1951 Argentine coup attempt

The 1951 Argentine coup attempt, also nicknamed the chirinada by loyalist General Franklin Lucero, was a failed military uprising that took place on 28 September 1951. It was led primarily by retired General Benjamín Andrés Menéndez, with elements of the Argentine Army's cavalry arm and minor factions of the Navy and Air Force, against the constitutional government of President Juan Domingo Perón.^[1] The coup was suppressed within half a day, and has since been considered one of the most poorly planned and executed military operations in Argentine history.^[1]

The modifications introduced by the constitutional reform of 1949 marked a new phase in Perón's government, strengthening the hegemonic tendencies of both the executive and the Peronist Party, and straining relations with political opponents and the armed forces alike.^[2] The new electoral law limiting the rights of new parties and prohibiting coalitions, as well as measures to control the press (including the expropriation of the newspaper La Prensa) convinced several opposition leaders that Perón would only leave power by force, a view that resonated with several retired officers, most notably General Benjamín Menéndez.^[3]

Historian Robert Potash estimated that among the roughly four hundred officers of the Escuela Superior de Guerra, including course directors, professors and student officers, perhaps 80 percent had distanced themselves from Perón by 1951.^[1]

Historians Alain Rouquié and Robert A. Potash have described two parallel conspiracies at work to overthrow Perón, while Félix Luna argued there was in substance only one, noting that what existed was "a state of virtual uprising in certain sectors of the Army that only needed a leader to materialize."^[3] One group was led by General Eduardo Lonardi, who would go on to lead the successful coup of September 1955. The other was led by General Benjamín Menéndez.^[1]

Menéndez and Lonardi held two secret meetings in August 1951, during which their disagreements became clear. Menéndez wanted to act immediately, arguing that the economic situation had deteriorated and that significant labour conflicts had emerged; Lonardi believed the moment had not yet ripened sufficiently.^[3] Lonardi also favoured a governmental programme that would preserve the social laws of the Peronist era, while Menéndez proposed a provisional dictatorship and the abolition of the 1949 constitution. According to Potash, a view shared by Luna, what ultimately separated them was also "personal dignity, pride and ambition."^[3]

Lonardi, who had requested his retirement due to political friction with his minister and had been immediately granted it, ultimately decided not to join the coup, though he left his followers free to act, and some of them did support the uprising.^[1]

Menéndez belonged to the cavalry arm of the army, traditionally at odds with Perón.^[3] He was joined notably by Captain Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, Lieutenant Colonel Julio Rodolfo Alsogaray, Tomás Sánchez de Bustamante, Navy Captain Vicente Baroja, and Brigadier Major Guillermo Zinny of the Air Force.^[3] Businessman Raúl Lamuraglia, who had previously financed opposition campaigns, also provided resources to support the attempt.^[3]

Menéndez held a secret meeting to brief opposition political figures on the plan's steps; attendees included Arturo Frondizi of the UCR, Américo Ghioldi, Horacio Thedy representing the Democratic Progressives, and Reynaldo Pastor.^[3]

The revolutionary plan was bold: seize the tanks at Campo de Mayo, advance to the National Military College, expected to have already risen, and then join forces with units from La Tablada, which would previously have occupied the Morón airbase, where Gloster Meteor aircraft from Tandil would land in support. These aircraft, together with those at Punta Indio, would, if necessary, bomb other airports near Buenos Aires and the Casa Rosada while a ground column advanced on the capital.^[3]

One critical oversight quickly became apparent: the rebel planners had not arranged for fuel for the tanks they intended to mobilise.^[1] Additionally, Menéndez had not told many of his loyal officers the exact date of the uprising, meaning several had travelled to the interior that weekend, unaware the coup was imminent.^[1]

Menéndez chose to launch the coup on 28 September, taking advantage of two circumstances: the tank regiment stationed at Magdalena, known to be loyal to the government, was away on manoeuvres; and the Punta Indio naval air station, whose units were expected to rebel, was also on exercises and thus ready to deploy.^[3]

In the early hours of 28 September, Captain Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, commanding troops from the Escuela de Equitación (Riding School) at Campo de Mayo, seized control of gate number 8 of the base, through which Menéndez and his general staff then entered.^[1] They proceeded first to the Escuela de Caballería, which had already been taken by Captain Víctor Salas, and then to the 8th Tank Regiment (RC-8). It was there, already well into the morning, that they discovered the tanks had no fuel.

The loyalist commander of RC-8, Lieutenant Colonel Julio Cáceres, arrived and received the support of the non-commissioned officers present. During the resulting exchange of fire, Corporal Miguel Farina was killed and was the only fatality of the uprising.^[4] The rebels managed to mobilise only a handful of tanks out of the thirty available, probably due to sabotage by non-commissioned officers, and several of those broke down before reaching the gate.^[1]

The rebels ultimately lacked the support of units they had counted on, as these decided to back the government instead. After approximately half a day, the uprising collapsed. The loyalist forces were headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Ángel Ovidio Solari.^[1]

That evening, Eva Perón, then gravely ill, spoke by radio to the Argentine people from her sickbed, condemning the coup attempt in an impassioned address.^[5]

Menéndez and several collaborators were tried immediately after their detention and received prison sentences:^[1]

In total, 111 officers of the three armed services received prison sentences, and 66 others who could not be detained for trial were dismissed. Others received administrative sanctions, bringing the total number of officers whose military careers were ended to approximately 200.^[1] Those imprisoned were transferred to common civilian prisons rather than military detention facilities.^[1]

The day after the coup, the Ministers of Aeronautics, César Ojeda, and of the Navy, Enrique B. García, both resigned and were immediately replaced.^[3] Three army major generals, nine brigadier generals and eight admirals were placed on retirement.^[1]

Some Peronist politicians and media outlets called for harsher sentences, including the death penalty; Perón did not comply, a decision that later commentators argued was a strategic miscalculation.^[1]

Félix Luna summarised the political consequences thus: "Menéndez had allowed Perón to do what he would not have dared do himself... the president could count on an army, a navy and an air force that had rid themselves of all elements capable of obstructing the political plans in which they were engaged."^[3] The failure of the chirinada was seen as dispersing the illusions of many opposition politicians who had hoped for a rapid reversal of Perón's rule.^[1]

The coup attempt took place just weeks before the presidential elections of November 1951, in which Perón was re-elected. Several officers who had participated in the failed 1951 uprising, including Eduardo Lonardi himself, despite having declined to join, went on to play roles in the successful coup of September 1955 that ultimately overthrew Perón.^[3]

• Juan Domingo Perón
• Benjamín Menéndez
• Eduardo Lonardi
• Revolución Libertadora
• Eva Perón
• Argentine Constitution of 1949

• Félix Luna, Perón y su tiempo. II. La comunidad organizada. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1985.
• Robert A. Potash, El Ejército y la política en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1982.