Assyrian naming dispute

Since the mid-to-late 20th century, there has been a debate over the most appropriate ethnic name for Assyrians. Such debates are divided into distinct arguments that fall on the declaration of three unique identities, especially in diaspora, and are usually defined by the Syriac Christian denomination one belongs to:

• Assyrian: Assyrian is the most common label used, being employed by the Assyrian Church of the East as well as adherents of the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Syriac Orthodox Church, and the Syriac Catholic Church. The Ancient Church of the East, Assyrian Pentecostal Church, and Assyrian Evangelical Church also use the label.
• Chaldean: Within the Chaldean Catholic Church, some members will declare a wholly Chaldean identity that is ethnically separate from Assyrians. Additional claims, albeit in the minority, include that Chaldean Catholics descend from southern Iraq and the former ancient civilization state of Chaldea. The label is most prominent among Iraqi Assyrian communities.
• Syriac/Aramean: Within the Syriac Orthodox Church (and a minority of Syriac Catholics), an Aramean identity is espoused, claiming ancestry to the Semitic-speaking Arameans. The identity is often linked with a "Syriac" element, especially after the year 2000.

The emergence of the dispute is tied to the Ottoman millet system and the antagonistic divisions created based on church denominations. From the early 20th century onward, shifts in identity were greatly influenced by the Assyrian genocide, though the catalyst for the dispute is often cited as being the Simele massacre. The massacre prompted both the Chaldean Catholic and Syriac Orthodox churches to begin separating their adherents from Assyrian identity under fear of persecution. Starting from the 1960s and 70s, issues of identity became more apparent and resulted in high-scale conflicts between different factions, which constituted tribalist infighting, positions on secular or religious identity, and individual political interests. Since then, the dispute has been amplified by successive human rights violations against Assyrians in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.

Disputes around ethnic identity are more over the question of the name itself, rather than a question of separate ethnicities (though advocacy for such exists in the minority). Nowadays, the dispute tends to be more political than historical or religious. Generally, Assyrian identity is more likely to be used by those who prioritize politics and secular initiatives, while Aramean and Chaldean identities are used by those who prioritize religious values and heritage. Names belonging to the community are recognized to represent one people who have different views on the subject of identity.

The naming dispute has contributed to greater division within the Assyrian community, often on a visibly social level. The rise of the Internet and other online communication technologies has made the dispute more visible and volatile than ever before, and the subject has since dominated their internal discourse. Additionally, the dispute is also noted as having been taken advantage of politically by external actors to undermine Assyrian political interests, and religious advocacy for separate Chaldean/Aramean identities have since been characterized by expressions of anti-Assyrian sentiment. Though compromises have been previously suggested, few have been implemented with varying degrees of success, but a comprehensive solution to the dispute has not yet been achieved. Today, the topic remains deeply controversial.

Today, Assyrians are known by various names, such as Chaldeans, Syriacs, Syrians (not to be confused with Syrians from the country of Syria), Jacobites, Nestorians, Arameans, or a combination thereof.^[1][2][3][4] Endonyms such as "Suraye/Suroye," "Suryaye/Suryoye," and "Süryani"^[5] are also used.^[6][7][8][9] Different names within the community have religious, historical, and/or doctrinal backgrounds, and have been used interchangeably,^[10][11] with some only representing a fraction of the Assyrian people.^[1][12][13]

Assyrians across all denominations and identities primarily use "Suraye/Suroye" (Syriac: ܣܘܼܪ̈ܝܐ) or "Suryaye/Suryoye" (Syriac: ܣܘܪ̈ܝܝܐ) to identify themselves natively.^[6][14] The two forms derive from the Akkadian word for Assyrian, "Aššūrāyu,"^[15][16] which is also where the term "Syrian" is originated from. The word underwent multiple sound shifts,^[16] and a grammatical shift later on when the "A" was silenced, creating the modern pronunciation that is used.^{[17][18][19][20]} Suraye and Suryoye are also the origins of names used in reference to spoken Aramaic dialects ("Sureth", "Suryoyo", etc.).^[18] These two words, alongside "Athuraye", "Othuroye", "Aturaye", "Ashuri", "Athuri", "Asuri", and other variants trace back to the same roots etymologically and were used interchangeably.^[21][22] Members of the community in Tur Abdin had previously used the terms "Suroye/Suroyo" and "Surayt" for people and language until around the 1990s.^[23][24]

Although there is no specific term to describe the naming dispute itself, many academics have noted that the arguments exist and define them in various ways. Naures Atto has previously written about the discourse of identity in Sweden, and the antagonism of the label "Syrianer" to the by-then used "Assyriska".^[25] Similarly, Dr. Sargon Donabed and Erica McClure have previously written about the dispute as a linguistic one, relating to the meaning and significance of several identifiers or Neo-Aramaic dialects in formulating modern identity.^[26][27] References to the dispute have been labeled as "identity conflict,"^[28] "identity crisis,"^[29] and "appelative conundrum"^[30] in the past.

In the context of Assyrians, a person who advocates for separation into a distinct Chaldean or Aramean identity, while disavowing connection to other Assyrians or Assyrian ancestry, is considered to be a "separatist." The term has primarily been used surrounding the emergence of Chaldean identity and the political actions of clergymen, namely Sarhad Yawsip Jammo and Ibrahim Namo Ibrahim.^[31][32]

The Assyrians are a stateless ethnic group indigenous to Mesopotamia, originating from a homeland that is now spread across northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, northeastern Syria, and northwestern Iran. They are considered to be some of the first converts to Christianity, alongside the ancient Arameans and the Armenians, Greeks, and Nabataeans, and traces of ancient Assyrian and Aramean reference are present within Syriac tradition.^[33][34] Assyrians primarily belong to four different churches; the Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Syriac Orthodox Church, and the Syriac Catholic Church. Smaller numbers of Assyrians belong to the Ancient Church of the East and other Christian denominations.

The Church of the East was originally formed in Mesopotamia during the time of the Parthian Empire. After the Council of Seleucia-Ctesiphon in 410, the COE would organize itself as the national church of the Sasanian Empire.^[35] Between the 9th and 14th centuries, the COE was the world’s largest Christian denomination by geography. The Nestorian label was first applied to the Church of the East due to its refusal to condemn Nestorius at the Council of Ephesus in 431.^[36] However, the label is nowadays considered theologically incorrect by scholars,^[37] and has been considered a misnomer by scholars such as Sebastian Brock.^[38]

In 1968, with support from the Federal government of Iraq, the Church of the East would split into new and old calendar variants, with the old calendar variant being the newly formed Ancient Church of the East. The government would recognize the new patriarch, and even confiscate properties to be delivered to the new church.^[39] Under the leadership of Shimun XXIII Eshai and his successor, Dinkha IV, the Church of the East would change it's name to the Assyrian Church of the East in 1976, in response to the negation of Assyrian ethnicity by Arabization and repressive policies.^[40]

The Syriac Orthodox Church is part of the Eastern Christian Oriental Orthodox churches that were formally in communion with the State church of the Roman Empire before the Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD.^[41] Following the council, various Christological controversies occurred that resulted in a battle for the position of Patriarchate between supporters and opponents. The church wouldn’t become a distinct entity until 512 AD, when Severus the Great was chosen as patriarch after a synod in Laodicea, Syria.^[42] The church and it’s adherents would receive the name ‘Jacobite’ after Bishop of Edessa Jacob Baradaeus, who ordained most of the miaphysite hierarchy of the church in the sixth century.^[43]

The SOC was also formally in communion with the Church of the East^[44] until the Council of Chalcedon, where the two split due to differing views on Christology.^[36] The split between Monophysite and Dyophysite christology influenced identity shifts between "Jacobite" and "Nestorian" identities.^[45]

The Chaldean Catholic Church was formed out of the Schism of 1552, when the Church of the East split into two factions. During Shemon IV’s reign as patriarch, the practice of patriarchal succession was made hereditary, which often resulted in controversies and schisms within the church.^[46] In opposition to this policy, a group of bishops from Amid (modern day Diyarbakir) and Salmas elected Yohannan Sulaqa, who was the abbot of the Rabban Hormizd Monastery in Alqosh at the time. To affirm his succession to the patriarchate, Sulaqa travelled to Rome where he entered communion with the Catholic Church.^[47]

Most Chaldeans who are originally from Iraq converted from the COE to the Chaldean church in the 1800s. Around this time, Assyrians fleeing the Massacres of Bedir Khan were encouraged to convert in exchange for assistance, something which Jacobites and COE members did not receive.^[48] In one instance, the village of Tel Keppe became Chaldean Catholic around 1830 after a series of brawls between those who wanted to stay members of the COE and those who wanted to convert.^[49] The church was strongest in urban contexts, namely in Mosul, Diyarbekir, and Mardin.^[47]

The Syriac Catholic Church follows the West Syriac Rite of liturgy but is a jurisdiction of the Eastern Catholic Churches. The earlier causes of the church’s formation began in the 1660s, when Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries began a pro-Catholic movement within the Syriac Orthodox Church.^[50] In 1662, Ignatius Andrew Akijan, who was pro-Catholic, was elected to the seat of patriarch.^[51] Throughout the 18th century, Syriac Catholics would face harsh living conditions under the Empire due to their lack of recognition.^[50] Hostile relations with the SOC prevented independence for the church and a consistent succession of Catholic bishops until 1782, when Ignatius Michael III Jarweh of Aleppo was elected Patriarch.^[51][52] Like with the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Syriac Catholic Church was also strongest in urban contexts.^[47]

In the Ottoman Empire, the millet system divided non-Muslim groups based on religious affiliation, and provided these various groups with autonomous self-government for the purpose of maintaining responsibilities of tax payments and security.^[53] The system was closely linked to the tenants of Islamic law for non-Muslims living under Muslim authority. It served to make several religious minorities within the Empire represented within its space, albeit as second-class citizens;^[54] in the case of Assyrians, the millet system contributed to their status as a minority.^[55]

The Syriac Catholic Church received millet status in 1829.^[56] The Chaldean Catholic Church, which was formerly defined by its affiliation with the Church of the East, was granted millet status in 1844.^[57] The Church of the East applied for millet status in 1864, although this was rejected by Ottoman authorities; the church would not receive status as a unique millet until 1914.^[56] The Syriac Orthodox Church had previously been under the jurisdiction of the Armenian millet, linked by virtue of being non-Chalcedonian theologically. However, following various inner church conflicts, a series of petitions (often numbering into the thousands) would be made by the SOC under Ignatius Peter IV and its dioceses for a separate millet.^[58] After the Tanzimat reforms, the SOC was declared its own millet independent of the Armenians in 1882.^[54]

Assyrians predominated within the four millets corresponding to these churches.^[56] Although they were still considered to be the same ethnicity, the growing religious and geographic divides across churches greatly reduced kinship and encouraged animosity amongst them.^[59][60] Members of the Church of the East in Hakkari did not have as close of a connection with Jacobites from Tur Abdin, and even within these churches, disputes between Syriac Catholic and Chaldean Catholic designations had arisen.^[61][a] For many of these millet's leaders, whom were patriarchs of their respective churches, unity as a nation-millet would mean relinquishing the individual power they had as temporal and spiritual heads.^[63] Amplified by political pressures, the impacts of the Ottoman millet system have persisted in the political involvement of clergymen.^[64]

The Assyrian genocide (also known as Sayfo) was less systematic than the experience shared by the Armenians, indicating that local circumstances mitigated general anti-Christian views.^[65] However, Assyrians were still victim to the Turkish nationalist sentiments of the Committee of Union and Progress, which sought to homogenize the nation.^[66] Sayfo resulted in the deaths of at least a third of the Assyrian population at the time, which contributed to the division and weakening of traditional structures which by then were used to identify the community.^[67][66] Many found themselves in new/enlarged refugee communities in countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Armenia, and in the Americas/Europe.^[68][69]

From just before Sayfo, Assyrian nationalism began to develop, encompassing a uniting ideology under various Syriac-rite churches in the space of the Ottoman Empire.^[70] With the emergence of Protestant-sponsored education near Urmia and increased literacy, publications and political thought began to emerge, stressing the need to surpass denominational schisms under a uniting name.^[71][66][61] Alongside figures such as Freydun Atturaya,^[70] various Assyrians of the Syriac Orthodox Church had advocated for a nation state and unity under the Assyrian name. Ashur Yousif, who was Syriac Orthodox, was one of the first Assyrian nationalists to receive Western education and encompass a uniting ideology amongst Assyrians.^[72][70] Naum Faiq was also one of the earliest advocates for unity irrespective of millet,^[70][73] and advocated for the use of "Asuroye" over "Suryoye" or "Suroye".^[74]

Assyrians in Massachusetts, whom were Syriac Orthodox, also expressed similar ideals for unity and hopes for an Assyrian nation state. The design of the original Assyrian flag was designed by Syriac Orthodox adherents, with three white stars representing the three main churches of the Assyrian people.^[75] These Assyrians also had joint events with members of the Church of the East and even intermarried alongside them, with their associations using the label to represent a secular identity.^[76] Members of the Syriac Orthodox diaspora formed various organizations and institutions encompassing Assyrian (Süryânî) identity, and translated "Süryânî kîlîsesî" as the "Assyrian (Apostolic) Church."^[77]

Former Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church Ignatius Aphrem I, who at the time was Archbishop, was one of the leaders of the Assyro-Chaldean delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, alongside Abraham K. Yoosef.^[78] Barsoum presented six requests on behalf of his people and Ignatius Elias III, whom he addressed as descendants of the Assyrian nation, and put a case for Assyrian autonomy.^[79] These cases defined the Assyrian people as including Nestorians, Chaldeans, Jacobites, Maronites, Assyrians in Russia, Persian Assyrians, Yazidis, and the Muslim Shekak tribe.^[80] Similarly, Yousef VI Emmanuel II Thomas, then patriarch of the CCC, advocated for the creation of an Assyrian homeland when he met with the American King-Crane Commission.^[81]

Among Chaldean Catholics and Syriac Orthodox, nationalism was not significant early on, and clergymen feared that embracing it would mean certain ruin.^[81] Most Jacobite villagers, especially in Tur Abdin,^[82] were rarely exposed to Assyrian nationalist sentiments,^[83] and amplified by Sayfo, greater Assyrian nationalism was unable to reach areas outside of Urmia and Hakkari, as many leaders had immigrated or were killed.^[84][66] At the same time, issues arose with the Paris Peace Conference and attempts for autonomy; Agha Petros, an Assyrian military leader who was Chaldean Catholic, had posed an umbrella approach that was rejected by religious leaders who feared losing power over their churches and favored British protection.^[85] He had previously made repeated demands for an autonomous Assyrian state to be created.^[86] The concept of Assyrian nationalism became more politicized and existed in stark contrast to the religious authority of the churches, particularly the Church of the East.^[87]

Barsoum would later reflect on his involvement, dismayed at the lack of compassion he felt from the Allied powers.^[88] By the end of the conference, Assyrians would be guaranteed minority rights and local autonomy in an independent Kurdistan under the Treaty of Sevres,^[89] but these were subdued by the Treaty of Lausanne and never put into effect.^[90]

By the time the Ottoman Empire dissolved, and with the coming formation of several nation states tied to Arab identity, Assyrians were gradually collectivized in the minds of the majority-Muslim population as "Christians", owing to the legacy of the millet system.^[91] For Assyrians of the Church of the East, in contrast with the loyalty of the CCC, SCC and SOC,^[92] pushes for an independent nation-state or autonomy were still strong. Hopes for resettlement back to Hakkari were diminished following its inclusion to the Turkish state, and COE Patriarch Shimun XXIII Eshai expressed concerns about how the Assyrians would be treated following the end of the British Mandate.^[93][94] Faisal I attempted to dissuade Mar Shimun from pursuing the Assyrian question further, but this was to no avail.^[95] Arab nationalists and supporters of the Iraqi government quickly cast the Assyrians as agents of the British Army, whom were acting against the interests of the new state.^[96] Later conflicts in Dayrabun would cause Kurdish-Iraqi army general Bakr Sidqi to send forces upwards to the north, beginning the Simele massacre.^[95][97]

The Simele massacre is often cited as being the catalyst for the modern naming dispute, amplifying the denominational schisms that Assyrians would face.^[98] Following failed negotiations, the Iraqi government exiled Shimun to Cyprus and the COE would relocate its patriarchate to Chicago. At the same time, Chaldean patriarch Thomas as well as other clergymen in both the CCC and SOC, had sent letters under duress congratulating Iraqi authorities for suppressing the Assyrian "rebellion".^[99][100] Ignatius Aphrem I, becoming patriarch the previous year, had adopted an anti-Assyrian stance after the events of the massacre.^{[101][78][81]} For him, there was no longer any political benefit that he could gain from associating himself or the SOC with anything Assyrian,^[102] and having moved the patriarchate to Syria, alarm of a possible confrontation was uniquely present (especially as many of the survivors of Simele settled in al-Hasakah governorate^[101]).^[103] For Chaldean Catholics and the SOC, it was reason enough to be killed just by being Assyrian, so the perceived solution was to deny any affiliation with Assyrian identity and ethnicity.^{[99][104][105]}

Even before the Simele massacre, the position of the Chaldean Catholic Church was to maintain neutrality in conflict, professing loyalty to the state/rule they were under.^[106] Patriarch Thomas' position, as opposed to Mar Eshai Shimun, was to commit to the Arabic national identity of Iraq and to accept rule under the new kingdom.^[107] Partly due to his relationship with King Faisal I and his position on the Senate of Iraq, integration for Chaldean Catholics was much higher,^[107] and Chaldean life gradually transitioned from the villages to urban centers. These policies under the patriarchate meant that Chaldean Catholics were much more open and prone to Arabization policies in the new Iraqi state, and that resistance was little.^[104][108] They were also aided by fears after Simele, as Chaldeans and the church stayed mostly silent on Assyrian activism,^[109] aiming to distance itself from Assyrian nationalism.^[110]

At the expense of this upsurge in prosperity, Chaldo-Assyrians began to lose components of Assyrian identity, with increased knowledge of Arabic language over Sureth and the only distinguishing marker being their Chaldean faith.^[111] At the same time that Chaldeans received this preferential treatment, Assyrians were banned from declaring their ethnicity on Iraqi censuses in a growing policy of Arabization,^[39] and both never lost their minority status as emphasis on religion grew.^[111] Denial of Assyrian continuity was systematically publicized in Iraqi books and literature, positing them as refugees who settled in Iraq from Turkey and Iran, fueling the growing divisions.^[112] The church began to see itself more as just a religious community, referring to its members as Iraqi or Arab Christians while integration and assimilation continued.^[113] In the face of these threats, the Assyrian Democratic Movement was formed and established itself as a secular organization aiming to secure Assyrian rights in Iraq.^[114]

The Ba'athist government of Iraq and Saddam Hussein began to adopt preferential attitudes towards Chaldeans, assisting them in building new churches and schools in bigger cities.^[115] Many Chaldeans were also recruited positions within the Iraqi government (such as Tariq Aziz).^[116] Hashim Shabeb, formerly Director General of the Iraqi Mass Media under Saddam Hussein, issued an assessment stating:

"The Chaldeans will remain always faithful to the government, loyal to Ba'ath party, trustful and dependable in implementing our strategy toward our Christian minorities in Diaspora, while (the Eastern) Assyrians will remain always traitorous and unfaithful to the Iraqi government and the Ba'ath party."^[115]

Modern Chaldean identity first began to emerge in the Assyrian diaspora; as opposed to their identity as Christians within the Catholic Church, and the developments of Assyrian identity encompassing the various Syriac-rite churches, Chaldean Catholics drew upon their unique membership of the CCC, dialect of Neo-Aramaic, ties to Mesopotamia, and entrepreneurship to define themselves.^[117] Chaldean immigration to the United States heightened after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965^[118] and was rather homogenous, being mostly from a certain set of villages in northern Iraq (most prominently Tel Keppe^[119][120]) towards the cities of Detroit and San Diego.^[121]

Religion was a major basis for out-group formation for Chaldeans.^[122] Emphasis on the Chaldean Catholic Church was especially important for immigrants to differentiate themselves (namely from Arabs), ease acculturation^[123] and formulate their identity. It served as a central component that the community could universally identify with religiously, and fulfilled family-oriented and socio-religious obligations.^[124] By extension, emphasis was placed on the priests for solving the general problems of the population,^[125] to the point that no external organizations worked with Chaldean Catholics until the early 1970s^[126] (though secular organizations existed during this time, such as the "Chaldean Federation of America"^[127]).

In 1963, most members of the community predominantly identified themselves by their village ("Telkeffees") and objected to being labeled as Iraqis or Arabs, but eventually they began to shift away from a solely village identity.^[128] Around the 1970s and 1980s, many Chaldeans in Detroit regarded themselves as descendants of the Assyrians, and hadn’t identified with Iraq as most had immigrated prior to the founding of the country.^[129] However, they were wrought with disagreements over how to identify themselves, complicated by inner subdivisions and Arabization.^[130] The discussion over the potential Arab identity of Chaldeans was a controversial one, and although it was growing amongst newer immigrants, Arab nationalist viewpoints were in the minority.^[131] Assyrian identity and nationalism was present amongst Chaldeans in Detroit, though it was comparatively small and did not have as significant of an influence as Chaldean/Telkeffee identity or Arab nationalism.^[132]

In contrast with the Detroit community, who centered on their religious heritage, Assyrian-American leaders in Turlock, California had a stronger linguistic-nationalistic orientation and attempted to deemphasize denominational differences.^[133] A similar position was eventually taken by the Chaldean patriarch Raphael I Bidawid, who clarified in an interview:

“I personally think that these different names serve to add confusion. The original name of our Church was the ‘Church of the East’ ... When a portion of the Church of the East became Catholic, the name given was ‘Chaldean’ based on the Magi kings who came from the land of the Chaldean, to Bethlehem. The name ‘Chaldean’ does not represent an ethnicity... We have to separate what is ethnicity and what is religion... I myself, my sect is Chaldean, but ethnically, I am Assyrian.”^{[134][135][136]}

Sarhad Yawsip Jammo, who was bishop for the Eastern US Diocese of the CCC, is credited as being the first person to create a larger push towards a separate Chaldean identity.^[137] Jammo had initially been supportive of Assyrian identity and advocated for unity across ecclesiastical lines, emphasizing that Chaldean and Assyrian were nomenclature from different perspectives that referenced the same people.^[138][139] According to Assyrian-American lawyer Robert Dekelaita, Jammo's primary goal was to reunite the CCC with the ACOE, and from Dekelaita's understanding, he wanted to eventually become the patriarch of the unified church. But when these plans failed, he became obsessively hostile to those that he felt thwarted his plans, namely Dinkha IV and a collectivization of Assyrian nationalists. Having felt that nationalists were hostile to his goals, Jammo became obsessively anti-Assyrian.^[140]

It was with the turn of the Iraq War that activism for separate Chaldean political institutions and activism began to take shape. After the September 11 attacks, Chaldeans living in Michigan were subject to an identity crisis as they fell under increased scrutiny for their Middle Eastern background and couldn’t really define being Chaldean as a unique identity. At the same time, with heightened violence after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, they felt a greater need for lobbying efforts to be made.^[141]

Internal divisions increased after the Fall of the Saddam regime; by the time he was appointed bishop, Jammo, alongside Bishop Ibrahim Namo Ibrahim of Michigan, both began to assert a separate Chaldean identity in their respective diaspora centers.^[142] In early 2003, Jammo announced the formation of the Chaldean National Congress, and recognized the Chaldean Democratic Party (then the Chaldean Democratic Union) as the sole representative of Chaldeans in Iraq.^[31] Separatist sentiments among Chaldean Catholics began to gradually widen; later that year in May, both bishops prepared a memorandum that officially asserted a separate Chaldean identity and rejected any common political or nationalist purpose with Assyrians, while a letter sent to Paul Bremer highlighted that "Chaldeans comprise 75% of the Christian Community in Iraq and constitute a distinct ethnicity from Assyrians".^[143] By that point, Jammo had begun to use the phrase "Chaldean Renaissance" in public speeches, tying his role as a church leader to diasporic activism.^[144] The memorandum called for the declaration of Chaldeans and Assyrians as being separate groups in the Constitution of Iraq based on religious demographics, but it was not endorsed by other bishops nor the then Patriarch Bidawid.^[145]

Separation between Chaldean and Assyrian identity would continue with the leadership of Emmanuel III Delly, who stated in a 2006 interview "Any Chaldean who calls himself an Assyrian is a traitor and any Assyrian who calls himself Chaldean is a traitor.’’^[136] Delly is purported to have made this statement in Arabic to an Arab crowd.^[146]

During his years of leadership, the former patriarch of the CCC, Louis Raphaël I Sako, took differing and often opposing positions regarding Chaldean identity. In 2015, Sako suggested that Assyrians and Chaldeans would be represented as Arameans in the Kurdish constitution, suggesting emphasis on Christian universalism rather than ethnic identity.^[147] In 2017, Sako released an official statement rejecting the use of the tri-name label "Chaldean Syriac Assyrian", stating that it distorted the Chaldean identity contrary to what was established in the Iraqi constitution.^[148] In a 2018 interview with Rudaw Media Network, Sako stated that the three different names of the tri-name label represented one group.^[149]

In 2024, Sako called for unity between the CCC, the ACOE, the Ancient COE, and the Evangelical Protestant Church.^[150] He had previously outlined a plan for unity with the ACOE in a 2015 statement.^[151] In 2026, Sako released a letter that was strongly criticized by Assyrians cross-denominationally, describing it as "divisive rhetoric." Rather than dividing the community further, the letter generated near universal pushback against Sako.^[152]

Even before the Simele massacre, issues of identity and minority rights were at the helm of the Syriac Orthodox Church in response to Sayfo and the formation of the Republic of Turkey. As opposed to the Armenians and Greeks, the leadership of the SOC under Ignatius Elias III did not press for minority rights, emphasizing loyalty to the Turkish state.^[68] Several sources indicate that Patriarch Shaker encouraged adherents to obey Turkish policy, likely as a political strategy for survival.^[154] Exclusion from the Treaty of Lausanne meant that they weren’t allowed minority rights shared by Armenians, Greeks, and Jews,^[155] and ultimately, Patriarch Shaker would be expelled from Turkey.^[156] The patriarchate of the Syriac Orthodox Church would settle in Homs, Syria following Shaker's expulsion.^[68] Syriac Orthodox communities from Tur Abdin, Azakh, and Urfa settled in the Jazira Region and Aleppo after Sayfo.^[157]

Similarly to the Chaldean Catholic Church, the SOC were also more open to Arabization in the new Middle Eastern states.^[104] Simultaneously, fears of persecution and endangerment resulted in gradual distancing from Assyrian nationalist advocacy.^[110] Consequently, Barsoum would eventually be known as "'Qass al 'Urubal" (Priest of the Arabs) among Arab nationalists, and defend Arab rights for the sake of the church's safety.^[81][158] While some Arabic-speaking Syriac Christians saw themselves as Arab Christians, others across both West and East Syriac rites used Assyrian nomenclature in both diaspora and the Middle East.^[96]

After the Simele massacre, Barsoum began a campaign of removing the Assyrian label from institutions affiliated with the SOC (which were then named the "Assyrian Apostolic Church"^[4]), combined with a push for a "Syrian" designation.^{[78][159][160]} Despite much opposition, including from a set of SOC churches in Worcester, Massachusetts, he commandeered a legal battle to successfully remove the Assyrian designation from the church, with his justification published in a 1952 pamphlet that rejected the Assyrian name.^{[161][96][162]} According to Aphrem's pamphlet, the use of "Assyrian" contradicted the available history, tradition, recognition of the community and agreement by Western scholars towards the SOC.^[163][160] With increasing regularity, clergymen and intellectuals of the church who expressed Assyrian identity/nationalism were met with opposition and excommunication;^[162] this divide became increasingly apparent in journalistic publications between the diaspora and the homeland, such as that of Taw Mim Semkath.^[164] By the same token, Barsoum forbade the SOC from uniting politically with Church of the East adherents under the same threat of excommunication.^[158] Farid Nazha is an example of the growing rift between secular Assyrian nationalists and church clergy, writing in response to an SOC clergyman in 1939 who criticized his use of the Assyrian name.^[165] Many of the families of Massachusetts who were Syriac Orthodox would later convert to the Church of the East.^[166]

Gradual adoption of Syrian nationalism, namely by those from Urfa, started in the 1930s in order to integrate into the new Syrian society and state, crafting their collective memories into the development of a religious identity.^[167] This gradual adoption of Syrian nationalism began to replace Assyrian identity through developing into religious identity (Syriac) and then Aramean identity.^[168] By the 1950s, the Syrian Orthodox (Syrianism) identity was built as a concept in contrast to the Church of the East-based Assyrian identity concept.^[169] For secular SOC members, this provided a plausible way for them to express ideas while still remaining a non-threat to the Ba'athist Syrian government. For others, they felt that it was more beneficial to do so in order to silence any discussion on Christian persecution and to differentiate themselves from Kurds.^[170] Due to its lack of association to a concrete state, Aramean identity was seen as less threatening to Arab nationalists, making it a convenient alternative to "Assyrian" and "Syrian" labels.^[171]

Syriac Orthodox immigration to European countries began in the 1960s, mostly from Tur Abdin.^[172] However, following the outbreak of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, immigration was heightened as Assyrians had no protection from the violence, alongside growing Muslim-Christian tensions and persecution as a result of the Cyprus problem.^{[173][174][175]} Additional opportunities for immigration and conflicts in other countries prompted increased flights to Europe. Most left for Germany and Sweden, though smaller numbers arrived in the Netherlands^[176] and Austria, primarily as guest workers.^[177][178] After Germany adopted a more restrictive asylum and visa policy around 1980, many settled in Sweden as a "last stop."^[177]

For many immigrants, political recognition was important to help other Suryoye living in Tur Abdin to maintain their rights. However, what challenged this was the emphasis on Christianity, previously enough to distinguish themselves in the Middle East but not in Europe.^[179] Similarly to Chaldeans, Syriac Orthodox were forced to change their relationship with identity from solely religion after arriving in majority Christian countries,^[180] although the church had played an important role in fulfilling religious and social obligations.^[73] The ideology of Assyrianism was initially for many immigrants a way to build a growing and distinct identity that would differentiate them from other Middle Eastern and European Christians.^[181] For them, it was also considered a breath of fresh air for ethnic expression that was stifled by discrimination in Turkey, in which they would commonly hide their identity.^[182]

After attaining asylum in Sweden, Assyrians began using newly accessible resources to establish organizations, the first of which being the Assyrian Association in Sodertalje (Swedish: Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje) in 1971.^[183][184]

According to oral history, naming conflicts began in 1960s Germany when religious leaders in the SOC protested the use of “Assyrian” in their churches, and insisted on the use of "Aramaic" on the basis of linguistic continuity.^[185] After initial success in unifying initiatives among Syriac Orthodox youth, particularly with the establishment of the Assyrian Democratic Organization, clergymen once again adopted a confrontational attitude to the idea of Assyrianism and secular thought.^[186][187] This time period was the first time a clear Aramean identity was unquestionably promoted by social and cultural groups.^[188]

Although there was a period of hegemonic use of "Assyrian" (Swedish: Assyrier) in the 60s and 70s,^[189] by the mid-1970s a name conflict had begun between Suryoye who had immigrated to Sweden, falling between Assyrian and Aramean designations. On the one hand, several claimed an ancient Assyrian past and were more secular; by default, Swedish authorities used Assyrier due to their previous contacts with the Church of the East.^[190] On the other hand, a separate faction ('Syriac') felt that the Assyrian name held connections to paganism which they wanted no part of, and reduced the importance of the Syriac Orthodox Church in their thousands-year long history. Simultaneously, the Syriac group upheld an ancestry that was inherently religious, finding it hard to accept an Assyrian designation after suddenly arriving in the country.^[184]

In the course of the naming conflict, there were various instances of switching sides between one identity to another. The Syriac network of organizations was younger compared to the Assyrian one, was closer with the Syriac Orthodox Church, and activities were considered reactionary to Assyrian initiatives.^[191] The Assyrian Association was split in 1976 by former members to create the Syriac Association (Swedish: Syrianska föreningen i Södertälje).^[184] Various Aramean/Syriac groups were founded by former members of Assyrian groups; for example, Syrianska FC was founded by former members of Assyriska FF in 1977 due to the heightened disagreements caused by the conflict.^[188] Similarly, in Vienna, Austria, many former Assyrian activists eventually embraced Aramean identity and switched sides,^[192] and an association was formed after attempts to create a youth organization under the church umbrella failed because of refusal to use "Assyrian" in its legal registration document.^[193]

Despite a Holy Synod in 1981 proclaiming neutrality on the conflict, the majority of clergymen began vigorously promoting an Aramean identity amongst laymen.^[194] By the 1980s, Aramean identity developed into a fully-fledged rival to Assyrian identity by clergymen,^[186] and the SOC began a campaign to discredit anyone who associated themselves with Assyrian identity. In one instance, Julius Yeshu Çiçek began removing any mentions of Assyrians in his writings despite formerly being a member of an Assyrian association in Berlin.^[195] It was at this point that the lay elite identifying as Aramean gained hegemony in competition with the Assyrian lay elite, and had actively boycotted reintegration of community members identifying as Assyrians.^[196][189] The SOC board of governors in Sweden was run by traditionalist clans from Tur Abdin, and would frequently engage in conflicts with bishops who supported or were neutral towards Assyrian identity, eventually leading to a split into two parishes.^[197] The two parishes were split along secular Assyrian and Aramean ideologies, and remain in place to this day.^[196][189]

Protests and street brawls began in Sweden as a result of the heightened tensions surrounding the naming conflict,^[198] leading to the murder of a prominent Assyrian activist.^[185] Excommunications were also frequent in the conflict as the SOC adopted a stance towards Aramean identity from the reign of Barsoum as Patriarch.^[158][197] A plan to excommunicate 60 SOC members who identified as Assyrian was reverted before it could take effect.^[185] The same issues of identity were hotly debated in the Netherlands, namely in the towns of Enschede and Hengelo.^[198] Swedish authorities were ultimately surprised by the rising naming conflict in the country, prompting scientific investigations to explain the differing claims. These investigations researched dialects of Neo-Aramaic, theological differences, and the names "Syrian"/"Assyrian". Ultimately, they settled on "Syrian" or the hyphenated "Assyr/Syrian".^[199]

In April 2000, the Holy Synod changed the church's official name from "Syrian" to "Syriac" in order to avoid confusion with the Syrian nationality.^[41] Since then, scholars and church officials began increasingly using "Syriac" in place of "Syrian," though with a subtle Aramean element.^[200] The SOC-sponsored film The Hidden Pearl was also cited as a point of contention for the naming dispute, with statements that the authors spoke from an unequivocally Aramean perspective that was challenged by others in the Assyrian community.^[201] The book and movie set were heavily promoted by the SOC as the best source of history on members of the church.^[202]

Under the leadership of Ignatius Aphrem II, the SOC has taken a more neutral stance on the naming dispute, and has insisted on using the label "Suryoye" to unite the community outside of the Assyrian and Aramean designations currently used.^[203] However, Mor Aphrem II's stance on the dispute provoked discord from organizations who espoused Aramean identity, namely the World Council of Arameans, who questioned his calls for unity.^[204] In 2017, he addressed a letter to the WCA, in which he criticized the organization for attempting to examine the convictions of the church in regards to the naming dispute, and statements indicating that the church did not take a clear stance on Aramean identity.^[205]

In 2025, a small controversy began during a visit to Sweden by Ignatius Aphrem II, when he was accompanied by a parade of church adherents waving the Aramean flag. The move was criticized by Nemrod Barkarmo in the Swedish-Assyrian magazine Huyada, who remarked Aphrem's 2015 interview with Assyria TV stating the church's neutrality to the conflict.^[206] Barkarmo's criticism was itself subsequently criticized by Bahro Suryoyo of Syrianska Riksförbundet.^[207]

Among those identifying as Chaldean, a vocal minority of activists stress that modern Chaldeans are descendants of ancient Chaldea and have ancestry from southern Babylon.^[208] Activists who support this theory respond to claims that the ancient Chaldeans died out by stating that they were forced to change ethnicity or religion in light of mounting persecution, while other claims argue that the Chaldeans were the ones who assisted in the overthrow of the Assyrian empire, therefore the Aramaic speakers of the region were ethnic Chaldeans.^[209] Mary Sengstock, an anthropologist from Wayne State University, cited that Babylon and Chaldeans were in the South while modern Chaldeans were in the North (Assyria).^[210]

Arguments against Assyrian identity by some Chaldeans often portray it as heretical by the basis of religion, accusing those who identify as Assyrians of paganism and worshipping ancient Mesopotamian religion due to embracing it.^[116] Those in favor of Aramean identity emphasize that a number of church fathers explicitly claimed an Aramean identity,^[211] believing they did not claim the ancient Assyrians as part of their heritage.

A number of claims in academia, which are also stated by those in support of Chaldean or Aramean identity, posit that modern Assyrian identity was only as a result of the British re-inserting the name onto the community,^[212] and that they had not previously identified with Assyrians beforehand.^[136] Contenders for Syriac-Aramean identity argue on the basis of denying Assyrian continuity, insinuating that the identity was an invention of the British Empire^[212] and that they had begun identifying with the ancient Assyrians for political purposes.^[213] Contenders for the identity believe that after the Fall of Nineveh, the ancient Assyrians became weak, and were assimilated into other ethnic groups; thus, the Assyrian ancestry of the group is minimal.^[214]

Disputes and arguments have also arisen surrounding the use of the endomyn "Suraye/Suroye" and/or "Suryaye/Suryoye." Syriacist Assad Sauma Assad argues that although the endonym means Assyrian, it doesn't necessarily mean that the Suryoye are descended from them.^[211] Those who advocate for an Aramean identity, such as Johny Messo of the World Council of Arameans, contest that the endonym is synonymous with "Aramean" due its usage by the ancient Greeks to refer to those who spoke Syriac.^[215][211]

“Chaldo-Assyrian” was a suggested compromise for Chaldean and Assyrian designations around the drafting of the Constitution of Iraq. The term began a modern resurgence in the 1970s and in 1996, the Communist Party of Kurdistan - Iraq became the first political party to use the term.^[216] In 2003, several political parties opted to adopt the name "Chaldo-Assyrian" for the people and "Syriac" for the language;^[217] most notably, the Assyrian Democratic Movement adopted the name^[1] in October after a meeting with Bishop Ibrahim.^[216] The name was adopted by a majority of votes in October 2003,^[218] with the chief objective being to legally adopt it as the best way to avoid external influence into the naming dispute.^[219]

The name was recognized for a short period of time by the Chaldean Catholic Patriarchate of Baghdad.^[216] Initially, the designation saw some favorable acknowledgement among Iraqi Assyrians cross-denominationally, but in the diaspora, the term was not unanimously accepted.^[220] According to an opinion article by Wilfred Bet-Alkhas, who was editor of Zinda Magazine, religious feuds between the two churches and the lack of movement of the term amongst Chaldean groups in Detroit resulted in it never moving forward substantially.^[221] Hanish, on the other hand, states that when the Chaldean church saw lack of movement of the term among Assyrian groups and political use of the term by the ADM, they rejected the term and insisted on Chaldean identity.^[222] Church leaders feared that the ADM would use the name to push for an autonomous region, favoring intergroup coexistence in the post-Saddam Iraq.^[223] A similar rejection was met by Chaldean political parties, and ultimately, the name was never adopted.^[222] The Transitional Administrative Law eventually settled on "Chaldeans and Assyrians," dividing the community into two sect-based communities and playing into divide and conquer strategies between Baghdad and Erbil.^[223][224]

Tri-name designations have been suggested and implemented as compromises to the naming dispute in the past. From the late 2000s, the use of the designation became more popular, and was used in the 2000 U.S. Census as well.^[1] Hanish stated that the use of the term was the better option for the time, stating that it included all three identities without leaving out a particular group.^[225] Organizations affiliated with the Dawronoye, such as Suroyo TV and the European Syriac Union, have also utilized the tri-name designation to position itself in the middle of the dispute.^[191]

The tri-name designation has previously been rejected by Cardinal Sako of the Chaldean Catholic Church.^[148] He has also on more than one occasion called for political candidates to unite under a "Christian" list, which was unpopular among secular groups.^[226]

Previous attempts have been made to come to a compromise on the dispute by emphasizing the use of the endonym "Suraye/Suroye" and/or "Suryaye/Suryoye." During the naming conflict in Sweden, Ignatius Yaq'ub III encouraged church adherents to use the term "Suryoyo" as the name was used in traditional SOC environments, but it had not developed long-term currency in Sweden.^[185] Ignatius Aphrem II also insisted on the use of the term "Suryoye" as a unifying term.^[203] Certain studies, particularly in the Swedish context, have also relied on endonyms as neutral terms to describe the community.^[227] In addition, the term has also been used as a neutral terminology by Dutch journalists in Enschede and Hengelo.^[228]

Over time, controversies have arisen with the endonym as disputes over its meaning and what the word represents continue to arise from time to time.^{[229][158][230]} Certain issues with the endonym's legibility on a larger scale have also added to the term's controversy. Sarah Kellogg, in a 2019 article on the Dutch Assyrian/Syriac community, noted that while research participants had no issues with the endonyms, controversies still persisted (namely for a meeting in the Netherlands) as there was no clear line between religion and ethnicity with how people used the label.^[231] She further stated under local conditions in the Netherlands, the term "Suryoyo" became increasingly legible as an ethnic term, but loses its legibility as the political ladder scales higher.^[232] Atto observed during research for her dissertation that some individuals objected to the use of the term, believing it would make the naming dispute more confusing for outsiders to understand.^[233] Meanwhile, some Assyrians (namely Chaldeans^[234]) use the word to designate a Christian background rather than ethnicity.^[235][18][b]

Assyrian and Aramean identities differ by the amount of emphasis that is placed on politics or religion. Generally, those who identify as Assyrian are much more likely to be secular and political, whereas Aramean identity is emphasized by those who follow Christian traditions.^[237][238] However, religion is still observed to be playing a role in both secular Assyrian and Aramean identities, with differing views over its larger importance of maintenance.^[239] Generally, while Assyrian identity is present across all respective denominations, Aramean and Chaldean identities are limited to membership within the Syriac Orthodox^[240][241] and Chaldean Catholic^[80] churches, respectively. As of 2017, the majority of Syriac Orthodox Assyrians identified with Syriac/Aramean identity and traditions.^[186]

Donabed states that Chaldean identity is today mostly an Iraqi phenomenon and lacks saturation among the larger Chaldean Catholic community, including church members from Bohtan and Urmia.^[80] Expressions of the development of Chaldean identity have previously shown skepticism over its origins as a religious identity, which were shared by Ghassan Hanna of the CNC. Hanna stated in a personal interview that the party's failure to achieve notability reflected the sectarian nature and religious foundation of the identity, despite being formed to promote it, and to that end, it would never properly emerge as an ethnic one.^[242]

Disputes about identity predominately originated in the Western diaspora.^[189] Assyrians may identify under a certain label that is more common to a specific place in the diaspora. For instance, while members of the Chaldean church are more likely to identify as Assyrian in Chicago, they substantially identify under the Chaldean designation in Detroit and San Diego.^[243] Among proponents of Aramean identity, while some may argue for a complete separation of identities from the Assyrian one, it is not the case for the majority.^[244] Though some advocates may argue for inclusion of the Maronites as part of Aramean identity, others found efforts in a joint Aramean-Assyrian collaboration and identity.^[241][c] In some cases, Assyrians just emphasize their religion as opposed to ethnicity, linked to the impacts of the naming dispute.^[247]

A digital survey prepared by Marta Wozniak-Bobinska in 2008 was completed by 300 participants. 10% stressed the need for unity and cooperation, while 5% wished for the restriction of churches in their involvement with politics. All interviewees noticed the conflict surrounding the naming dispute.^[248] Wozniak-Bobinska later followed up on a survey studying those of the Aramean faction, which was completed by 306 participants.^[249] 2% of respondents mentioned disunity and the naming dispute as the biggest threat to Aramean identity, while 2.5% considered "the Assyrians" to be the greatest threat.^[250] In 2026, results of a community ethnic identity survey from three years prior were published by the Seyfo Center. The survey gathered 213 responses, and results were cross-tabulated based on variables such as location, identity, and church affiliation.^[251] Among participants, 47.8% believed that "Assyrian" was the most unifying identity name among six total choices, with "Suraye/Suroye" being listed by 29.6%.^[252] 85% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac, and Aramean represented the same ethnic group.^[253]

David Gaunt states that in one aspect, the naming dispute represents individual power struggles continued from the homeland, and a similar conflict likely would've existed in its place if not about identity.^[254] Part of the conflict is represented by preserving existing social structures from countries such as Turkey and Syria, and in itself represents a tension between tradition and modernity, primarily represented by church hierarchy.^[241] Heleen Murre-van den Berg identifies that other parts of the dispute have focused on tribalist clan conflicts, which play a role in choices between identities.^[255] Aryo Makko follows up on Gaunt's points, stating that for Arameanism, what originally resulted in opposition to Assyrian identity due to clerical power interests has since evolved into ongoing divisions, as well as the emergence of secular Aramean nationalism among younger advocates.^[186]

Discussions and criticisms of the dispute often focus on clergymen and the role that religious figures play in it. In the context of the dispute between Assyrian and Aramean identities, Atto and Schmoller observe that the Syriac Orthodox Church and its patriarch become the closest to an interconnecting figure between the rival factions.^[256][257] She states that Suryoye lay elite identifying as Assyrian elaborate better arguments for secular leadership than the Aramean faction, but in general, the lay elite are highly critical of the unquestioned authority given to clergymen.^[258] Sarah Kellogg noted how organizations such as the World Council of Arameans reaffirmed the stance of the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch in controlling the ethnic boundary placed on labels.^[259]

Additional criticisms are levied towards the churches and clergymen for fanning the flames of the naming dispute for personal interests. Dekelaita noted that the advocacy started by Jammo was inherited by Chaldean clergymen, including Sako, who despite saying that Chaldeans and Assyrians had no differences, began creating separate Chaldean political parties in an interest of power.^[260] Dekelaita stated that for Jammo and Ibrahim, the statement of representation was a budget issue; by stating that they had represented 80% of Iraq's Christians, dealings proceeded through the Chaldean clergy as opposed to the Assyrian Democratic Movement, the latter representing Assyrians cross-denominationally.^[63] He also implied that Ibrahim and Delly were aware of the unity between the two nomenclatures before they began making separatist remarks.^[146]

Mark Tomass, a professor originally from the Assyrian/Syriac quarter of Aleppo, argues the identity conflict is not due to arguments of ethnic origin, but is instead the product of social and economic dynamics faced as a result of mounting persecution.^[261] He cites emphasis on religious identity over ethnicity (a common occurrence in the Middle East),^[262] as well as the Simele massacre,^[263] as examples of circumstantial events that demarcated self-identification among Assyrians from the 20th century. He states that from the 1980s, the Syriac Orthodox Church began to emphasize "Syriac" identity as a response to pressure from interrogations and harassment that community members faced by secret police in Iraq and Syria;^[171] simultaneously, clergymen offered Aramean identity as a means to protect the community from harassment and massacre in the Middle East.^[264]

The naming dispute has been cited as a cause for hindered aspirations for forms of Assyrian autonomy or statehood, and is part of the failure of Assyrian nationalism to mobilize the community on a larger scale.^{[265][266][267]} The impacts of the naming dispute have reframed the aims of modern Assyrian activists to preserve identity and maintain a sense of being one people, especially as threats of assimilation continue to increase.^[268] Gregory Kruczek highlights the formation of the Nineveh Plain Protection Units as a means to supersede intragroup cleavages and the naming dispute without completely disregarding them;^[269] the ADM thus shifted its recruitment strategy to deemphasizing the issue.^[270] Meanwhile, certain plans for Assyrian autonomy were hindered by the impacts of the naming dispute, with differences in denomination^[271] and linguistics having so far hindered Assyrians at a political level while paralyzing the community with frequent arguments.^[272][273]

The naming dispute has also been noted as being exploited in order to further divide the community and attain certain political benefits.^[223][274] In Iraq, Assyrian identity began to become more associated with the Church of the East (and later the Assyrian Church of the East) in religious and ethnic terms, while "Chaldean" and "Syriac" for their respective churches, thus continuing to urge their respective spiritual leaders to be the sole representatives of their adherents while fitting within the framework of Arabization.^[275] The vagueness of terms created by the separation of churches has been noted by Harald Suermann as opening the door to political instrumentalization,^[276] and Ba'athist policies of Arabization are cited as "casual and contributory factors in the hardening of otherwise ecclesiastical designations."^[277]

In a 2018 report by the Assyrian Policy Institute, the group noted several Assyrian parties that expressed sentiments of separatism and sectarianism, while receiving little to no support from Assyrians themselves, that had formed in the previous decade.^[278] Before the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary election, candidates that were part of the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council were imposed on locals in towns that had a majority Chaldean Catholic, Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox population, encouraging them to vote for "one of their own".^[278] The report also noted that after 2003, several political parties (Chaldean Democratic Party, Syriac Assembly Movement,^[278] Chaldean League, etc.) only won elections via support through the Kurdistan Democratic Party, while church leaders such as Sako and those in the SCC supported or funneled the creation of separatist political parties to run in the 2018 elections.^[279][280] Chaldean separatism was also promoted by Rayan al-Kildani of the Babylon Movement, despite having no tangible relationship with Iraq's Assyrian community.^[281] The group wrote that the continued religious-based classification of Assyrians to define them in a political context was reminiscent of the legacy of Arabization under Ba'athist Iraq, and was deliberately imposed to dilute their ethnic identity.^[282]

The issue of the naming dispute continues to remain deeply morally charged, centering around loyalty or disloyalty to a family, village, community, or Christianity.^[192] It has contributed to a deeper level of fragmentation often on a visibly social level, expanding into choices of church attendance, media to consume, names to use in reference to language,^[283] and overall identity crises.^[191] Organizations formed in diaspora that aimed to advocate for separate identities were founded with a lack of central authority that could compel belonging across denominations, and have since continuously contested the various ideologies of the naming dispute.^{[284][184][7]} In some cases, the dispute has even divided families,^[285] with members of the same family in Sweden differing between identifying as Assyrian or Aramean.^[286]

Often in attempts to distinguish themselves from each other, Assyrian vs Chaldean vs Aramean arguments introduce distinct and unique national heroes, days, symbols, and rituals to express collective identity, as well as differing views on culture, language, and music.^[287] Conflicts between names have carried over to online spaces since the rise of the Internet, often being a solidarity of denominational members with each other (ACOE with ACOE, Chaldeans with Chaldeans). Such conflicts have since become more widespread,^[273] as differing perceptions on the concept of identity have dominated the Assyrian community's internal discourse over several decades, with online communications making the dispute more visible and volatile than before.^[9][288] The conflict has routinely distracted from participation in cultural activities and has diverted the energy of community members into bitter internal strife.^[267]

In Sweden, the debate between Assyriska FF and Syrianska FC is often reflective of the naming dispute and the collectivization of modern Assyrian/Syriac identity as played out through football.^[289] The most notorious instance of dispute was in 1989, when during a local derby, fans of Syrianska ran onto the field and began attacking Assyriska players.^[290] Divisions have also been observed as forums for the two teams had also devolved into arguments over the naming dispute rather than about the actual teams themselves, alongside other mundane divisions^[291][292] and arguments over a potential merger.^[293] An incident of heightened criticism took place in 2009 when it was alleged that clergymen in the Syriac Orthodox Church rung a church bell in celebration of Syrianska's victory in a match.^[229]

The naming dispute has been a significant cause to the development of anti-Assyrian sentiment within the Assyrian community. In recent times, clergymen in the Syriac Orthodox Church have supported an Aramean identity out of an anti-Assyrian stance.^[256][189] Said support has developed into a vocal and sectarian form of Assyrophobia.^[294][295] The same phenomenon has been observed with the Chaldean Catholic Church through support for a separate Chaldean identity.^[294][295] Anti-Assyrian tendencies among the non-COE communities to deny Assyrian identity have been documented since after the Simele massacre in 1933.^[296]

Several years after the establishment of Assyrian websites, declarations of Aramean identity appeared on the internet. The website Arameans of Aram-Nahrin described Assyrians as 'bandits', 'apostates', and 'criminals' committing spiritual genocide on the Aramean nation.^[297] Andreas Schmoller of the University of Salzburg has also previously described the website as anti-Assyrian.^[298] In 2009, heightened disputes between Assyriska FF and Syrianska FC caused several violent incidents by Syrianska supporters, including the burning of the Assyrian flag, an arsonist attack, and the beating of an Assyriska player.^[299] A press release by Assyriska regarding the incident was condemned by the WCA (then the Syriac Universal Alliance) shortly after, describing the release as a "deplorable act."^[300]

Before the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary elections, various secular Chaldean and Syriac politicians who ran on Assyrian lists reported receiving harassment from members of their churches because they identified as Assyrians.^[301] A Chaldean candidate's children were harassed and told their father was a race traitor, while hate speech also circulated online.^[301]

In 2024, Assyrian-American comedian Paul Elia spoke out about how he had received a death threat from the Chaldean owner of a home renovations company in Toronto before a scheduled performance for stating that Chaldeans are ethnically Assyrian.^[302][303] Elia, who is Chaldean himself, has previously been open about Assyrian identity and has emphasized unity and a greater understanding of his heritage amongst his community,^[304] yet he has also discussed how he began to feel more ostracized among Chaldo-Assyrians in Detroit after speaking out about the naming dispute.^[303]

The lack of representation in academic fields has often resulted in inaccurate or deliberately divisive information online (parallel to issues of repression), as long lasting effects of repression have fueled the naming dispute and its presence in diaspora and academia.^[305] In the case of the Syriac Orthodox, academic discourse has influenced the development of a cohesive identity among the community,^[306] though trends in scholarship as of 2009 were to dismiss Assyrian claims entirely, especially in Syriac studies.^[201] In a 2012 article, Donabed wrote how in various instances, writers discussing Iraqi Assyrian history compounded the issue of the naming dispute by misrepresenting and inaccurately tackling the identities and origins of Assyrians living in the country.^[307] He discussed these moves, alongside others, as part of the means of excluding Assyrians from academia and denying their continuity/identity.^[308]

Gaunt has stated that articles and publications that aim to support Assyrian or Aramean identities often become list of citations without cohesion, attracting little attention beyond those who already support either side of the naming dispute.^[309] Oftentimes, community members across the different arguments for identity feel threatened by the various references to these identities, with this becoming a source of mental strain for clergymen, intellectuals, and ordinary laymen alike.^[9]

Continuous recognition of previous Assyrian history with different nomenclature has contributed to the hindrance of larger global awareness of it and the people, namely in the case of the Assyrian genocide. The impact of the ongoing naming dispute has hampered public recognition of the genocide, with confusion over who was actually killed and maintaining the historical divisions of the Ottoman millet system by compounding the various names used.^[310] Labeling Assyrians by their religious affiliation continued in order to diminish ethnic identity, and by extension, has resulted in a lack of scholarship/recognition of the Assyrian experience compared to the Armenian genocide until very recently.^[311]

Conflicts over how to recognize Seyfo have also permeated discussions of the genocide and the building of monuments.^[254] A monument in Sweden was unveiled in 2015 that memorialized the 100th anniversary of the Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek genocides as the “Centenary of the Genocides of the Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans and Hellenes.”, while the "Oecumenical Memorial" in Berlin identified the victims as “Armenians, Hellenes of Asia Minor, Pontus and eastern Thrace, and Arameans (Syriacs, Assyrians, Chaldeans).”^[310][312] In 2023, the Enschede municipality stopped construction of a Seyfo monument after protests from the Dutch Turkish community, with the situation exacerbated by conflict over what names should appear on the monument.^[313]

• Assyria
• Arameans
• Chaldea

• Chaldean Federation of America - Chaldean History video
• Saddam Hussein Trial Footage
• The Shendaj Files - Chaldean Flag Lawsuit
• Helen Murre-van den Berg, The Syriac Orthodox community in the Netherlands