He ordered to turn around the fleet, which had the Venetian and Papal galleys at the forefront, the sailing ships in the center, and the Spanish and Genoese galleys in the rear guard. Wind favored the sailing ships, commanded by Franco Doria, which left the fleet behind and advanced in masse while firing their artillery, inflicting damage on the Ottoman galleys. However, wind stopped and rendered the sailing ships immobile.^[24]

Doria had believed the ships would be enough to defeat the Ottoman fleet, so he changed his gameplan.^[25] He sent a messenger on a brigantine to call Grimani and Cappello, communicating his intent to attack with the galleys and asking if they were ready, which they both confirmed.^[26] Grimani thought it was risky to frontally engage Barbarossa, but was willing to do so.^[27] Capello came to the extent of offering his son as a hostage to demonstrate his compliance.^[28] Doria then signaled for the sailing ships to try to get between the Ottoman fleet and the coast, intending to cut them from their allied land, and eventually use the Christian galleys to envelop any Ottoman who attempted to do the same to the sailing ships.^[27]

He ordered the Christian galleys to form, with the Spanish and Genoese galleys at the forefront, the Venetians in the center, and the Papal galleys in the rear guard. He also had some of his galleys form between the Venetian vessels, as he had previously deemed the latter unsuitable for battle, and had unsuccessfully tried to convince the Venetians to embark Spanish soldiers in their galleys.^[26] However, despite Doria ordering to attack thrice, they Venetian and Papal galleys did not move.^[26][27] In turn, the Venetian galleys started moving away from the battle.^[29]

As the Ottoman galleys had surrounded the sailing ships, the Doria dispatched the Spanish Viceroy of Sicily, Ferrante Gonzaga, in another brigantine to urge Cappello and Grimani to follow his strategy. The allied captains replied evasively.^[30] Grimani claimed he lacked superior orders from the Republic of Venice to engage in direct combat.^[27] Doria was only followed by nine allied galleys. He sailed around the formation, calling the rest to regroup, but many became entangled in the attempt, which would have made them easy prey had the sailing ships not been between them and Barbarossa.^[30]

Meanwhile, Barbarossa had started attacking the sailing ships. Doria had given up the battle, but he tried to make Barbarossa pursue him in order to get him away from the ships, advancing against him with his galleys before feinting and turning to open sea. However, Barbarossa did not take the bait and returned to attack the ships.^[6] The Genoese had ended up close to the Papal galleys, so he ordered two of them to go tow one of the immobile galleons to help it better use its artillery. They complied, but were captured by the Ottoman galleys in the attempt.^[31]

Regardless of the cause, the sailing ships were under attack. The huge Venetian flagship Candia or Galeone di Venezia, captained by Alessandro Condalmiero, was left stranded 4 miles off the coast and 10 miles off Sessola. Condalmiero was surrounded by dozens of Ottoman galleys; he initially fended them off with heavy artillery, but Barbarossa's ships managed to position themselves on the ship's blind spots and attack. Condalmiero attempted to turn around to prevent this. The ship fought fiercely, waiting for galleys that did not arrive, ending up damaged, but not captured, even after Barbarossa's flagship joined the fray.^[21]

The Spanish and Genoese sailing ships fought back through sheer firepower. The two main flagships, captained by Francisco Sarmiento and Juan Villegas de Figueroa, defended against multiple Ottoman attacks. Figueroa's ship was eventually overwhelmed, forcing his marine infantry to fight in a last stand until the vessel sank. Another ship, captained by Machín de Munguía with marine company, faced ozens of Turkish galleys, becoming dismasted and severely damaged, although ultimately escaping unboarded.^[32] Several ships fired towards the attackers, while others lost hope of aid and abandoned the ships.^[21]

Christian sources state that the Christians had lost two galleys and five ships by the end of the day,^[5][1] while Turkish sources state that the Ottomans had sunk, destroyed or captured 128 ships, taking approximately 3,000 prisoners.^[7] Others sources state that there were 13 destroyed ships, 36 captured and 3,000 prisoners.^[4] The Ottomans kept all of their ships, but 400 died and 800 were wounded.

There was large dissent within the Holy League due to their actions in battle. Due to prior hostility between Venice and Genoa, Cappello accused Doria of sabotaging the battle to not risk Hispano-Genoese ships, saving them for future operations outside the League, while leaving the ships of Venice to be destroyed.^[33] Chroniclers focused on Doria's inexplicable decision to not attack despite his superior fleet.^[34] Sephardic scholar Joseph ha-Kohen proposed that God confounded Doria's mind to punish him for mistreating Jewish prisoners in his campaigns.^[35]

Doria insisted for the Holy League to continue the campaign and capture the fortress of Castelnuovo, present day Herceg Novi, Montenegro, to form a beachhead for an invasion of the Ottoman Balkans. Spaniards and Venetians fought over who would garrison Castelnuovo. To ease tensions, Charles V offered Venice permanent control over the fortress, but was rejected, as the Venetians claimed to lack the means to defend it. Venice had already started negotiations with the Ottomans.^[36] Barbarossa launched an expedition to recover the fortress the following year, leading to the Siege of Castelnuovo. He captured almost all of the remaining Christian outposts in the Ionian and Aegean Seas.

In October 1540, a peace treaty was signed between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, under which the Ottomans gained control of the Venetian possessions in the Peloponnese and Dalmatia and the former Venetian islands in the Aegean, Ionian and Eastern Mediterranean sea. Venice paid a war compensation of 300,000 ducats in gold to the Ottoman Empire.

With the victory at Preveza and the subsequent victory at the Battle of Djerba in 1560, the Ottomans repelled the efforts of Venice and Spain, their main rival powers in the Mediterranean. Ottoman superiority in similar battles remained unchallenged until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.^[37]

• Crowley, Roger (2008). Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean 1521–1580. Faber & Faber. ISBN 978-0571232314.
• Fernández Duro, Cesáreo (1895). Armada Española, desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y Aragón, tomo I. Instituto de Historia Naval.
• García Cereceda, Martín (1873). Tratado de las campañas y otros acontecimientos de los ejércitos del emperador Carlos V en Italia, Francia, Austria, Berberia y Grecia desde 1521 hasta 1545 · Tomo 12, Parte 1. Indiana University.
• Hattendorf, John; King, Ernest (2013). Naval Strategy and Power in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-71317-0. Retrieved 25 November 2015.
• Lane-Pool, Stanley (1890). The Barbary Corsairs. Fisher Unwin.
• Vandenesse, Jean (1988). Journal des voyages de Charles-Quint. Gachard.

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